Chaney v. Department of Transp.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 9,Docket No. 96282,9
• Citation: 523 N.W.2d 762,447 Mich. 145
• Parties: Ray CHANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 762

523 N.W.2d 762

447 Mich. 145

Ray CHANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 96282

Calendar No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 9, 1994.

Decided Aug. 31, 1994.

Gittleman, Paskel, Tashman & Blumberg, P.C. by Clifford Paskel, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bendure & Thomas, Detroit (Mark R. Bendure, Sidney A. Klingler, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Counsel of Record, Brenda E. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for defendant-appellee.

Robert A. Koory, Elizabeth A. Givens, Detroit, for amicus curiae, the Michigan Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

BRICKLEY, Justice.

This case asks us to decide whether the highway exception to governmental immunity ¹ encompasses a concrete bridge abutment and adjoining guardrail adjacent to, but beyond the shoulder of, a state trunkline entrance ramp and overpass. The Court of Appeals relied upon our plurality opinion in Scheurman v. Dep't. of Transportation, 434 Mich. 619, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990), to reverse the Court of Claims denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition. While we agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we do not fully endorse its rationale. 198 Mich.App. 728, 499 N.W.2d 29 (1993). We hold that because the abutment and guardrail are neither part of "the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel," nor installations integrally and directly affecting safe vehicular travel upon the improved portion, governmental immunity bars the cause of action set forth in plaintiff's complaint.

I

Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle left the roadway of a highway entrance ramp and overpass, crossed the shoulder, and struck either a metal guardrail or concrete abutment ² immediately adjacent to, but beyond, the shoulder. Plaintiff was thrown over the bridge railing and landed next to a median barrier on the highway below, incurring a number of injuries.

Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Claims, alleging that the entrance ramp was owned by the state and under the jurisdiction and control of defendant who, plaintiff maintained, had responsibility for the design, construction, and maintenance of those bridge railings on the entrance ramp. Plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged that defendant had failed to properly design and construct the bridge railing, failed to inspect the entrance ramp for dangerous conditions, and failed to provide adequate warnings of dangers on the entrance ramp. The complaint further alleged that these negligent acts and omissions were the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

Defendant moved for summary disposition and, relying upon our decision in Scheurman, supra, argued that because of governmental immunity it was under no duty to maintain bridge railings "which fall outside the traveled and paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel." The Court of Claims denied summary disposition, concluding that guardrails are "designed to affect the way vehicles travel down the road." Invoking stare decisis and explaining that it was bound to "follow" our holding in Scheurman, the Court of Appeals reversed in a per curiam opinion. ³ Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the bridge railing "was neither 'roadbed' nor 'designed for vehicular travel,' governmental immunity applies and defendant should not be held liable for plaintiff's injuries" (citing Scheurman ).

II

A

As a general rule, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability for actions taken in furtherance of a governmental function. M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107). The Legislature has articulated limited exceptions to this general rule, including the highway exception, which mandates that a governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway

shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. [M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1).]

Notably, for activities undertaken to fulfill this mandate, both the government's duty and its liability are limited to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." It is this limiting language which we interpret and apply in the instant case.

As this Court explained in Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), the statutory grant of governmental immunity is broad, and its exceptions are narrowly drawn. We are mindful, however, that like all judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, this Court is bound by the well-established rule that our primary goal is to give effect to the controlling intent of the Legislature. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). Accordingly, while we address our efforts in the shadow of a narrowly drawn statutory exception, our analysis inextricably proceeds toward the light of legislative intent.

The legislative purpose for the highway exception is, we believe, a clear one: to enhance the safety of public travel upon state-owned highways. This interpretation of the highway exception was first articulated in Roy v. Dep't. of Transportation, 428 Mich. 330, 341, 408 N.W.2d 783 (1987), and was most recently reaffirmed in Gregg v. State Hwy. Dep't., 435 Mich. 307, 316, 458 N.W.2d 619 (1990). We expressly reiterate and adopt it today.

As was first explained in Roy, the legislative purpose underlying the highway exception is fulfilled by requiring certain governmental agencies to "repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." Roy, supra, 428 Mich. at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783. Although this duty to "repair and maintain" is a limited one--extending only to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel"--within this conceptual boundary the statutory goal of maintaining safe highways is clear and unambiguous. Because we are obligated to give effect to the controlling legislative intent of this exception, it is against the backdrop of this statutory purpose that we today interpret and apply the limiting language of M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102).

B

1. Roy v. Dep't. of Transportation

The highway exception, and its limiting language, was first examined by this Court in Roy. There we held that a bicycle path adjacent to, but separate and detached from, a highway was not part of the improved portion of that highway designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 340, 408 N.W.2d 783. In reaching this conclusion, we focused primarily on the location of the allegedly defective installation. Specifically, we explained that "the [highway exception] does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location," and that "[t]he criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel." Id. at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783 (emphasis added). Because the bicycle path in Roy was located beyond the improved portion designed for vehicular travel, we concluded that governmental immunity from suit was not abrogated by the highway exception.

2. Scheurman v. Dep't. of Transportation

The location of allegedly defective installations was again emphasized by this Court in Scheurman. There we held that the failure to install lighting along a state trunk line did not subject the government to potential liability because "the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel." Id. at 633, 456 N.W.2d 66. ⁴ Notably, while four justices in Scheurman joined in the rationale and result of the lead opinion, only three justices expressly subscribed to its holding that the limiting language of M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102) "refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel." Id. at 623, 456 N.W.2d 66. ⁵ Conversely, four justices specifically expressed their desire for an interpretation of the limiting language that would include installations--even those located outside the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel-- that integrally affected safe travel on the improved portion. ⁶

We interpret Scheurman as reiterating the general rule, first articulated by this Court in Roy, that the highway exception does not normally include installations physically separate and detached from the paved or traveled portion of a highway. As is explained below, this interpretation is consistent with Gregg, supra, this Court's most recent majority interpretation of the highway exception. This interpretation of Scheurman is also consistent with the position we take in the instant case.

3. Gregg v. State Hwy. Dep't.

In Gregg, supra, a majority of this Court again affirmed that location is a key determinant for properly defining and applying the highway exception. There we held that a bicycle path running between the traveled portion of a highway and its paved shoulder comprised part of the improved highway "designed for vehicular travel." In reaching this conclusion, we explained that highway shoulders, while not part of the normally traveled roadbed, were nevertheless intended and designed for vehicular travel. Id., 435 Mich. at 314, 458 N.W.2d 619, citing Johnson v. Michigan, 32 Mich.App. 37, 188 N.W.2d 33 (1971). We held that the highway exception must be tempered by common experience, and that certain installations located beyond the traveled or paved roadway "are essential to a safe modern highway" so as not to be excluded from the highway exception. Id. at 315, 458 N.W.2d 619. This interpretation of the highway exception, we concluded, was more consistent with the exception's express purpose of protecting vehicular travelers by mandating the safe repair and maintenance of highways. Id. at 316, 458 N.W.2d 619.

C

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