Casey v. Northeast Utilities, (SC 16009)
Decision Date | 29 June 1999 |
Docket Number | (SC 16009) |
Citation | 249 Conn. 365,731 A.2d 294 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | JACKIE CASEY v. NORTHEAST UTILITIES ET AL. |
Borden, Norcott, Palmer, McDonald and Peters, Js. Nancy R. Sussman, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant second injury fund).
Richard T. Stabnick, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant second injury fund (fund), may be ordered to pay penalties for failing to make timely payments pursuant to General Statutes § 31-303.1 The fund appeals from a decision of the compensation review board (board) affirming an order issued by a workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) directing the fund to pay a penalty on a certain payment to the plaintiff, Jackie Casey, which the commissioner found to be untimely under § 31-303.2 We affirm the decision of the board.
The facts are not in dispute. On May 18, 1988, the plaintiff suffered a compensable back injury while employed by the named defendant, Northeast Utilities (employer). The plaintiff had suffered a spinal cord injury prior to his 1988 injury. Because the fund had accepted that the spinal cord injury materially and substantially had exacerbated the plaintiffs 1988 injury, the claim for the 1988 injury was transferred to the fund. On May 24, 1995,3 a commissioner found that the plaintiff had been and continued to be totally disabled since May 18, 1988, and accordingly issued a finding and an award by which he ordered the fund to pay the plaintiff temporary total disability benefits starting from the 1988 date of injury. The employer and the fund were parties to these proceedings. On July 21, 1995, fifty-nine days after the May 24, 1995 award of benefits, the fund mailed the plaintiff a check in the amount of $21,336.32. That amount represented the plaintiffs temporary total disability benefits through July 22, 1995.
Because the fund had made its payment more than ten days from the date of the award of benefits, the plaintiff sought to have a penalty imposed on the fund pursuant to § 31-303. Following a hearing, another commissioner found that $20,703.52 of the $21,336.32 payment was late under § 31-303, and assessed a late payment penalty of 20 percent against that amount. Accordingly, the fund was ordered to pay $4140.70 to the plaintiff pursuant to § 31-303. The board affirmed the commissioner's order, and the fund then appealed the decision of the board.
The fund claims that the board's upholding of the imposition of the penalty was improper because: (1) § 31-303 imposes a deadline on the fund where payments are due under a "fully executed agreement," but imposes no deadlines on the fund where payments are to be made under an award; (2) § 31-303 assesses penalties for late payments against employers but not against the fund; and (3) § 31-303 imposes penalties only on untimely periodic payments but not on untimely lump sum payments. We disagree. The issues in this appeal require that we interpret § 31-303. Accordingly, we begin by setting out the applicable standard of review. Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 444-45, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997). Generally, "[o]ur review of an agency's decision on questions of law is limited by the traditional deference that we have accorded to that agency's interpretation of the acts it is charged with enforcing." Police Dept. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 225 Conn. 297, 300, 622 A.2d 1005 (1993). We do not, however, accord special deference to the agency's decision when that decision involves "a question of law [that] has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996).
" Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., supra, 243 Conn. 444.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 391, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). With these principles in mind, we address the issues raised in this appeal.
The fund first claims that, under § 31-303, it is obligated to make payments within ten business days only from the date of the receipt of a fully executed agreement. Accordingly, because the payment in this case was due under an award, the fund argues that the board improperly concluded that the fund's payment to the plaintiff was untimely. We are not persuaded.
Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, 224 Conn. 391. We, therefore, begin our analysis of this issue with the language of § 31-303.
Section 31-303 provides that (Emphasis added.) The fund contends that because the statute places an express time limitation only on payments due from the fund for fully executed agreements, there is no time limitation on payments due from the fund pursuant to awards. We do not agree.
We first note that the practical result of the fund's interpretation would be a statutory regime where payments due under a fully executed agreement would be due within a certain period of time, but payments due under an award would be subject to no time restraints. There appears to be no practical difference, however, between payments that have become due under a fully executed agreement and those due under an award. "The unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result." State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 563, 429 A.2d 960 (1980). We, therefore, reject the fund's suggestion that it may be liable for a penalty only for untimely payments due under a fully executed agreement.
The better approach to analyzing § 31-303 is to focus on the practical implication of its application where payments have become due under an award to determine whether, in the context of imposing time limitations, there are any relevant differences between payments due from the fund under an award and those due under a fully executed agreement, such that the fund necessarily would have to be immune from time limitations under § 31-303. It is important to note that the first three sentences of § 31-303 are concerned with setting time limitations. Under § 31-303, the time period for payments due under a fully executed agreement begins to run from the date of the receipt of the agreement, whereas payments due under an award must be received ten days from the date the award is granted. Both formulas include a reference point from which the time period is calculated.
The reference point from which the time period for payments under a fully executed agreement is calculated is the date of the receipt of that agreement by the fund. Common sense would lead one to conclude that the receipt date has been set as the reference date because it is on that date that the fund has definite notice of its obligations.4 On the other hand, § 31-303 provides only that "[p]ayments due under an award shall commence on or before the tenth day from the date of such award," and does not set a different reference date for calculation of a due date for payments due from the fund. Indeed, where payments are due under an award, that statute does not distinguish between situations involving payments due from an employer, its insurer or the fund. This lack of specificity in the statute is, however, of no...
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