Brown v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 06 December 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24753
• Citation: 208 Cal.Rptr. 724,37 Cal.3d 477,691 P.2d 272
• Parties: , 691 P.2d 272, 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1064, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,097 Andrew BROWN et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Alameda County, Respondent; C.C. MYERS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 724

208 Cal.Rptr. 724

37 Cal.3d 477, 691 P.2d 272, 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1064,

36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,097

Andrew BROWN et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Alameda County, Respondent C.C. MYERS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

S.F. 24753.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 6, 1984.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Marian M. Johnston and Manuel M. Medeiros, Deputy Attys. Gen., as amici curiae for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Mark A. Meier, Michael B. O'Harra, Nageley, Tennant & Parshall & Nageley, O'Harra & Tweedy, Sacramento, for real parties in interest.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Do the special venue provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code, § 12965, subd. (b)) control over the general venue provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a) where both FEHA and non-FEHA causes of action are alleged?

I.

Petitioners, Andrew Brown, Charles Jones and Sam George, were employed by real parties in interest, C.C. Myers, Inc., other corporate entities and several individuals (hereafter defendants), on a highway construction project in Alameda County. Defendants allegedly discriminated against and ultimately discharged Brown and Jones because they are black. George, who is white and was a foreman on the project, was discharged because he refused to participate in defendants' alleged discriminatory practices.

On June 22, 1981, petitioners filed a complaint against defendants in the Alameda County Superior Court, alleging (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) wrongful discharge, and (3) a violation of petitioners' federal civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1981). Each of the three claims was based on the same factual allegations regarding liability and damages. Petitioners also filed complaints alleging employment discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department).

Sometime after petitioners filed their complaint in the superior court, the Department notified them of their right to bring a civil action under the FEHA. (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq. ¹ )

In June 1982, petitioners amended their complaint to add an FEHA cause of action and to delete the federal civil rights claim. The FEHA cause of action incorporated the same factual allegations regarding liability and damages as the emotional distress and wrongful discharge claims. ²

Prior to filing an answer, defendants moved for a change of venue to Sacramento County on the grounds that three individual defendants resided there, the corporate defendants' principal places of business were located there, and none of the defendants resided in Alameda County. Respondent court granted the motion and ordered the case transferred to Sacramento County. No reasons were stated in support of this ruling.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate its order changing venue to Sacramento County. (Code Civ.Proc., § 400.)

II.

Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made. (Haurat v. Superior Court (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 330, 337, 50 Cal.Rptr. 520; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Actions, § 425, p. 1257.) In this case, the complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) wrongful discharge, and (3) FEHA violations.

It is undisputed that if petitioners had alleged only FEHA violations, the FEHA venue statute would govern. In that instance, venue would be in Alameda County--the county in which the discriminatory practices were allegedly committed. ( § 12965, subd. (b). ³) However, here, two non-FEHA causes of action were also alleged. These claims would normally be governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), ⁴ which controls venue in "transitory" actions. ⁵

This court must determine whether the special provisions of the FEHA or the general provisions of section 395 control if both FEHA and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts are alleged in the same complaint. ⁶

It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. (Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763-764, 167 P.2d 481; Mosby v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224, 117 Cal.Rptr. 588; Holstein v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710, 80 Cal.Rptr. 301.) Section 395 codifies this rule and provides that the trial of the action shall be in the county of the defendant's residence, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law."

Three cases have construed the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" language of section 395. In Delgado v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 560, 141 Cal.Rptr. 528, the plaintiff filed an action in Sacramento County for property damage, personal injuries and wrongful death. The named defendants were Yolo County, a Sacramento automobile dealership and an automobile manufacturer. Yolo County moved to change venue to that county under Code of Civil Procedure section 394. That section provides that an action against a county for an injury occurring there shall be tried in that county. The superior court granted the motion. (Delgado, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 562, 141 Cal.Rptr. 528.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's ruling on the ground that Code of Civil Procedure section 394 governed venue. The court reasoned that the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" is a "true subordinating declaration" which permits application of section 395 only when no other venue provision applies. (Delgado, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 564, 141 Cal.Rptr. 528.)

Delgado was followed in Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 702. There, a San Francisco resident filed an action for damages in San Francisco County against a local Contra Costa County agency and a San Francisco corporation. The local agency sought a change of venue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 394, subdivision (1). ⁷ The trial court denied the motion. (Central Contra Costa v. Superior Court, 84 Cal.App.3d 702 at p. 704, 148 Cal.Rptr. 801.)

The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to set aside its order denying the motion. (Central Contra Costa, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 706, 148 Cal.Rptr. 801.) Relying on Delgado, the court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 394 prevailed over the "subordinate residence venue provisions" of section 395. (Central Contra Costa, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 705, 148 Cal.Rptr. 801.)

Finally, in Tharp v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 496, 186 Cal.Rptr. 335, 651 P.2d 1141, an automobile dealership brought an action against the secretary of the New Motor Vehicles Board to dismiss certain licensing proceedings. The trial court granted the secretary's motion for change of venue to Sacramento County from Tulare County where the cause of action had arisen. (Id., at pp. 498, 502, 186 Cal.Rptr. 335, 651 P.2d 1141.)

In directing the trial court to vacate its order, this court held that venue was controlled by Code of Civil Procedure section 393. Under that statute, trial had to be held in the county where the cause of action arose against the public officers for acts undertaken in their official capacity. The court concluded that that statute constituted an exception to section 395. (Tharp, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 502-503, 186 Cal.Rptr. 335, 651 P.2d 1141; see also Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 535, 91 Cal.Rptr. 57, 476 P.2d 457.)

In each of these cases, the more specific venue provisions governed. None of these cases involved several causes of action subject to conflicting venue provisions. In each case, the prevailing venue provisions were found to be bona fide exceptions to section 395.

Here, neither party disputes that the FEHA venue statute establishes an exception to section 395. The question is whether that exception governs all the causes of action and prevails over section 395, just as the specific venue provisions did in Delgado, Central Contra Costa, and Tharp. Thus, the issue is whether the FEHA venue statute applies to non-FEHA claims which arise from the same facts as an FEHA claim alleged in the same complaint.

In construing the FEHA venue statute, this court is guided by well-settled rules. "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] Moreover, 'every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' [Citation.]" (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) A construction rendering statutory language surplusage " 'is to be avoided.' " (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580.)

To determine the Legislature's intent, the court looks first to the words of the statute. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) However, the legislative purpose will not be "sacrificed to a literal construction of any part of the act." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 645, 335 P.2d 672.) The language of a statute " ' "should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." ' [Citations.]" (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.)

With these principles in mind, this court turns to the language of the FEHA venue statute. Section 12965, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part that "the person claiming to...