Cazier v. Ga. Power Co.
Decision Date | 16 November 2016 |
Docket Number | A16A1313 |
Citation | 339 Ga.App. 506,793 S.E.2d 668 |
Parties | CAZIER et al. v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Roy E. Barnes, James G. Richardson, John Frank Salter Jr., for Appellant.
William Middleton Droze, Atlanta, Robert Pursley Edwards Jr., Roger S. Reigner Jr., Atlanta, for Appellee.
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 583 (4), 740 S.E.2d 458. In addition, we declined to consider "whether the appellees' complaint may be amended to assert a claim founded on OCGA § 46–2–90 or as to the merits of such a claim." Id. at 583 (3), 740 S.E.2d 458.
The litigation returned to the superior court, and petitioners amended their complaint, retaining the claim regarding the franchise fee and adding a claim under OCGA § 46–2–90 () Georgia Power renewed and amended its earlier motion for summary judgment, asserting that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission ("PSC"). The trial court dismissed the action in its entirety in a one-page order, stating that it lacked authority to rule on the merits because petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the PSC. It also denied the motion for class certification. For the reasons stated below, this was error, and we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and our earlier opinion in Cazier I .2
1. We first address the trial court's conclusion that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Our Supreme Court "has consistently held that as long as there is an effective and available administrative remedy, a party is required to pursue that remedy before seeking equitable relief in superior court." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fulton County Taxpayers Foundation v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm. , 287 Ga. 876, 878–879 (2), 700 S.E.2d 554 (2010). In order to determine whether an "effective and available administrative remedy" exists, therefore, we must look at both the nature of petitioners' claim and the law under which they seek to proceed.3
Petitioners contend that the relevant PSC orders require Georgia Power to calculate municipal franchise fees as a stated percentage of "electricity usage revenue," "usage revenue," or "revenue." They do not complain of any PSC ruling or seek review of any commission action. Rather, they assert that Georgia Power has inflated the basis for calculating the franchise fees by including in its declaration of "revenue" certain "cost recovery items" which were not contemplated by the PSC orders. They further contend that this accounting practice by Georgia Power violates the applicable PSC orders and unlawfully overcharges customers for amounts not authorized by the PSC.
The Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of agency decisions, including those of the PSC. Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga. , 255 Ga. 253, 254 n.2, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985). The relevant provision is OCGA § 50–13–19. Id. Subsection (a) states:
Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter. This Code section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.
Id. Subsection (c) further provides that "no objection to any order or decision of any agency shall be considered by the court upon petition for review unless such objection has been urged before the agency."
This Code section, and the cases construing it, by their terms apply to persons who are "aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" or who have an "objection to any order or decision" of the relevant agency. See id. at 257 (1), 336 S.E.2d 790 ( ); Fulton County Taxpayers , supra, 287 Ga. at 878 (2), 700 S.E.2d 554 In other words, the administrative remedies contemplate an order or decision by the PSC in a contested case .
Here, in contrast, petitioners do not claim to be aggrieved by any action of the PSC, nor do they object to any decision or order of the commission. Instead, they contend that Georgia Power has violated the relevant orders of the PSC by failing to use the basis prescribed by the commission to calculate municipal franchise fees. As we noted in Cazier I, "there is no challenge to the validity or reasonableness of any utility rate set by the commission, and instead there is simply a challenge to the method of calculating and collecting the said fee." 321 Ga.App. at 583 (4), 740 S.E.2d 458.
In this appeal, petitioners assert that they are proceeding against Georgia Power under OCGA § 46–2–90, which authorizes legal action against companies under the jurisdiction of the PSC:
This Code section stands in contrast to other provisions of Title 46, which expressly provide for administrative petitions or hearings. See, e. g., OCGA § 46–2–91 ( ); OCGA § 46–3–8 ( ); cf. OCGA § 49–4–153 ( ).
OCGA § 46–2–90 does not contemplate any administrative proceedings before the PSC or the challenge of any order or decision by the commission, but rather authorizes an action to recover damages "in any court of competent jurisdiction" from a company under the PSC's jurisdiction that has violated a PSC order by act or omission. This is consistent with our observation in Cazier I that this count does not challenge a rate set...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ga. Power Co. v. Cazier
...Commission, and seeking to recover the excess fees for themselves and a class of Georgia Power customers. In Cazier v. Georgia Power Company, 339 Ga. App. 506, 793 S.E.2d 668 (2016), the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before br......
- Dickson v. State
-
Cazier v. Ga. Power Co.
...for improper MFF calculation under OCGA § 46-2-90, which authorizes claims against entities subject to PSC jurisdiction. See Cazier II, 339 Ga.App. at 507. After Georgia Power moved for summary judgment, the trial court accepted Georgia Power's contention that plaintiffs had failed to exhau......
-
Administrative Law
...G. Watstein, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 59 (2016).2. 321 Ga. App. 576, 740 S.E.2d 458 (2013).3. 339 Ga. App. 506, 793 S.E.2d 668 (2016). 4. Id. at 506-07, 793 S.E.2d at 669-70.5. Id. at 509, 793 S.E.2d at 671.6. O.C.G.A. § 46-2-90 (2017).7. Cazier I,......