Davis v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 17 May 1972 |
Citation | 102 Cal.Rptr. 238,25 Cal.App.3d 596 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Boyd B. DAVIS and Marie Davis, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California In and For the COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; Frances I. CARR, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 30983. |
Van H. Pinney, Redland, Elder & Pinney, San Francisco, for petitioners.
Frank D. Fitzgerald, San Francisco, for real party in interest.
Petitioners seek a writ of mandate commanding respondent court to set for trial an action in which they seek to recover damages for personal injuries. It appearing from the petition that the superior court had erroneously ordered the action transferred to the municipal court, an alternative writ of mandate was issued. 1 No return was made to the alternative writ by either respondent court or the real party in interest, who is the defendant in the pending action. It appearing that the action is one within the jurisdiction of the superior court a peremptory writ of mandate must issue ordering the respondent court to proceed to set the case for trial upon petitioners' at issue memorandum in accordance with applicable rules of court.
On October 2, 1970 petitioners filed their complaint seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by them on or about April 25, 1970 as a proximate result of the negligence of real party in interest. Petitioner Boyd B. Davis alleged that he sustained injury to his neck, back and spine and suffered pain, shock and suffering. He seeks damages for hospitalization, x-rays, medical and nursing care and attention; and the loss of earnings in amounts to be ascertained; and he claims $25,000 general damages. Petitioner Marie Davis alleged that she sustained injury to her cervical spine, trochanter, head and body and suffered pain, shock and suffering for which she seeks the same amount of damages as Boyd B. Davis.
Real party in interest filed his answer October 31, 1970; petitioners filed their memorandum that civil case was at issue (see Cal.Rules of Court, rule 206) on November 3, 1970; and on October 19, 1971 respondent court made the order re settlement conference and trial setting conference (id., rules 207.5 and 220) setting the same for December 21, 1971. Thereafter, the conference was continued to January 28, 1972.
The uncontradicted declaration of the attorney for petitioners reflects that petitioner Marie Davis suffered the loss of two permanent teeth and required considerable additional dental work; that she also suffered acute cervical sprain, trochanteric bursitis and cerebral concussion; and that she necessarily incurred bills for medical attention and hospitalization of $1,368 and a wage loss of $108.75, and suffers residual pain and limitation of motion. He further relates that at the conference the judge announced that in his opinion the case of Marie Davis would not justify a verdict of $5,000. Accordingly the court on that day ordered the case transferred to the municipal court of the Berkeley-Albany Judicial District.
'Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts.' (Const., art. VI, § 10; cf. former § 5.) 'The Legislature shall provide for the organization and prescribe the jurisdiction of municipal and justice courts.' (Const., art. VI, § 5; cf. former § 11.) 'Each municipal court shall have original jurisdiction of . . . all cases at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, . . . amounts to five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less, . . .' (Code Civ.Proc., § 89, subd. 1(a) par. 1.)
At the time of the court's order, section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided in pertinent part: 'If an action . . . is commenced in a court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, as determined by the complaint or petition, if there is a court of this State which has such jurisdiction, the action or proceeding shall not be dismissed . . . but shall, . . . on the court's own motion, be transferred to a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . .' 2
In Rodley v. Curry, Supra, the court stated, (120 Cal. at p. 543, 52 P. at p. 1000.)
It is generally recognized that the assertion in bad faith of an unfounded claim will not vest jurisdiction in the superior court. In Becker v. Superior Court, Supra, the court observed
Here the complaint does not appear fraudulent on its face. To permit the setting judge to determine Sua sponte that an alleged claim is unfounded or fraudulent is to deny the plaintiff his right to a jury trial. In Schwartz v. Cal. Claim Service, Supra, (52 Cal.App.2d at p. 57, 125 P.2d at p. 889), the court approved the following passage from Barry v. Edmunds (1886)116 U.S. 550, 6 S.Ct. 501, 29 L.Ed. 729; 'In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and measure of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional tribunal to award.' (116 U.S. at 565, 6 S.Ct. at p. 509.)
In Barry v. Edmunds, the court concluded: 'The section of the act of March 3, 1875, under which the circuit court acted in dismissing the present action confers a beneficial authority to be wisely exercised in defeating collusive and fraudulent experiments upon its jurisdiction; but the discretion it confers is judicial, proceeding upon ascertained facts according to rules of law, and subject to review for apparent errors.' (Id., p. 566, 62 S.Ct. p. 510.)
So here, although section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the superior court power to transfer the cause to an inferior court in a proper case, it cannot arbitrarily disregard the prayer of the complaint. Even if the plaintiff overstates his case in good faith, he may be penalized by loss of costs. (See Code Civ.Proc., § 1032, subd. (d).)
The showing made at the pretrial hearing did not show that an award of damages of more than $5000 would be excessive as a matter of law. The failure to allow any recovery in excess of special damages may demonstrate that damages are inadequate as a matter of law. (Galentine v. Richardson (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 56 Cal.Rptr. 237; Thompson v. Mattucci (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 208, 210--211, 35 Cal.Rptr. 741.) In the former case the court said, (248 Cal.App.2d, at 155, 56 Cal.Rptr. at 239.) Similar results have been obtained where only...
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