Campbell v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 16 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. A045186,A045186
• Citation: 261 Cal.Rptr. 509,213 Cal.App.3d 147
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Harry T. CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent, CALA FOODS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 509

261 Cal.Rptr. 509

213 Cal.App.3d 147

Harry T. CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent CALA FOODS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. A045186.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Aug. 16, 1989.

Alan G. Rodier, San Francisco, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Lawrence E. Kern, Law Offices of Lawrence E. Kern, Inc., San Francisco, for Empire Security Patrol Service, Inc.

Lawrence A. Bennett, Michael J. Smith, Bennett & Rowland, San Francisco, for Cala Foods, Inc.

LOW, Presiding Justice.

In this case, we hold that a superior court may transfer a case to the municipal court when it appears that the case will not result in a verdict within the superior court's jurisdiction. (Code Civ.Proc., § 396.) We further hold that the standard of review is that for abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Harry T. Campbell filed a tort action in superior court against real parties in interest Cala Foods and Empire Security Patrol Service, Inc. After arbitration and several settlement conferences, the superior court transferred the cause to municipal court based on its finding that petitioner could not possibly obtain a verdict in excess of $25,000, the superior court's jurisdictional minimum. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 10; see Code Civ.Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(1).) Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to set aside the transfer order. Because the scope of permissible transfer from superior to municipal court is a significant issue for the bench and bar, we issued an order to show cause (in lieu of an alternative writ) and heard oral argument. We uphold the transfer and deny the petition.

Petitioner's unverified complaint, attached as an exhibit to the petition, alleges that he was shopping at a Cala Foods store when he was detained by two Cala employees and an Empire Security guard and accused of shoplifting. Petitioner was not physically assaulted, but was allegedly detained by threats of assault and arrest. The complaint alleges the shoplifting accusation was wholly false, that petitioner had done nothing to arouse reasonable suspicion or probable cause he had committed theft, and that petitioner was cleared when police arrived, searched him and found no stolen items.

Petitioner further alleges that he returned to the Cala Foods a few days later, where the same Empire Security guard "assaulted" him "by shouting obscenities and threatening physical violence." In the petition's statement of facts, petitioner claims, without record citation, that the guard told him, " 'We don't like thieves or homosexuals around here.' " Petitioner asserts that this statement caused him to become angry and distressed, and he points to this statement as a primary component of the conduct for which he seeks redress from real parties. The statement, however, is not alleged in the complaint and is not included in the record before us.

Petitioner seeks damages on theories of assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligent entrustment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The bases for liability against Cala Foods and Empire Security are apparently threefold: confirmation or ratification of the intentional torts of their employees, respondeat superior for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the negligent entrustment of guard responsibilities to the Empire Security guard in question. The complaint prays for general and special damages according to proof and punitive damages of $1 million. In a statement of damages submitted shortly after the complaint was filed, petitioner specified general damages of $500,000 for "humiliation, mental anguish, [and] emotional and physical distress."

It is undisputed that petitioner does not claim any special damages for medical or psychological treatment, economic loss, or loss of wages. There is no indication petitioner seeks compensation for anticipated future medical treatment or future economic loss. We are told by real party Empire Security, without contradiction from petitioner, that petitioner testified at his deposition that he experienced severe humiliation, distress and anguish for one week after the incidents, and continues to be outraged that the incidents occurred. Petitioner does not allege he was physically assaulted, handcuffed, or arrested. It is apparent petitioner sought neither medical nor psychological treatment as a result of the altercations.

The petition emphatically pronounces that prior to the day the superior court found the case was worth less than $25,000 and ordered transfer, "the amount in controversy was not challenged by any counsel or Judge." As real parties aptly observe, this opens the door in this original proceeding to otherwise improper recitation of settlement negotiations, proffered by declarations of counsel. Eighteen months after the complaint was filed, petitioner made a $60,000 prearbitration settlement demand, which he then reduced to $35,000. Real parties made a counteroffer of $3,500, which petitioner rejected. Four months later an arbitrator awarded petitioner $1,400 against Empire Security and nothing against Cala Foods. Petitioner rejected the award and requested trial de novo.

