Bruns v. Halford
| Decision Date | 23 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C 94-0258.,C 94-0258. |
| Citation | 913 F. Supp. 1295 |
| Parties | Keith W. BRUNS, Plaintiff, v. Sally HALFORD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Keith W. Bruns, pro se.
R. Andrew Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Iowa Attorney General's Office, Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.
This matter comes before the court pursuant to defendants' August 24, 1995, motion for summary judgment, resisted September 5, 1995. The plaintiff, a prisoner in the Iowa Department of Corrections system, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The prisoner claims that his due process rights were violated by his placement and continuation in administrative segregation for ninety days for refusing to give any information about an assault on another inmate which he witnessed. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's due process claim is precluded by the recent Supreme Court decision in Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), or, in the alternative, that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff Keith W. Bruns, formerly an inmate at the Iowa Mens Reformatory (IMR) in Anamosa, Iowa, and now an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) in Fort Madison, Iowa, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 8, 1994. Mr. Bruns's application was approved on December 15, 1994, and his complaint was filed on that date. The complaint in this matter asserts that Mr. Bruns's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was placed in administrative segregation at the IMR on December 15, 1993, and kept in that status for approximately ninety days, for refusing to give any information about an assault on another inmate which he admits that he witnessed. Defendants waived service and answered the complaint on January 26, 1995.
Pursuant to a scheduling order filed January 27, 1995, the dispositive motion deadline in this matter was originally set for May 30, 1995, and plaintiff eventually filed a pre-trial statement on June 29, 1995. However, on July 26, 1995, defendants filed a status report suggesting that no evidentiary hearing would be required if they were allowed an extension of the dispositive motion deadline to assert a motion for summary judgment in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, which had been handed down on June 19, 1995. Defendants therefore moved for an extension of the dispositive motion deadline on July 26, 1995, and that motion was granted. The new dispositive motion deadline was set for August 23, 1995. Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the Sandin decision was docketed on August 24, 1995, and plaintiff resisted that motion on September 5, 1995.
In their summary judgment motion, defendants contend that Mr. Bruns's claim of violation of his due process rights as the result of his placement and continuation in administrative segregation is entirely precluded by the decision in Sandin. Defendants characterize Sandin as holding that placement of an inmate in punitive or administrative segregation does not present an "atypical significant deprivation" of a liberty interest, and hence provides an insufficient basis for a prisoner's claim of violation of due process. Defendants also contend that defendants' actions towards Mr. Bruns violated no clearly established constitutional rights, and therefore defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Mr. Bruns contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether his transfer to administrative segregation was an "atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Specifically, he contends that as a "lifer," he could not safely bear the stigma of being a "snitch," and that defendants improperly compelled him to choose between risking his life by cooperating in the investigation of the inmate assault and submitting to administrative segregation for refusing to cooperate in that investigation. He also contends that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, because they were "acting outside their normal discretionary functions allowed by law," and knew that their conduct violated his constitutional rights.
The court has considered the standards for summary judgment in some detail in a number of recent rulings. See, e.g., Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 908 F.Supp. 672 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 910 F.Supp. 1399, 1407 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Kracht v. Aalfs Assocs. H.C.P., 905 F.Supp. 604, 608-610 (N.D.Iowa 1995). Suffice it to say here that in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b), the defendants bear "the initial responsibility under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). When the defendants have borne this burden here, in order to defeat the motion, Mr. Bruns "must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, Mr. Bruns must point to specific portions of the record and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995). An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record. Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir.1995); Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394.
If Mr. Bruns fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then the defendants are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990). However, if the court can conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for Mr. Bruns, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the factual background to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The record reveals that the following facts are not in dispute. On December 11, 1993, an inmate at the IMR named Hernandez was assaulted by another inmate named Sanchez. Although plaintiff Bruns, also an inmate at the IMR, admitted that he was present during or immediately after the assault, he refused to provide IMR officials investigating the incident with any information. Mr. Bruns indicated to officers investigating the assault that he was a "lifer," and therefore it would be unsafe for him to provide any information, because doing so might brand him as a "snitch," thus placing his life in serious danger in the general population at the IMR. In notes following an interview with Mr. Bruns on December 14, 1993, defendant Schafer indicated that he and defendants Sissel and Thalacker doubted that they should "allow a lifer with a bad attitude to interfere with an investigation or withhold information during an investigation and to do so blatantly." Defendant Schafer's notes also indicate that he told Mr. Bruns "an uncooperative lifer" might be transferred to some other population where his attitude could be tolerated.
On December 15, 1993, during another interview with defendant Schafer, Mr. Bruns indicated that his position on giving information had not changed. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bruns was served with an "Immediate Administrative Segregation Notice," advising him that he was being placed in administrative segregation. The notice indicated that the grounds for this action were that Mr. Bruns might be a danger to...
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Hancock v. Thalacker
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