California School Employees Assn. v. Azusa Unified School Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 February 1984 |
| Citation | 152 Cal.App.3d 580,199 Cal.Rptr. 635 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 16 Ed. Law Rep. 210 CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, etc., Petitioners and Respondents, v. The AZUSA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Respondents and Appellants. Civ. 67917. |
Wagner, Sisneros & Wagner, and Patrick D. Sisneros, Burbank, for respondents and appellants.
Peter A. Janiak, Madalyn J. Frazzini, E. Luis Saenz, San Jose, Marcia Meyers, Oakland, and William C. Heath, Los Angeles, for petitioners and respondents.
This is an appeal by Azusa Unified School District, et al. (hereinafter appellants) from a judgment and order entered June 16, 1982, granting a peremptory writ of mandate. Respondent herein and petitioner below is the California School Employees Association (CSEA). CSEA is a labor organization representing classified employees of the Azusa Unified School District, including cafeteria workers, bus drivers and instructional aides.
On behalf of the cafeteria workers, bus drivers and instructional aides, CSEA petitioned the trial court for a peremptory writ of mandate seeking to compel appellants, pursuant to Education Code section 45203, 1 to pay these classified employees wages plus interest and other benefits for six days when these employees were prevented from working. 2
The six days the classified employees were prevented from working fell within the regular school attendance calendars and were designated as either "local holidays for students" or "professional/conference days." The practical effect for these days was the same regardless of the designation. On these days students were not in attendance, teachers (certificated employees) were present and were paid. Some classified employees were present on these days and received pay while other classified employees (bus drivers, cafeteria workers and instructional aides) did not work and were not paid.
The grounds urged in support of the petition for peremptory writ of mandate to compel payment of wages to the classified employees who were not scheduled to work on the six days described above, was section 45203.
Appellants answered the petition and asserted five affirmative defenses. First, appellants alleged that CSEA had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Second, it was alleged that failure to pay wages to classified employees who did not work on the days students were not in attendance constituted an arguably unfair practice and that the Public Employee Relations Board, therefore, had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Third, it was alleged that the suit was barred because CSEA did not first satisfy the claim filing requirements of Government Code section 800 et seq. Fourth, appellants alleged that the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 911.2 of the Government Code barred claims for wages for more than a year prior to the filing date of the petition. Finally, appellants alleged that the action was barred because CSEA failed to follow the grievance procedures provided by the collective bargaining agreement between CSEA and appellants.
Based on oral and documentary evidence, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law which are summarized as follows:
The Board of Education of the Azusa Unified School District approved the school attendance calendars for school years 1979-1980, 1980-1981 and 1981-1982. Each of the approved school attendance calendars provided for two days designated as either local holidays for students or professional/conference days, which designations "represent the same type of day on the school calendar." On these designated days "students were not in attendance at school; teachers were at school, worked, and received their regular rate of pay." Also on these days "some classified employees were required to work and received their regular rate of pay; other classified employees, including cafeteria workers, bus drivers, and instructional aides, were not allowed to work ... and received no wages for said days."
The court found that under section 45203 the above designated days "were school days on which students would otherwise have been in attendance, but were not." The trial court thus concluded that, under section 45203, all classified employees were entitled to be paid whether or not the employees worked on the above designated days.
It was further found that CSEA exhausted all available administrative remedies and that the grievance procedure contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties was not a remedy applicable to the instant dispute. The court also concluded that CSEA was not obliged to file a claim pursuant to Government Code section 900 et seq. The court then found that appellants' "refusal to pay all classified employees their regular rate of pay" for the above designated days "whether or not said classified employees were required to report for duty, is a violation of Education Code § 45203."
The following issues are raised on the instant appeal:
1. Whether the claim for wages made under section 45203 is excepted from the filing requirements of Government Code section 900 et seq.;
2. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy where the dispute concerns the proper construction of section 45203 which gives rise to an official duty to pay a salary claim 3. Whether administrative remedies are available to CSEA which were not exhausted, thus precluding the issuance of the writ as premature; and
4. Whether when the school attendance calendars were established by appellants and certain days during the school year were designated as days when students would not be required to attend school, the effect of such scheduling took the designated days outside the ambit of section 45203.
For reasons discussed below, we find that while in this case the claim for wages under section 45203 is excepted from the filing requirements of Government Code section 900 et seq. (see Gov.Code, § 905, subd. (c)), appellants adopted a board policy requiring that a claim for wages be filed according to the procedures established by the provisions of Government Code section 900 et seq. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that a claim was not required to be filed as a prerequisite to instituting the proceedings here under review. However, we conclude that the claim filing requirements adopted by appellants were satisfied under the doctrine of substantial compliance and that CSEA was not, therefore, precluded from petitioning for writ of mandate to compel the payment of wages.
Also, the finding of the trial court that all available administrative remedies were exhausted by CSEA prior to commencing the proceedings below was proper. Finally, we conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of section 45203 entitles classified employees to their regular pay whether or not they are required to report for duty, on days pupils would otherwise have been in attendance but are not and for which certificated personnel receive regular pay.
Our discussion begins with Government Code section 905. That section provides, in part, that:
The exception to the claim filing requirements of Government Code section 900 et seq. quoted above relates only to claims which are not based on contractual or tortious theories of recovery. (See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078-1079, 195 Cal.Rptr. 576; Hanson v. Garden Grove Unified School Dist. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 942, 946-948, 181 Cal.Rptr. 378.) Since the claim for wages in this matter arises from a dispute over the proper construction of section 45203 and, thus, is not founded upon either a contract or a tort theory of recovery, the claim for wages falls within the exception of Government Code section 905, subdivision (c).
However, Government Code section 935 provides, in part:
Pursuant to Government Code section 935, appellants adopted board policy 2602 in 1968, which provides: "As a prerequisite to bringing suit against the school district, any claim against the school district for money or damages as set forth below, or for money or damages which are not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto, shall be presented and acted upon in accordance with Title 1, Division 3.6, Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of the Government Code of California: [p] Claims for fees, salaries, wages, mileage or other expenses and allowances [p] Any claim against the school district for money or damages which are [sic] not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto, shall be acted upon in accordance with Title 1, Division 3.6 of the Government Code of...
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