Cameron v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 04-19-00245-CR,04-19-00245-CR
• Parties: Vanessa CAMERON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Vanessa CAMERON, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 04-19-00245-CR

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

June 30, 2021

OPINION

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2010CR4286C
Honorable Velia J. Meza, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice

AFFIRMED

Vanessa Cameron appeals her conviction for murder. She presents three points of error on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment and objection to the jury charge because the doctrine of in pari materia required she be tried for criminal solicitation rather than for murder as a party, (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her video-recorded statements, and (3) the trial court erred by denying her ex parte motion to approve expenses for an expert witness. We affirm the judgment.

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BACKGROUND

Vanessa Cameron was indicted on April 21, 2010, for the murder of Samuel Johnson. Cameron pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to her first trial. The jury found Cameron guilty, and she was sentenced to seventy years' imprisonment. In the first appeal, this court concluded Cameron's constitutional right to a public trial was violated during the jury selection phase, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Cameron v. State, 415 S.W.3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013), vacated & remanded, 490 S.W.3d 57, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (op. on reh'g). On discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed, but issued a new opinion on rehearing that vacated this court's judgment and remanded the case to this court with instructions to apply the sequential two-step test set forth in Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) to determine if Cameron's right to a public trial was violated. Cameron v. State, 490 S.W.3d 57, 65, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 95 (Mem) (2016). Applying Lilly, this court again concluded Cameron's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Cameron v. State, 535 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref'd).

Cameron pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial for the second time. The State presented evidence that Cameron concocted a plot to murder her former partner and son's father, Johnson, and collect life insurance proceeds. This plot involved three individuals: Cameron's sister, B.J. Brown, and one other individual. The jury found Cameron guilty and sentenced her to life in prison.

Cameron timely filed a notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION

A. In Pari Materia

In her first and second points of error, Cameron argues she was denied due process of law when the trial court erroneously denied her motion to quash the indictment because the doctrine of in pari materia entitled her to be tried under the criminal solicitation statute. She further contends the trial court erroneously denied her objection to the jury charge based on the doctrine of in pari materia and thereby improperly charged the jury on murder and the law of parties instead of criminal solicitation. This resulted in her receiving a higher sentence than that allowed under the criminal solicitation statute.

Cameron's challenge to the indictment presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Desir v. State, 543 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The doctrine of in pari materia is a rule of statutory construction codified in Texas law as a part of the Code Construction Act. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.026; Jones v. State, 396 S.W.3d 558, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Statutes are in pari materia when they address "the same general subject, have the same general purpose, or relate to the same person or thing or class of persons or things," with the purpose of a statute being the most significant factor. Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op. on reh'g); see Burke v. State, 28 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Two penal provisions are in pari materia if "one provision has broadly defined an offense, and a second has more narrowly hewn another offense, complete within itself, to proscribe conduct that would otherwise meet every element of, and hence be punishable under, the broader provision." Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough to conclude the two offenses are in pari

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materia based on "[t]he adventitious occurrence of like or similar phrases, or even of similar subject matter" if the offenses were enacted for wholly different ends. Alejos, 555 S.W.2d at 450.

If we conclude two statutes are in pari materia, we must construe them together and, if possible, harmonize any conflicts between them so that all provisions of each statute are given effect. Jones, 396 S.W.3d at 561-62. However, if the statutes irreconcilably conflict, due process and due course of law require the State to prosecute under the more specific enactment unless the legislature clearly intended to make the general act controlling. See id. at 562; see also Mills, 722 S.W.2d at 413-14.

Cameron was charged in an indictment with the offense of murder under sections 19.02(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. She moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of in pari materia, arguing the State would rely on party liability to establish the offense of murder when Cameron instead should have been charged with solicitation to commit murder pursuant to the criminal solicitation statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.03(a). Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

Under sections 19.02(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense of murder if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death. Under section 15.03(a), a person commits the offense of criminal solicitation if, with intent that a capital felony or first-degree felony be committed, the person "requests, commands, or attempts to induce another to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding his conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute the felony or make the other a party to its commission."

In construing the offenses, the plain language and placement in the Penal Code indicate that sections 19.02(b)(1)-(2) and 15.03 are not in pari materia because they do not have the same

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subject or purpose. The subject and purpose of section 19.02 is to define the elements of and penalize the commission of murder, and it is located in Title 5 of the Penal Code, which addresses crimes against persons. By contrast, the subject of section 15.03 is criminal solicitation, and its location in Title 4—Inchoate Offenses—and Chapter 15—Preparatory Offenses—demonstrates the statute is not strictly concerned with crimes against persons, but with punishing people who induce or attempt to induce another to commit a first-degree felony, which may or may not involve injury or death to another person. TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.03(a). Section 15.03 confirms this by stating it is no defense to the prosecution under the criminal solicitation statute that the underlying crime was not actually committed. Id. § 15.03(c). Moreover, sections 19.02(b)(1)-(2) and 15.03 are not more narrowly hewn versions of the other because each statute contains elements the other does not. Jones v. State, 396 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Murder requires the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)-(2). Criminal solicitation requires a second person be involved in the commission of the offense. Id.§ 15.03(a). The criminal solicitation statute does not proscribe conduct that otherwise meets every element of the murder statute; thus, it is not a more specific version of the murder statute. See Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Cameron argues this court should compare criminal solicitation with party liability codified at Texas Penal Code §§ 7.01 and 7.02, not murder. Generally, a comparison of penal statutes to decide whether the doctrine of in pari materia applies involves a comparison of offenses. See Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("In construing penal provisions this Court has on a number of occasions found two statutes to be in pari materia, where one provision has broadly defined an offense, and a second has more narrowly hewn another offense, complete within itself, to proscribe conduct that would otherwise meet every element of, and hence be

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punishable under, the broader provision." (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Jones, 396 S.W.3d at 561; Azeez, 248 S.W.3d at 192.

Section 7.02 may contain the "adventitious occurrence" of certain terms and subject matter that may be considered similar to § 15.03(a). See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a) ("person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if: (1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense; (2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or (3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense"); Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op...