Dinkins v. Mass. Parole Bd.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-12882
• Citation: 160 N.E.3d 613,486 Mass. 605
• Parties: William DINKINS, Jr., & another v. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

486 Mass. 605

160 N.E.3d 613

William DINKINS, Jr., & another¹

v.MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD.

SJC-12882

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued September 10, 2020

Decided January 19, 2021

Ryan M. Schiff, Boston, for the plaintiffs.

Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Jeffrey G. Harris, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another.

James R. Pingeon for Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts.

Patricia Garin, Boston, for Northeastern University School of Law Prisoners' Assistance Project & others.

Present: Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.²

CYPHER, J.

The issues presented on appeal are whether 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 200.08(3)(c) (2017) (regulation), which concerns parole eligibility for inmates sentenced to a prison term that runs consecutive to a life sentence, conflicts with the statutory framework governing parole, violates due process or separation of powers principles, or, as applied to prisoners serving life sentences for offenses committed as a juvenile, violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by failing to ensure that the inmate has a parole hearing at which he or she has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. We conclude that the regulation is contrary to the plain terms of the statutory framework governing parole and thus is invalid. Accordingly, we decline to reach the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs.³

Background. 1. William Dinkins, Jr. Dinkins was convicted on two counts of murder in the first degree stemming from two separate and distinct incidents that occurred when he was seventeen years old. See Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. 715, 802 N.E.2d 76 (2004) ; Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 415 Mass. 715, 615 N.E.2d 570 (1993). In the first case tried, the trial judge imposed a sentence of life without parole on the murder charge and concurrent sentences on charges of assault with intent to murder while armed, for a term of from nine to twelve years, and unlawfully carrying a firearm, for a term of from three to five years. In the other case, the trial judge imposed a sentence of life without parole, ordering it to run consecutively to the other life sentence. In 2000, Dinkins was convicted of assault and battery on a correction officer and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of from seven to ten years to be served consecutively to the prior sentences. In 2019, as a result of this court's decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013), both of Dinkins's sentences of life without parole became sentences of life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years.

2. Eugene Ivey. Ivey was convicted of murder in the second degree for an incident that occurred when he was seventeen years old. See Commonwealth v. Ivey, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 1116, 863 N.E.2d 988 (2007). The judge imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years. In 2002, Ivey was convicted of three counts of assault and battery on a correction officer and one count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to terms of from four to five years on each count, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the life sentence. In 2009, Ivey was denied parole at his initial parole hearing. He waived his 2014 parole hearing; in March 2020, he was granted parole from his life sentence to begin serving his sentences for the counts of assault and battery on a correction officer.

3. Procedural history. In May 2018, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the county court, seeking declaratory relief invalidating the regulation. In October 2018, a single justice transferred the case to the Superior Court, as "the matter would benefit from consideration by a judge of the Superior Court in the first instance." The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint. In July 2019, a judge of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the parole board (board), finding the regulation to be valid. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was entered in the Appeals Court in September 2019. The plaintiffs then filed an application for direct appellate review, which we allowed.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We are asked to determine the validity of the regulation. Where a regulation is duly promulgated, it is "presumptively valid." Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 23, 138 N.E.3d 996 (2020), quoting Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520, 117 N.E.3d 676 (2019). However, an agency "does not have the authority to promulgate a regulation for the ... administration of a statute that ‘is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its underlying purpose.’ " Buckman, supra, quoting Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 301, 994 N.E.2d 355 (2013).

In determining the validity of a regulation, we first look to the language of the controlling statute, see Buckman, supra at 24, 138 N.E.3d 996, to determine "whether the Legislature has spoken with certainty on the topic in question." New England Power Generators Ass'n v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 480 Mass. 398, 404, 105 N.E.3d 1156 (2018), quoting Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 632-633, 830 N.E.2d 207 (2005). Where a statute speaks clearly on the issue, "we determine whether the regulation is consistent with or contrary to the statute's plain language," Buckman, supra, in an effort to "give effect to the Legislature's intent" (citation omitted), New England Power Generators Ass'n, supra. Where a regulation does not speak clearly on the issue, "we accord substantial deference to the agency charged with interpreting and administering the statute in question, and do not invalidate regulations unless their provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate" (quotations and citation omitted). Craft Beer Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. at 520, 117 N.E.3d 676. However, "[a]n incorrect interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency is not entitled to deference." Kszepka's Case, 408 Mass. 843, 847, 563 N.E.2d 1357 (1990).

Additionally, the regulation here must be interpreted within the context of the larger statutory framework governing parole. "[W]here two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose." Young v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 486 Mass. 1, 11, 154 N.E.3d 884 (2020), quoting Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 339, 28 N.E.3d 1139 (2015).

2. Statutory framework governing parole. The board is tasked with the duty to "determine which prisoners in the correctional institutions of the commonwealth or in jails or houses of correction may be released on parole, and when and under what conditions, and the power within such jurisdiction to grant a parole permit to any prisoner." G. L. c. 27, § 5. The Legislature has not defined parole by statute. However, this court previously has stated, "Parole provides prisoners with the opportunity to serve the balance of their term of imprisonment outside a prison provided that they comply with the conditions established by the parole board ..." (emphasis added). Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 298, 10 N.E.3d 1081 (2014). This court also approvingly has referred to parole as "conditional release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence has been served ... on the condition that the parolee regularly report to a supervising officer for a specified period." See id., quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (9th ed. 2009). This definition is in line with the statutory framework established by the Legislature, as laid out in G. L. c. 127, § 130, which governs the granting of parole permits:

"Permits shall be granted only if the board is of the opinion, after consideration of a risk and needs assessment, that there is a reasonable probability that, if the prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and community supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.... A prisoner to whom a parole permit is granted shall be allowed to go upon parole outside prison walls and inclosure upon such terms and conditions as the parole board shall prescribe ...."

See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 300.04(1) (2017). Pursuant to its statutory authority, then, the board "has the power only to permit a defendant to serve the balance of his term of imprisonment outside the prison walls ... and the power to revoke the parole permit and return the [parolee] to prison or jail for the balance of his term of imprisonment." Cole, supra at 299, 10 N.E.3d 1081.

Once an inmate has served the minimum term of his or her sentence, the inmate may be eligible for parole. See G. L. c. 127, § 133. When an inmate receives two or more sentences that run consecutively, the inmate becomes eligible for parole at the time of his or her parole eligibility date. General Laws c. 127, § 133, requires the board to establish a single parole eligibility date and provides, in part:

"Where an inmate is serving two or more consecutive or concurrent state prison sentences, a single parole eligibility shall be established for all such sentences. Prisoners who are granted parole permits shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the board until the expiration of the maximum term of sentence or, if a prisoner has two or more sentences to be served otherwise than concurrently, until the aggregate maximum term of such sentence, unless earlier terminated by the board under the

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