Casler v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 1970
• Citation: 33 A.D.2d 305,307 N.Y.S.2d 695
• Parties: Claim of Burton Davis CASLER, Respondent-Appellant, v. The STATE of New York, Cl. $48740, Appellant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 695

307 N.Y.S.2d 695

33 A.D.2d 305

Claim of Burton Davis CASLER, Respondent-Appellant, v. The STATE of New York, Cl. $48740, Appellant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Argued Jan. 8, 1970.

Decided Feb. 12, 1970.

Ruth Kessler Toch, Sol. Gen., Albany, Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for appellant (Joseph J. Ricotta, Dunkirk, of counsel)

Philip D. O'Donnell, Herkimer, for respondent.

Before GOLDMAN, P.J., and WITMER, GABRIELLI, MOULE, and HENRY, JJ.

OPINION

WITMER, Justice.

Upon being stopped by a Police Officer on a speeding charge at about 1:00 o'clock P.M. on May 25, 1967 in the Town of New Hartford, New York claimant showed his automobile registration and driver's license. The Officer had learned by radio that morning that a robbery of a loan association in the Syracuse area had occurred, but he had no information concerning the robbers. On stopping claimant the Officer observed that he appeared to be nervous. The Officer saw a box on the rear seat and one on the front seat of claimant's automobile and asked their contents. Claimant told him that they contained old coins, and he showed them to the Officer. The latter asked to look into the automobile trunk, and did so, finding nothing but a tool box. He then looked into the glove compartment and saw a black box. Claimant testified that the Officer opened the glove compartment, but the Officer said that claimant left it open on getting out his registration certificate. The Officer asked claimant what the black box contained, and he replied that it was a revolver which he bought in Kentucky. The Officer opened the box and took out the gun and the bill of sale therewith, and he asked claimant if he had a permit for it. Claimant did not. The Officer told him he was violating section 1897 of the Penal Law, kept the gun and searched the automobile. He found no ammunition for the gun, and nothing else of consequence. The Officer had claimant follow him to the police station where he was placed in a room alone for one half hour, and then the Officer appeared and advised claimant that he was under arrest for illegal possession of a deadly weapon. He was finger-printed and photographed. The Officer then took claimant to the home of a Justice of the Peace and charged him first with the offense of speeding, in violation of section 1180(d) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Claimant pled guilty, and a $15 fine was imposed but suspended. Claimant was then arraigned before the Justice of the Peace on the charge of illegal possession of a dangerous weapon. Bail was set but since claimant could not raise it, he was promptly placed in the Oneida County jail to await action by the Grand Jury. Upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus he was finally released from jail on July 18, 1967, upon an order by Mr. Justice Cardamone who found that claimant's arrest and detention for illegal possession of a gun were unlawful. No appeal was taken therefrom.

Although determinations in a criminal proceeding are not Res judicata in a civil action (Brenon v. State of New York, 31 A.D.2d 776, 297 N.Y.S.2d 88), the proceeding before Justice Cardamone was civil (CPLR, §§ 7001--7012; People ex rel. Curtis v. Kidney, 225 N.Y. 299, 122 N.E. 241) and hence his determination that the arrest and detention were unlawful was conclusive on the Court of Claims (Williams v. State of New York, 9 A.D.2d 415, 194 N.Y.S.2d 421, affd. 8 N.Y.2d 886, 203 N.Y.S.2d 925; Nastasi v. State of New York, 275 App.Div. 524, 90 N.Y.S.2d 377, affd. 300 N.Y. 473, 88 N.E.2d 658).

The Officer stopped claimant only for speeding. At that point he had no ground whatever for suspecting claimant of any crime. Although claimant acted 'nervous' on being stopped, he cooperated with the Officer and gave no indication of intent to escape nor to endanger the Officer. The closed boxes on the car seats gave the Officer no cause to search them, but in any event claimant submitted to their examination and to the search of the trunk, and the results thereof confirmed that there was no cause to believe claimant was guilty of a crime. Nonetheless, the Officer looked into the glove compartment, and seeing a box, asked what was in it. On this traffic arrest, he had no cause to make such inquiry, and the result thereof was not a proper basis for arresting claimant (People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 228 N.E.2d 783; People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466--467, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482; People v. Granese, 32 A.D.2d 568, 300 N.Y.S.2d 215; and see People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417, 421, 191 N.E.2d 798, 800--801). In People v. Marsh, supra 20 N.Y.2d at page 101, 281 N.Y.S.2d at page 792, 228 N.E.2d at page 785, the Court said:

'The search for weapons is a special exception to the proscription against warrantless searches, and it should not be extended beyond its purpose of securing the safety of the officer and preventing an escape. A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not thereby indicate any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the officer who stops the speeder has not even the slightest cause for thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted. * * * the Legislature never intended to authorize a search of a traffic offender unless, when the vehicle is stopped, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the officer is in danger or there is probable cause for believing that the offender is guilty of a crime rather than merely a simple traffic infraction.'

The consent by claimant for the Officer to examine the box in the glove compartment may not be deemed a voluntary permission (People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 307, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454, 200 N.E.2d 441, 442; People v. Loria, supra, 10 N.Y.2d page 373, 223 N.Y.S.2d 466--467, 179 N.E.2d 482).

Although the Officer could merely have given claimant a speeding ticket, it was also proper for him to take claimant before the Justice of the Peace on the speeding charge (Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 154 N.Y.S.2d 37, 136 N.E.2d 504); but here it is clear that claimant was taken into custody on the gun charge, taken to the police station and held (presumably while the police made further inquiries), placed under arrest, finger-printed and photographed, and then taken to the Justice of the Peace perfunctorily on the speeding charge, but held on the charge of illegal possession of a dangerous weapon. Thus, claimant was falsely arrested and imprisoned to the time of his arraignment before the Justice of the Peace (Warner v. State of New York, 297 N.Y. 395, 70 N.E.2d 459; Williams v. State, supra, 9 A.D.2d 415, 194 N.Y.S.2d 421, affd. 8 N.Y.2d 886, 203 N.Y.S.2d 925, 168 N.E.2d 723).

The continued detention of claimant following his arraignment, however, rested upon the order of the Justice of the Peace, and even though the Justice made an erroneous determination, if he had jurisdiction of the charge and of claimant, the State may not be held liable for such continued false imprisonment (Warner v. State, supra; Caminito v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 848, 269 N.Y.S.2d 826, affd. 19 N.Y.2d 931, 281 N.Y.S.2d 338, 228 N.E.2d 396; Douglas v. State of New York, 269 App.Div. 521, 56 N.Y.S.2d 245, affd. 296 N.Y. 530, 68 N.E.2d 605; Ford v. State of New York, 21 A.D.2d 437, 250 N.Y.S.2d 857; Jameison v. State of New York, 7 A.D.2d 944, 82 N.Y.S.2d 41; Mudge v. State of New...