Judge Stuart R. Pollak conducted a settlement conference at which Empire Security and Cala Foods offered $5,000 and $500, respectively. Petitioner adhered to his demand of $35,000 and refused the offers. Two months later, while the case was awaiting a courtroom for trial, a second settlement conference was held by Judge Robert L. Dossee. Empire Security increased its offer to $10,000, and petitioner reduced his demand to the jurisdictional floor of $25,000. Once again, the case failed to settle. Counsel for Cala Foods declares that in both settlement conferences the trial courts spent substantial time persuading petitioner to settle for the amount offered. At oral argument, both below and in this court, petitioner contests this point and denies that either settlement judge valued his case at less than $25,000.

The matter was again set for trial, and the parties appeared before Judge Ollie Marie-Victoire as acting presiding judge. After a discussion in chambers, the court indicated on the record a thorough knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case, as evidenced by references to the $10,000 settlement offer, the $1,400 arbitration award, and the nature of petitioner's damage claims. The court also stated, "I have previously been involved in this, trying to settle the case." The court then concluded, "I find there is no possible way an award over twenty-five thousand dollar[s] could be had" by petitioner, and accordingly transferred the cause to municipal court. This petition ensued.

Code of Civil Procedure section 396 (hereafter section 396) provides that "[i]f an action or proceeding is commenced in a court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, as determined by the complaint [or] petition," the action shall be transferred to the court having jurisdiction. The statute further provides that "[i]f an action or proceeding is commenced in or transferred to a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof as determined by the complaint or petition, and it thereafter appears from the verified pleadings, or at the trial, or hearing, that the determination of the action or proceeding ... will necessarily involve the determination of questions not within the jurisdiction of the court," the court must transfer the proceedings to a court with jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner initially contends that the sole determinant of the jurisdictional value of a case is the amount prayed for in the complaint, and the $1 million prayer for punitive damages prevents transfer to municipal court. Petitioner correctly notes the general rule that the amount of the prayer controls jurisdiction, unless the prayer is fraudulent or fictitious on its face. (2 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 19, p. 385; Depretto v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 36, 39, 171 Cal.Rptr. 810; Davis v. Superior Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600, 102 Cal.Rptr. 238.) " 'Ordinarily the relief claimed when the action is instituted determines the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter for the entire proceeding. [Citations.] To ascertain the nature of and amount in controversy for determining the jurisdiction of the subject matter the complaint as a whole may be examined. [Citations.]' " (Davis v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 599, 102 Cal.Rptr. 238, quoting Sellery v. Ward (1942) 21 Cal.2d 300, 304-305, 131 P.2d 550.)

This oft-cited general rule, however, must be read in tandem with the specific language of section 396, which provides for transfer to a court of competent jurisdiction when, subsequent to the filing of the complaint, it "appears" from the pleading or at a "trial" or "hearing" that the host court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Witkin notes that transfer can occur in two instances: the first where the lack of jurisdiction is evident upon filing of the complaint due to the amount of damages claimed, and the second "where the proceeding is originally commenced in ... a court with jurisdiction under the allegations of the complaint or petition, and the lack of jurisdiction over the complaint ... appears thereafter, either (1) from the verified pleadings, or (2) at the trial or other hearing." (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 326, pp. 743-744.) The statutory language obviously provides for some form of a comparative evaluation of the actual facts of the case and the allegations of the complaint and the damages claimed in the prayer. (Cf. Stratton v. Superior Court (1935) 2 Cal.2d 693, 698, 43 P.2d 539 ["even though lack of jurisdiction of [a] cause may not appear from the pleading itself, evidence may be offered at the trial [or other hearing] which discloses the lack of jurisdiction...