Carnival Corp. v. Middleton

• Decision Date: 04 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 3D06-160.,3D06-160.
• Citation: 941 So.2d 421
• Parties: CARNIVAL CORPORATION d/b/a Carnival Cruise Lines, Petitioner, v. Barbara MIDDLETON and James Middleton, her husband, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

941 So.2d 421

CARNIVAL CORPORATION d/b/a Carnival Cruise Lines, Petitioner, v. Barbara MIDDLETON and James Middleton, her husband, Respondents.

No. 3D06-160.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

October 4, 2006.

Rehearing Denied November 16, 2006.

Mase & Lara and Beverly D. Eisenstadt, Miami, for petitioner.

Rick G. Bannon, St. Petersburg, for respondents.

Before GERSTEN, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

Carnival Cruise Lines ("Carnival") appeals a non-final order reinstating a negligence cause of action against Carnival for injuries sustained on January 13, 2003, by passenger, Barbara Middleton, on board the vessel M./V. Victory. We treat the appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition and grant the relief requested.

Based on a forum selection clause in the passenger ticket,¹ which provided for resolution of any dispute in connection or incident to the guest's cruise to be litigated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, the trial judge dismissed the action without prejudice to be re-filed in the Southern District Court. The Middletons then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Pursuant to Clause 14(a)² of the passenger ticket, which provides for a one-year statute of limitations period for personal injury suits, the United States District Judge dismissed the federal action which had been filed by the Middletons on grounds that they had failed to file suit in federal court within the applicable ticket-contract provision of one year for personal injury actions.³ The state court then reinstated the action. This petition follows.

The Middletons argue that the venue provision in the passenger ticket is unenforceable because (1) the clause is ambiguous and neither reasonably communicates the limitations on the filing of the lawsuit nor provides adequate notice of the restrictions to passengers; and (2) the forum selection clause violates the passengers' right to a jury trial under the Florida Constitution.⁴ See Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const.

1. The federal court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, under appropriate maritime jurisdiction, states that:

As a general rule, conditions or limitations in a contract for passage are valid if the ticket provides adequate notice and reasonably communicates the limitations contained therein. See Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11, 13 (11th Cir.1987 [5th Cir.1979]); Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245-46. Title 46 U.S.C.A.App. § 183b(a) permits cruise lines to place a one-year contractual time limit on their passenger's right to file personal injury suits. Courts will enforce such a limitation if the cruise ticket provided the passenger with reasonably adequate notice that the limit existed and formed part of the passenger contract. [footnote omitted]

The Southern District found that adequate notice was provided in the passenger ticket, and that the ticket reasonably communicated the contractual limitations, including that the lawsuit had to have been brought before the Southern District of Florida within one year of the personal injury sustained. As respondents did not file suit in the Southern District of Florida until more than one year after the alleged injury, the action was subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The findings by the Southern District which were based on forum selection and limitations grounds were binding upon the lower court under the principles of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which prevents identical parties from relitigating the same issues which already have been decided. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906 (Fla.1995). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where the threshold requirements are met: (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was critical and necessary to the determination; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding. E.g., Baxas Howell Mobley, Inc. v. BP Oil Co., 630 So.2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Because we find that all four threshold requirements have been complied with in the federal litigation, we hold that the issue of the validity of the forum selection clause and the limitations found therein, already decided by the Southern District, are controlling, and the respondents were collaterally estopped from re-litigating them in the circuit court. See Oldsmar v. State, 790 So.2d 1042 (Fla.2001); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d at 906. Therefore, the lower court was without jurisdiction to entertain the issues already disposed of in federal court.

2. Any other substantive issues on...