Catlin by Catlin v. Sobol

• Decision Date: 22 March 1990
• Citation: 553 N.Y.S.2d 501,155 A.D.2d 24
• Parties: , 59 Ed. Law Rep. 862 Dunbar E. CATLIN, an Infant, by Daniel CATLIN et al., His Parents and Natural Guardians, et al., Respondents, v. Thomas SOBOL, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 501

553 N.Y.S.2d 501

155 A.D.2d 24, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 862

Dunbar E. CATLIN, an Infant, by Daniel CATLIN et al., His Parents and Natural Guardians, et al., Respondents, v. Thomas SOBOL, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

March 22, 1990.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Nancy A. Spiegel and Peter H. Schiff, of counsel), Albany, for Thomas Sobol, appellant.

Hogan & Sarzynski (Edward J. Sarzynski, of counsel), Binghamton, for Board of Educ. of the Edmeston Cent. School Dist., appellant.

Anderson, Banks, Curran & Hollis (Lawrence W. Thomas, of counsel), Mt. Kisco, for respondents.

Norman H. Gross (Cynthia Plumb Fletcher, of counsel), Albany, for New York State School Boards Association, Inc., amicus curiae.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and KANE, CASEY, WEISS and HARVEY, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

Plaintiff Dunbar E. Catlin (hereinafter Dell) was born in 1973 with Down's Syndrome. His parents, who resided in the Town of Bedford, Westchester County, elected to place Dell in the family home of Samuel and Elizabeth Conde in the Town of Edmeston, Otsego County. The Condes are certified by the State Department of Social Services to provide care "at board" for children up to the age of 18. Dell has lived continuously with the Condes since two weeks after his birth. Although the Condes make the decisions regarding Dell's day-to-day care, his parents pay for the cost of Dell's care at the Condes' home and they have not surrendered any of their parental rights or authority over Dell.

Dell began attending the Edmeston schools in 1978. The Bedford Central School District reimbursed the Edmeston Central School District for Dell's tuition until 1985, when Dell's parents moved from the Town of Bedford to Massachusetts. In July 1985, the Edmeston Central School District informed Dell's parents that tuition would have to be paid if Dell was to continue attending the Edmeston schools. Dell's parents appealed to defendant Commissioner of Education who concluded that Edmeston was not Dell's "actual and only residence" and that, therefore, he was not a resident of the Edmeston Central School District (see, Education Law § 3202[4][b]. Thus, the appeal was denied.

Dell's parents thereafter commenced an action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the residency requirement. The present action for a judgment declaring Dell to be a resident of the Edmeston Central School District was commenced by Dell and his parents following the application of the abstention doctrine by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Federal action upon the theory that the meaning of "actual and only residence" in Education Law § 3202(4)(b) was a potential controlling question of State law ( Catlin v. Ambach, 820 F.2d 588). Supreme Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, concluding that "[t]he fact that Dell's entire life has been spent with the Condes satisfied a simple reading of 'actual and only [residence]' ". (141 Misc.2d 169, 172, 532 N.Y.S.2d 1006). Defendants now appeal.

Initially, the parties disagree as to the appropriate scope of review. The Commissioner contends that the rational basis test must be applied to review his interpretation of the statute and his determination that Dell is not entitled to a tuition-free education in the Edmeston Central School District. Plaintiffs contend that because this is a plenary action for declaratory relief, the court should construe the statute and determine whether Dell is a resident of the Edmeston Central School District. We agree with the Commissioner.

Plaintiffs initially appealed to the Commissioner, seeking a determination that Dell was entitled to a tuition-free education. Dissatisfied with the result of their appeal, plaintiffs went into Federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the statute relied on by the Commissioner, rather than seek State court review of the Commissioner's determination. That plaintiffs were thereafter required by Federal law to resort to an action in State court to resolve a potentially controlling issue of State law involving the propriety of the Commissioner's determination should not result in a different standard of review than that which would have been applied had plaintiffs sought direct State court review of the determination.

Education Law § 3202(1) provides that a person over the age of five and under the age of 21 "is entitled to attend the public schools maintained in the district in which such person resides without the payment of tuition". Education Law § 3202(4) contains provisions concerning the cost of instruction of pupils placed in family homes. The provision at issue here states Children cared for in free family homes and children cared for in family homes at board, when such family homes shall be the actual and only residence of such children and when such children are not supported and maintained at the expense of a social services district or of a state department or agency, shall be deemed residents of the school district in which such family home is located (Education Law § 3202[4][b].

