Chambless Ford Tractor, Inc. v. McGlaun Farms, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 67384,67384 |
| Citation | 314 S.E.2d 689,169 Ga.App. 672 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHAMBLESS FORD TRACTOR, INC. et al. v. McGLAUN FARMS, INC. |
Joseph L. Waldrep, Columbus, for appellants.
James E. Butler, Jr., Columbus, for appellee.
This appeal stems from an action on account brought by appellant Chambless Ford Tractor, Inc. (Chambless) against appellee McGlaun Farms, Inc. (McGlaun) in connection with appellant's repair, and subsequent retention for non-payment, of a tractor owned by McGlaun and subject to a perfected security interest held by the Small Business Administration (SBA). McGlaun had refused to repay the $8,416.16 repair charge assessed by Chambless, contending that the repairs were necessitated by Chambless' negligent and faulty repair and parts replacement on the same tractor some two months prior to the breakdown for which the most recent repairs had been undertaken. McGlaun further contended that, even had the breakdown been due to some cause other than Chambless' allegedly negligent and faulty work, the 90-day warranty on the replacement parts (and particularly on a dual-power engine unit) should have covered the cost of repairs.
Chambless filed a mechanic's lien pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-361 et seq. (Code Ann. § 67-2001); appellee contests both the venue and the timeliness of this filing. Appellants then instituted foreclosure proceedings in accordance with OCGA § 44-14-550(2) (Code Ann. § 67-2401), and a hearing was scheduled, pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-550(3) (Code App. § 67-2401), "to determine if reasonable cause exists to believe that a valid debt exists." At the probable cause hearing appellant's counsel contended that no evidence should be admitted tending to show the reasons for either the accrual of the sum allegedly owed or appellee's refusal to pay upon demand, as provided in OCGA § 44-14-550(1) (Code Ann. § 67-2401). Introduction of such evidence should be postponed, appellant argued, until the "full hearing on the validity of the debt" provided for in OCGA § 44-14-550(5) (Code Ann. § 67-2001); that is, after a determination at the initial hearing "that reasonable cause exists to believe that a valid debt exists" (subsections 3, 4). Appellee McGlaun argued, on the other hand, that introduction of such evidence at the initial hearing was appropriate because the evidence was necessary to the determination of the existence of a valid debt. Counsel for SBA argued that under OCGA § 11-9-310 (Code Ann. § 109A-9-310) SBA's prior and perfected security interest had priority over Chambless' lien, and that appellant's retention of the tractor, especially if the court authorized its continuation, would seriously prejudice its security interest, evidenced by a timely filed financing statement, in all McGlaun's farm equipment.
The trial court requested letter briefs of counsel for both plaintiff and defendant. The record indicates that McGlaun's counsel complied with this request but that counsel for appellant apparently did not. After consideration of all relevant documents, the court entered an order "that defendant's motions [for a hearing and for dismissal of the foreclosure proceedings and the lien] be granted, that plaintiff's notice of lien foreclosure and its lien be dismissed" on the basis of Newton Ford Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Credit Corp., 163 Ga.App. 497, 294 S.E.2d 723 (1982), and that "plaintiff ... relinquish possession of the subject Ford tractor to defendant." Chambless appealed from this judgment, enumerating as error the following: (1) the dismissal of the foreclosure proceedings and the lien; (2) the court's predicating the dismissal upon the rationale of a case which appellant contends is inapposite to the instant case; (3) the court's ordering the tractor returned to appellee McGlaun; and (4) the court's failure to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order of dismissal. Held:
1. In the first paragraph of his order of dismissal the trial court set forth his ruling, as indicated supra. The second paragraph of the order consisted of the following sentence: "The basis of this ruling is Newton Ford Tractor Co., Inc. v. J.I. Case Credit Corp., 163 Ga.App. 497 (1982)." The order did not expressly set forth findings of fact or conclusions of law eo nomine.
Unless waived in writing, the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-52(a) (Code Ann. § 81A-152) that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law is mandatory. Motes v. Stanton, 237 Ga. 440, 228 S.E.2d 831 (1976); Doyal Development Co. v. Blair, 234 Ga. 261, 215 S.E.2d 471 (1975). Compare OCGA §§ 9-11-12, 9-11-41(b), 9-11-56. The findings should be brief, concise, pertinent, and adjusted to the evidence, and should be neither redundant nor argumentative. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga.App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971). Because the primary reason for requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law is to assist the appellate court in its review of the merits of an appeal, Coleman v. Coleman, 238 Ga. 183, 232 S.E.2d 57 (1977), the findings should be sufficiently inclusive to afford the means for an intelligent review. Donaldson v. Hopkins, 132 Ga.App. 713, 209 S.E.2d 131 (1974).
Although under the statute findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory, their absence is not necessarily a fatal defect requiring reversal of the judgment, however. Kennedy v. Brown, 239 Ga. 286, 236 S.E.2d 632 (1977); Frasier v. Dept. of Human Resources, 159 Ga.App. 1, 282 S.E.2d 667 (1981). When such an omission occurs the appellate court will ordinarily vacate the judgment and remand the action to the trial court for the preparation of appropriate findings. Kennedy v. Brown, supra; Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Richards & Assocs., 229 Ga. 156, 189 S.E.2d 853 (1972); Hickok v. Starka Indus., 151 Ga.App. 668, 261 S.E.2d 418 (1979); Spivey v. Mayson, supra.
Georgia courts have recently held that a substantial compliance with the Codal requirements is sufficient. Paxton v. Trust Co. Bank, 245 Ga....
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...case disposition, but also "assist the appellate court in its review of the merits of an appeal." See Chambless Ford Tractor v. McGlaun Farms, 169 Ga.App. 672, 674(1), 314 S.E.2d 689. "[T]he findings should be sufficiently inclusive to afford the means for an intelligent review." Id. Althou......
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