Burton v. Union Pacific Coal Company

• Citation: 107 P. 391,18 Wyo. 362
• Decision Date: 05 March 1910
• Docket Number: 617
• Parties: BURTON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX, v. UNION PACIFIC COAL COMPANY
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

107 P. 391

18 Wyo. 362

BURTON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX, v. UNION PACIFIC COAL COMPANY

No. 617

Supreme Court of Wyoming

March 5, 1910

Rehearing Denied January 6, 1911, Reported at: 18 Wyo. 362 at 395.

ON RESERVED QUESTIONS from the District Court, Laramie County HON. RODERICK N. MATSON, Judge.

The material facts are stated in the opinion.

H. V S. Groesbeck and N. R. Greenfield, for plaintiff.

The territorial law of 1886, relating to the operation of coal mines, and which gave a right of action for the non-observance of the prescribed regulations in language almost identical with Section 2582, Revised Statutes, 1899 repealed pro tanto, Sections 3448 and 3449 of said Revised Statutes, so far as the provisions of the later act were repugnant to those of the earlier statute. We therefore contend that there was no statute in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution limiting the amount of damages which might be recovered for death occurring in coal mines. It is clear that the first state legislature re-enacted the law of 1886, which embraced Section 2582, now to be considered, as a compliance with a direct constitutional mandate, and to save any question as to the constitutionality of the statute. The provisions found in Sections 3448 and 3449 and those found in Section 2582 are in many respects dissimilar. They are certainly repugnant to each other, and under familiar rules of construction the later expression of the legislative will must govern. With full knowledge of the constitutional provisions contained in Sections 2 and 4 of Article 9, and Section 4 of Article 10, the latter prohibiting the enactment of any law limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person, the Legislature enacted the statute embracing the provisions of Section 2582. It was incumbent upon the legislature to enact this law as well as to obey the further constitutional provision prohibiting it from enacting a law limiting the amount of recovery. The judiciary ought to accord to the Legislature as much purity of purpose as it claims for itself, as honest a desire to obey the Constitution, and also a high capacity to judge of its meaning. (In re Board &c., 4 Wyo. 133.)

Section 2582 provides: "for" damages occasioned by violation of the chapter enacted, and (2) recognizes and permits the right of such action independently of such chapter. In neither case is the amount of damages restricted to any given sum and the same could not have been so limited. Under the petition in this case a violation of the coal mining law is claimed, and recovery is also claimed under the permission therein given to maintain an action for negligence not arising under its provisions. A right of action is recognized, permitted and conferred by said section, so far as injuries in coal mines are concerned, and the Legislature acted under the constitutional restriction and removed the limit to the recovery of damages in coal mining cases, and negligence arising in the management and operation of coal mines, repealing the former statutory limitation as to recovery pro tanto.

Counsel for defendant in their brief indulge in some refineness of language, particularly as to the meaning of the preposition "for"; and it is stated that counsel for plaintiff seem to claim that the word "for" is intended to express the amount of the recovery, that is to say, that they seem to substitute the words "in amount of" "in the value of" for the word "for". In the most general sense "for" indicates "in consideration of," "in view of," or, "with reference to," which, anything is done. (Webster's Int. Dict.) It is here used in the sense of "on account of" or "by reason of" or "with respect to." (13 Ency. L. 731-734.) Thus, "on account of any injury to person or property occasioned by any violation," &c. (Strong v. Ins. Co., 31 N.Y. 103; State v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 647; Creckbaum v. Sohner, 1 O. Dec. 257; 3 Words & Phrases, 2860.) As there could not have been any limit of recovery under the Constitution, it must be presumed that no such limit was enacted by the Legislature, as no limit was expressed.

