Buchholz v. Cummins

• Decision Date: 23 September 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33429,33429
• Citation: 6 Ill.2d 382,128 N.E.2d 900
• Parties: Florence E. BUCHHOLZ et al., Appellants, v. Roy F. CUMMINS, Director of Labor, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 900

128 N.E.2d 900

6 Ill.2d 382

Florence E. BUCHHOLZ et al., Appellants, v. Roy F. CUMMINS, Director of Labor, et al., Appellees.

No. 33429.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1955.

O'Connor & Ghiglieri, and Heyl, Royster & Voelker, Peoria (Gerald M. O'Connor and William J. Voelker, Jr., Peoria, of counsel), for appellants.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Roy F. Cummins, Director of Labor.

Robert S. Calkins, Peoria, for Peoria Restaurant Association and defendant employers.

DAVIS, Justice.

This is an appeal under the Administrative Review Act, Ill.Rev.St.1953, ch. 110, § 264 et seq., to review an order of the circuit court of Peoria County affirming the decision of the Director of Labor, finding the plaintiffs ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act. The sole question we are called upon to decide is whether or not the facts in the record sustain the finding of the Director that plaintiffs' unemployment was caused by a labor dispute at the establishment where they were last employed within the meaning of the act.

The plaintiffs, some 225 persons, are members of a labor organization, the Cooks, Waiters, and Waitresses Union, Local 327, (herein called the Union,) and worked as cooks, waiters, porters and dishwashers for certain members of defendant, The Peoria Restaurant Association, (herein called the Association,) which was composed of restaurant and cafeteria operators in and near Peoria. For several years prior to January 31, 1950, the Union and the Association had negotiated labor contracts on behalf of their respective members and the Union was recognized as the sole bargaining agent for all claimants and the Association as the sole bargaining agent for its members. One such collective bargaining agreement was due to expire on January 31, 1950, and the Union and the Association were again negotiating a new contract. There was apparently no automatic extension provision in the old agreement, and the negotiations were futile prior to the expiration of the old contract. On February 1, 1950, the restaurant operators issued bulletins to their employees giving notice that the Association and the Union had been unable to agree; that no contract was in existence; that wages were to be reduced to 1948 levels; and that as of February 1, the employees were free to join or refrain from joining any labor organization. The Union held a meeting February 5, and reported that nine employer members of the Association had cut wages. Union demands were summarized at this meeting.

On February 10, the workers at the Palace Cafeteria, a member of the Association, withdrew their services and established a picket line. There is little evidence to show the exact cause of the strike and picketing at the Palace, or the issues in dispute between the management of the Palace and its employees, but apparently it was caused by the discharge of two employees. The evidence does show that the members of the Association had entered into an agreement to close all restaurants if a strike was called against any member of the Association and that the Union knew of this agreement. On February 10, at midnight, all of the restaurants closed stating that the action was pursuant to the Association's agreement. While the restaurants remained closed, contract negotiations continued between the Association and the Union until March 13, 1950, when a new collective bargaining agreement was reached. On the following day the restaurants opened and the employees returned to work.

Thereafter the plaintiffs claimed unemployment compensation under the Unemployment Compensation Act then in force. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chapter 48, pars. 217 et seq.) The employers contended that the plaintiffs were ineligible for compensation by virtue of section 7(d) of the act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 48, par. 223) which provides that a claimant shall be ineligible for benefits, 'For any week with respect to which it is found that his * * * unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the * * * establishment, * * * at which he is or was last employed'. The deputy Director of Labor found the claimants ineligible under section 7(d), which determination was affirmed by the Director and later by the circuit court on appeal under the Administrative Review Act. This case properly comes here on appeal from the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence sufficient to show that their unemployment was caused by a labor dispute at the establishments at which they were employed; that the fact that a labor dispute and a work stoppage were coincidental in time does not prove causation; that the work stoppage was caused by the dispute at the Palace, coupled with the agreement between the members of the Association, both of which were unrelated to the dispute between the Union and the Association.

Defendants, however, point out that the events taken in their logical sequence support the finding that the work stoppage was caused by the dispute between these plaintiffs and their employers; that the agreement between the members of the Association to lock out in concert, and the ultimate lockout, would not have occurred 'but for' the dispute between the Union and the Association. They also point out that the lockout ceased immediately upon the agreement between the Association and the Union.

At the outset we must consider the legislative policy contained in the Unemployment Compensation Act. It is not novel. Every State in the union has similar legislation. About 43 States follow, in general fashion, the original English statute, similar to our own, and embody in it some form of provision for ineligibility when work stoppage is caused by labor disputes. See Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136. About eight States, however, make some exception, either by amendment or in the original legislation, to the labor dispute provision in cases of lockout, treating it as a distinct type of labor dispute. A few states, such as California, incorporate a test of voluntariness, disqualifying only those who 'leave their work' because of a labor dispute. See Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc., v. California Employment Comm., 24 Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d 224; Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929; Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W.2d 223; Almada v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 137 Conn. 380, 77 A.2d 765.

The general purpose of the Illinois Act, as expressed in section 1, is to relieve involuntary unemployment. However, section 7(d) specifically disqualifies any individual for benefits for any week in which it is found that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the establishment at which he is or was last employed. By this provision the Illinois legislature adopted the policy that the State shall not, by payment of unemployment compensation, assist one party to a labor dispute, regardless of fault and that the State in cases of industrial strife ought not take sides and place blame. This provision was designed to maintain the neutrality of the State in labor disputes. This labor dispute clause is a departure from the general idea of relief from involuntary unemployment. The question of voluntariness in such a case is not the test. Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559, 112 N.E.2d 101. If a labor dispute results in the closing of a plant or factory, the statute does not place the blame, but considers the resulting unemployment as caused by a labor dispute. American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E.2d 465; Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E.2d 294.

The term 'labor dispute,' within the meaning of section 7(d), has been defined as any controversy concerning wages, hours, working conditions or terms of employment. Local Union No. 222 v. Gordon, 406 Ill. 145, 92 N.E.2d 739; Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E.2d 294; Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E.2d 637.

Section 7(c)(2) of the Unemployment Compensation Act in effect in 1950, declares ineligible for benefits any person who refuses to accept suitable work when offered him. However, this is modified by the following provisions: 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this Act to any...