Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 17 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 39074,39074 |
| Citation | 245 So.2d 68 |
| Parties | Bill BROWN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Ervin, Jr., of Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and J. Christian Meffert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment adjudging Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and a sentence of death.
Defendant, Bill Brown, Jr., and Nathaniel Grimes, were indicted for murder in the first degree. The indictment charged that, from a premeditated design to effect the death of Walter A. Minski the codefendant killed him by shooting him with a pistol. Before his death, Mr. Minski said he was shot by two colored men in stocking masks during an attempt to rob him at a motel in Tallahassee.
A severance was granted and Defendant Bill Brown, Jr. was found guilty of murder in the first degree without a recommendation of mercy. The cause is now before us on appeal from the judgment and sentence.
Prior to trial, the Defendant by motion invoked the provisions of F.Cr.P.R. Rule 1.210(a), 33 F.S.A. for the purpose of determining Defendant's mental condition at the time of trial.
In support of this motion, Defendant submitted a psychiatric report from the Georgia Industrial Institute indicating as to Defendant a state of chronic undifferentiated type schizophrenia, mental deficiency and borderline psychosis as of June 29, 1966. At the time of the report supportive psychotherapy was recommended.
Experts were appointed by the Court to examine Defendant. One expert, a psychologist, stated that he didn't feel he could give a valid estimate of Defendant's competency, but that objective test results indicated an I-Q level of 35 which is in the severely retarded range. A psychiatrist appointed by the Court concluded that, although Defendant was mentally deficient, there was no evidence of frank psychiatric illness; that Defendant appeared to know the difference between right and wrong; that he appeared capable of assisting in his own defense; and that, in the opinion of the psychiatrist, Defendant was competent to stand trial.
Defendant then requested further examination by experts. The Court, in entering an order finding the Defendant sane and capable of standing trial, recited that the reports of the experts previously appointed to examine the Defendant had been examined, and that the attorney for Defendant had announced that he had no testimony to offer and did not wish to cross-examine the experts who rendered the written reports. The Court in its order also found that no useful purpose could be served by any further examination.
In view of the report from the Georgia Industrial Institute and in view of the finding of the Court in the original order appointing experts that there was reasonable ground to believe the Defendant might be insane, Defendant now contends that the Court erred in not granting a further examination regarding Defendant's competency to stand trial.
At common law, if at any time while criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of crime, whether before or during or after the trial, the trial court either from observation or upon the suggestion of counsel has facts brought to its attention which raise a doubt of the sanity of the Defendant, the question should be settled before further steps are taken. See State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 211 (1933). Where no doubt is created in the mind of the Court as to the present sanity of the Defendant, it is under no obligation to have the question determined. Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345, 347 (1929).
The method of settling this question is prescribed by F.Cr.P.R. Rule 1.210(a), which authorizes the appointment of 'not exceeding three disinterested qualified experts' to examine the Defendant if the Court 'has reasonable ground to believe' that the Defendant is insane. The fact that the Court may have reasonable ground to believe that the Defendant is insane and appoints experts to examine Defendant places no burden on the State of proving the sanity of the Defendant. See Child v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 526 (Fla.1963). The report on the Defendant's sanity by a psychiatrist or other expert is merely advisory to the Court, which itself retains the responsibility of the decision. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 940(5), p. 746. As stated in Brock v. State, 69 So.2d 344 (Fla.1954):
(Pp. 345, 346.)
The purpose of the provisions of Rule 1.210(a), Supra, was to aid and assist the Court, so as to enable the Court wisely to determine whether the Defendant is in such a mental state that further proceedings in any pending criminal case must be proceeded with or stayed during a period of necessary treatment. The Defendant has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in making the determination as to Defendant's mental capacity.
Defendant says that the trial court committed error by denying his request for an examination regarding his sanity at the time of the alleged offense. F.Cr.P.R. Rule 1.210(b), which reads the same as Fla.Stat. § 909.17, F.S.A., requires the Defendant to give notice of his intention to rely upon the defense of insanity either at arraignment or prior thereto. He is also required to file a statement of particulars showing as nearly as he can the nature of insanity he expects to prove and the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he expects to prove such insanity. Rule 1.210(c) prescribes the procedure for the appointment of expert witnesses in the event the existence of insanity on the part of the Defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged becomes an issue in the cause. The record does not show that the notice of intention to rely upon the defense of insanity was given at arraignment or prior thereto, but Rule 1.210(b) provides that the Court may nevertheless, in its discretion, permit the introduction of evidence of such defense upon good cause shown for the omission of the notice.
Defendant's motion for mental examination to detemrine his sanity at the time of trial (under Rule 1.210(a)), states 'that the sanity of the defendant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense has become an issue in this cause.' Also, in his renewal of the motion for examination of Defendant there was a request that experts be appointed to examine him in regard to his sanity at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. The Defendant in the subsequent motion sought additional time 'to give notice of whether insanity will be relied on as one of the defenses of the defendant.' Defendant relies heavily upon the 1966 report of the Georgia Industrial Institute concerning the mental deficiency of the Defendant. Testimony bearing upon whether or not Defendant was mentally deficient would be irrelevant to the issue of legal insanity under the standard set forth by the McNaghten Rule, to which this State is committed. See Evans v. State, 140 So.2d 348 (Fla.App.2d 1962); Dampier v. State, 180 So.2d 183 (Fla.App.1st, 1965).
The enactment of Fla.Stat. § 909.17, F.S.A., and the adoption of Rule 1.210(b) were for the benefit of the State in order to obtain pretrial discovery by the prosecution and were not primarily for the benefit of the Defendant. Lee v. State, 214 So.2d 46 (Fla.App.4th, 1968). The Defendant does not say that the trial court excluded any testimony on the question of sanity, but merely complains because additional experts were not appointed to examine the Defendant. The failure to appoint an expert would not preclude the Defendant from the use of expert or nonexpert witnesses. This Court has held that nonexpert witnesses can detail facts known to them which show insanity and thereupon express an opinion as to the sanity of the person whose mental condition is being investigated. Of course, the value of such testimony would depend largely upon the opportunities of the witnesses to observe the appearances and conduct of the person whose mind is claimed to be unsound. See Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618, 17 L.R.A. 484 (1892); Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926).
There was no error in the denial of Defendant's request for a further mental examination.
The Defendant also contends that the denial of a further mental examination deprived him of due...
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