Counsel for defendant in their brief invoke the case of Mestas v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 12 Wyo. 414, as decisive of the question here to be determined. But in the decision of that case no mention was made of Section 2582 or the act in which it was embraced, and the court's attention was not called to it in any way. The coal mining statute was ignored by all of the counsel in that case, and this might be accounted for as not involved in the case. It is certain that the case did not fall within the coal mining law, and therefore the decision thereof could not apply to the case at bar. We do not contend that Section 3449 was repealed by what is now Section 2582, except as to cases arising for damages for injuries to persons in coal mines, like the case at bar. Statutes containing provisions similar to those found in our coal mining statute have been enacted in several states. While the legislation in the different states may differ somewhat, it is apparent that the general object and purpose of such statutes are the same, for they are based upon the fundamental and beneficent principle that the state should, as far as possible, under its police powers, regulate the methods and appliances used in dangerous callings, so as to minimize as far as possible injuries to those who are compelled to risk their lives and persons in the more dangerous callings. The same language is found in the statutes of other states with reference to the right of action for injuries as that employed in Section 2582 (Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 181 Ill. 495, 55 N.E. 131; Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413; Coal Co. v. Rowatt, 186 Ill. 156; Coal Co. v. Royce, 184 Ill. 402; Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607; Bodell v. Coal Co., 25 Ind.App. 654; Durant v. Mining Co., 97 Mo. 62; Coal Co. v. Muir, 20 Colo. 320, 38 P. 378; Coal Co. v. Britton, 3 Kan.App. 292, 45 P. 100.)

"It is the general rule of statutory construction that where a special statute is later than a general statute relating to the same subject, the enactment operates necessarily to restrict the effect of the general act from which it differs." (Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 183; Commissioners of Albany Co. v. Chaplin, 5 Wyo. 74; Sutherland Stat. Const. 158.) This is the general rule and one which is applicable to the case at bar. A new act extending and enlarging preexisting rights impliedly repeals the law by which the right was created or given. (Garrison v. Richards, (Tex.) 107 S.W. 861.) Though repeals by implication are not favored by he courts, where a new statute is intended to furnish the exclusive rule on a certain subject, or where the whole subject of the old law is covered, it is the duty of the court to construe the new law as impliedly repealing the old. (Findling v. Foster, (Ind.) 84 N.E. 529.) A prior statute is repealed by implication by a subsequent statute which prescribes the only rule governing in a certain class of cases. (Clark v. Baxter, 98 Minn. 256, 108 N.W. 838; R. R. Co. v. Ry. Co., (Tenn.) 95 S.W. 1019.) The repeal of statutes is wholly a matter of legislative intent. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1891, which contain the present Section 2582, were repealed by a general repealing clause. While such a clause adds nothing to the legal effect of the act (Struthers v. People, 116 Ill.App. 481), in legal effect it expresses the legislative intention of repealing all prior acts and parts of acts conflicting with the provisions found in the new act. No Legislature can bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws, except where future legislation is restrained by the federal or state Constitution. A statute may have the effect of repealing a prior Statute or some of its provisions though it be silent on the subject of repeal. An implied repeal results from some enactment, the terms and necessary operation of which cannot be harmonized with the terms and necessary effect of an earlier act. Tested by the familiar rules of construction we submit that the provisions of Section 2582 were enacted with a manifest legislative intent to enact a new law upon the subject of damages for injuries sustained in coal mines, and that such legislation should modify the former statutory provision limiting the amount of recovery; and this is particularly true because it would have been unconstitutional to fix a limitation upon the amount of such recovery. (Note in 88 Am. St. Rep. 275, 276; Maule Coal Co. v. Partenheimer, 155 Ind. 100, 55 N.E. 751; Collins Coal Co. v. Hadley, 38 Ind.App. 637, 75 N.E. 832; Coal Co. v. Taylor, 81 Ill. 592.)

Herbert V. Lacey and John W. Lacey, for the defendant.

The accident described in the petition occurred before the Legislature re-enacted Section 3449 of the Revised Statutes of 1899 so as to omit the provision limiting the amount of recovery to $ 5,000, and therefore the limit is applicable here if the limitation clause was not otherwise and prior to the accident repealed. There seems to be no claim that there had been any direct repeal of the limitation clause, but counsel for the plaintiff rely upon what they consider an implied repeal arising out of Section 2582, which is a portion of an act relating to coal mines. It seems to be claimed by counsel that Section 2582 not only provides for a recovery because of injuries therein mentioned, but also measures the damage, or rather measures the amount of recovery in such form and with such force and to such purposes as to impliedly repeal the limitation upon the amount of recovery in Section 3449. All of the questions here involved were clearly and necessarily involved in the case of Mestas v....