Carnes v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n

• Decision Date: 11 October 1898
• Parties: CARNES v. IOWA TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

106 Iowa 281

76 N.W. 683

CARNES

v.IOWA TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 11, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; W. A. Spurrier, Judge.

Action on life insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.Cummins, Hewitt & Wright, for appellant.

Baily & Ballreich, for appellee.

LADD, J.

When the certificate of membership was issued to Oscar D. Carnes the constitution of the association provided for indemnity whenever the death of a member occurred “from an accidental cause, except while said member shall be under the influence of intoxicating liquors or narcotics.” As afterwards amended, the articles of incorporation and by-laws, with the same exception, limited such indemnity to injuries “effected through or by external, violent, and accidental means.” We may determine, then, at the outset, whether the liability of the association is fixed by the constitution and by-laws at the time the certificate was issued or those in force when Carnes died. The certificate entitled him to “all the benefits accruing from such membership, under the provisions of the constitution and by-laws” of the association. Now, the by-laws relate entirely to the manner of transacting the business, and the constitution contained all the provisions with respect to the terms and conditions of insurance. The power to amend the by-laws was limited to matters not provided for in the constitution, and that could be revised or amended only on a two-thirds vote of the members. Nothing in it authorized the association to amend, and thereby bind a member to any change in the contract without his assent, nor do the amended articles purport to change existing contracts or to authorize any such change by the adoption of by-laws. In the absence of such provisions, the articles and by-laws as amended cannot be treated as retroactive in their operation. Mere silence as to the effect of revision and amendment of the constitution and by-laws will not warrant the inference that any change wrought will limit or extend the obligation theretofore created by the issuance of certificates of membership. Statutes are construed so as to give them a prospective operation, unless the intention that they operate retrospectively is clear and undoubted, and it is not perceived why the same canon of construction should not be applied to the rules adopted by a mutual insurance association for the transaction of its business and the government of its members. Hobbs v. Association, 82 Iowa, 107, 47 N. W. 983;Sieverts v. Association, 95 Iowa, 710, 64 N. W. 671;Benton v. Brotherhood (Ill.) 34 N. E. 939. Of the contention that, by changing from a voluntary to an incorporated association, the former ceased to exist, and recovery must be had, if at all, under the articles and by-laws of the latter, it is enough to say that such an issue is neither raised in the pleadings nor established by the proof.

2. As no evidence indicated Carnes to have been under the influence of intoxicating liquors or narcotics, the important inquiry was whether his death occurred from an accidental cause. The testimony is not in conflict. On the 16th day of March, 1896, being Monday, he was suffering from neuralgia in the face, and remained at home during the afternoon and the following day. He obtained morphine from some source, and during this time took it for the relief of the pain. He went out for whisky Tuesday, but is not known to have obtained any. The physician found him that day lying on a cot with clothes on, complaining of pain and soreness in his face and the back of his neck, and was informed by Carnes that he had taken, during Monday night, two quarter-grain tablets of morphine. The doctor prescribed tablets with no morphine in them, and whisky, which was administered in the form of a hot punch. He undressed and went to bed downstairs, his clothes remaining in the room. His wife left him at about 10 o'clock p. m., and found him unconscious at 6:30 the following morning. In the meantime he had taken none of the whisky or tablets prescribed, and no morphine was found in the room or about his clothes. He continued in a comatose condition for about four hours, when he died. That his death was caused by morphine taken between the time his wife left his bedside on Tuesday evening and when she found him dying the next morning is conceded. How much morphine he took is not known, but it was enough to cause death, and the physicians differ somewhat as to the amount necessary to do this. There are three possible ways to account for Carnes' death: (1) He may have taken the morphine with the purpose of committing suicide; (2) he may have taken more than he intended,--that is, several quarter-grain tablets instead of one or more; and (3) he may have intended to take the amount he did, and misjudged the effect it would produce. There is nothing in the evidence or surrounding circumstances pointing to suicide, and, as every one is supposed to be endowed with the instinct of self-preservation, he will be presumed not to have voluntarily ended his life. Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360;Cronkhite v. Insurance Co., 75 Wis. 116, 43 N. W. 731;Mallory v. Insurance Co., 47 N. Y. 52;Freeman v. Insurance Co., 144 Mass. 572, 12 N. E. 372;Insurance Co. v. Wiswell (Kan. Sup.) 44 Pac. 996. See 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 331. He must then have either taken more morphine than he intended, or taken what he intended and misjudged its effects. If he took more than he...