Brown v. State
Decision Date | 15 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 49S00-9901-CR-19.,49S00-9901-CR-19. |
Citation | 738 N.E.2d 271 |
Parties | Toney L. BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Catherine M. Morrison, Wolf & Morrison, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael McLaughlin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Defendant Toney L. Brown was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and carrying a handgun without a license for shooting two men in a fight. We find that the State had sufficient evidence to overcome his claim of self-defense and that the trial court did not err in rejecting his proposed jury instruction on self-defense because the court's own instructions were adequate.
We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).
The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on October 20, 1997, a group of people gathered on a near eastside Indianapolis street. The gathering included Defendant and the victims, Jason McEwan and Ron Cooper. Two of the younger people in the group began arguing and spitting at each other drawing Cooper and Defendant into the confrontation. Defendant pulled out a revolver and shot Cooper in the chest, seriously wounding him. Defendant then backed up as he was firing, fatally hitting McEwan three times. At one point, as Defendant was backing up down the street, he stopped, reloaded, and continued firing.
The State charged Defendant with Murder,1 Attempted Murder, a Class A felony,2 and with Carrying a Handgun Without a License, a Class A misdemeanor.3 A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 60 years for the murder, 30 years for the attempted murder, and 365 days for the handgun violation. The court ran the sentences concurrently.
Defendant contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Self-defense is recognized as a valid justification for an otherwise criminal act." Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind.1999). "A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect himself ... from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." Ind.Code § 35-41-3-2(a) (1993). Self defense is established if a defendant (1) was in a place where the defendant had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. See Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000)
; Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.1995).
Defendant correctly points out that the State carries the burden of disproving self-defense. See, e.g., Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 926 (Ind.1999)
. Therefore, once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 700. The State may meet its burden of proof by "rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing that the defendant did not act in self defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief." Id. ( ); See also Davis v. State, 456 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ind.1983).
"The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim." Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840; Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind.1999). In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court neither reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of the witnesses. See Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ind.1999)
. We look to the evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Sanders, 704 N.E.2d at 123. We will affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind.1999).
Defendant's self-defense claim here is supported by his own testimony that Cooper pulled out a gun and "fired two shots," that McEwan pulled out a knife, and that Defendant was "Scared for his life." (R. at 710-14.) He testified that he shot Cooper in self defense and began running while shooting backwards, unintentionally hitting McEwan. The State's evidence, however, adequately refuted Defendant's self-defense claim: Cooper and Deon Perkins testified that Cooper was unarmed; there were no guns recovered at the scene; and besides Defendant's testimony, there was no other evidence that Cooper was armed. Additionally, Defendant shot McEwan three times, and "we have previously held that the firing of multiple shots undercuts a claim of self-defense." Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 700. See also Hill v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1153, 1153 (Ind.1989)
(. )
It is not disputed that Defendant shot McEwan and Cooper, and the evidence most favorable to the verdict suggests that Defendant did not have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Consequently, we find that there was sufficient probative evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant did not shoot in self-defense.
Defendant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing his tendered self-defense instruction.
The defense tendered the following instruction:
(R. at 78-79.) The court refused the instruction, stating that it was "too complicated and confusing." (R. at 751.)
When evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing a tendered instruction, we consider whether: (1) the tendered instruction correctly stated the law; (2) there was evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions given by the court. See Cline v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind.2000)
; Stahl v. State, 616 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind.1993).
Here, we find that Defendant's tendered instruction fails the third prong of the test—its substance was covered by other instructions given by the court. The trial court gave the jury a self-defense...
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