Because it is undisputed that Dell lives in a family home at board and that he is supported and maintained solely at the expense of his parents, the only remaining question is whether the family home is Dell's "actual and only residence".

The Commissioner has concluded that the residency requirement contained in the statutory provision at issue is substantially the same as that contained in the general free education provision of Education Law § 3202(1). Thus, according to the Commissioner, Dell's residency must be determined in light of the long-standing rebuttable presumption that a child's residence is that of his parents (see, Matter of Horowitz v. Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 217 App.Div. 233, 238, 216 N.Y.S. 646). Supreme Court, however, held that Education Law § 3202(4) created a special class of pupils, those residing in family homes, who were not subject to the presumption. Based upon a "simple reading" of the statute, the court concluded that because Dell had always lived in the family home, that was his "actual and only residence" within the meaning of Education Law § 3202(4)(b). The Court of Appeals has recognized that there may be "practical problems of administration engendered by the present statutory formulation" contained in Education Law § 3202(4), but has cautioned against "judicial assistance in their minimization" (Matter of Jeter v. Ellenville Cent. School Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 283, 287-288, 392 N.Y.S.2d 403, 360 N.E.2d 1086). We are of the view that Supreme Court erred when it substituted its interpretation of Education Law § 3202(4)(b) for that of the Commissioner, instead of reviewing the Commissioner's interpretation for rationality and reasonableness (see, Matter of Robins v. Blaney, 59 N.Y.2d 393, 397, 465 N.Y.S.2d 868, 452 N.E.2d 1196; Matter of Lezette v. Board of Educ. Hudson City School Dist., 35 N.Y.2d 272, 281-282, 360 N.Y.S.2d 869, 319 N.E.2d 189). ^*

Because the term "residence", when used in a statute such as the one at issue, is equivalent to "domicile" (see, Matter of Seitelman v. Lavine, 36 N.Y.2d 165, 171, 366 N.Y.S.2d 101, 325 N.E.2d 523; State of New York v. Collins, 78 A.D.2d 295, 297, 435 N.Y.S.2d 161), the inclusion of the words "actual and only" create doubt and ambiguity as to the meaning of the phrase "actual and only residence". Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature intended the phrase to include those students who have continuously lived in a family home at board for almost their entire life, as Dell has. Such a construction avoids the residency presumption accorded to other students who live away from their parents and thereby increases the financial burden of the school district within which the family home is located. Such a result conflicts with the legislative intent of the paragraph which precedes the one at issue (see, Matter of Jeter v. Ellenville Cent. School Dist., supra, 41 N.Y.2d at 285, 392 N.Y.S.2d 403, 360 N.E.2d 1086). The Commissioner's interpretation, in contrast, treats pupils living in family homes at board the same as other pupils who live away from their parents, imposing the financial burden of a free education on the district where the family home is located only when the presumption that the child's residence is that of his parents is rebutted. We find nothing irrational or unreasonable in the Commissioner's statutory interpretation.

The Commissioner also determined that the presumption of Dell's residency with his parents had not been rebutted because his parents continued to provide financial support for Dell and they retained the right to revoke their delegation of parental authority to the Condes. In effect, the Commissioner has used the rebuttable presumption to impose upon a person who lives in this State and seeks a free public education pursuant to Education Law § 3202 the requirement that his or her nonresident parents default on their obligation to support their child and relinquish their parental rights. The Legislature has not seen fit to impose such a requirement, and we conclude that the Commissioner cannot do so under the guise of the rebuttable presumption of residency. Accordingly, we agree with the result reached by Supreme Court, but not the rationale.

As noted above, domicile and residence are equivalent for the purposes of the statute at issue and, therefore, the residency requirement is not satisfied by mere bodily presence, no matter how long a period (see, Unanue v. Unanue, 141 A.D.2d 31, 34, 532 N.Y.S.2d 769); there must be physical presence and the requisite intention to make the locality one's fixed and permanent home (id., at 35, 532 N.Y.S.2d 769; see, Matter of Brunner, 41 N.Y.2d 917, 918, 394 N.Y.S.2d 621, 363 N.E.2d 346). The Commissioner has often applied this test in determining residence under ...