Chapter 7 Tr. Fredrich Cruse v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of the Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-366-MTS |
| Parties | CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FREDRICH CRUSE, Plaintiff, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE MISSOURI-ILLINOIS METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court are the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Doc. [121] and [126], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Doc. [40], asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on sexual harassment and retaliation in the workplace. Because there remain genuine disputes of material fact relevant to each claim, the Court will deny the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Niema Jordan[1] sued her employer, Defendant Bi-State Development Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District (“Bi-State”), based on alleged sexual harassment by her supervisor and subsequent retaliatory conduct by Bi-State employees based on reporting her supervisor and other Bi-State employees.[2]
Lawrence Brew worked in a supervisorial role with Bi-State from approximately 2007 until October 2019. In April 2015, Bi-State hired Jordan. In or around the Fall of 2018, Jordan alleges Brew-her then supervisor-began sexually harassing her. According to Jordan, Brew sexually propositioned and harassed her, including quid pro quo harassment, [3] both in person and via telephone. In or around August or September of 2018, Jordan complained of Brew's conduct to a Bi-State manager, but nothing was done. Doc. [143-4] at 6 (21:25-22:20). During a telephone conversation between Jordan and Brew on September 24, 2018, Jordan asked what she could do to be promoted and in response, Brew told Jordan to show him why she was special or deserved the job, and when Jordan asked Brew what he meant, he said she was a smart girl and should be able to figure it out. Doc. [143] ¶ 30. Once again, Jordan reported Brew-this time to Human Resources (“HR”). Doc. [124-1] at 29-28. However, HR did not investigate and ultimately dismissed Jordan's complaints. Id. According to Jordan, Brew continued to sexually proposition and harass her, including quid pro quo harassment, and in October 2018, Jordan filed an internal harassment complaint about Brew to Bi-State's EEO group. Doc. [128-39] at 1. After several complaints of Brew's conduct within Bi-State, Jordan reported subsequent harassment and threats by Bi-State employees. In November 2018, Jordan filed an “official” Title VII complaint with the EEO group regarding Brew's conduct and Bi-State employees' subsequent retaliatory conduct. Doc. [128-16].
In December 2018, White Coleman & Associates, LLC took over Bi-State's EEO's investigatory functions to investigate Jordan's complaints of Brew's alleged sexual harassment.[4]In March 2019, after the investigation concluded and no action was taken against Brew, Jordan filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC regarding Brew's sexual harassment and Bi-State's retaliation. Doc. [128-14]. After filing the EEOC charge, Jordan reported that the complained-of-harassers were still working as her supervisors and had “doubled down” on the harassment and discrimination. Id. at 3. In June 2019, Jordan filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC relating to Bi-State employees alleged retaliatory conduct. Id. Since then, Jordan reported “workplace retaliation and harassment increased, ” and in September 2020, she filed a third Charge of Discrimination. Id. at 5. During this time, Jordan has also filed several other internal complaints with Bi-State, see, e.g., Doc. [128-25]; [124-28], and with much more frequency, she continues to make many calls to various Bi-State managers to report different forms of retaliation, Doc. [153] ¶ 66.
Plaintiff asserts four counts against Bi-State: (1) sex discrimination/harassment in violation of Title VII (Count I); (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count II); (3) sex discrimination/harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and § 1983 (Count III); and (4) retaliation under the First Amendment and § 1983. Doc. [40] at 8-14. In the current Motions, Plaintiff moves for Summary Judgment on Counts I-III, Doc. [121], and Bi-State moves for Summary Judgment on all four Counts, Doc. [126].
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled and do not change when both parties have moved for summary judgment. See Tower Rock Stone Co. v. Quarry & Allied Workers Loc. No. 830, 918 F.Supp.2d 902, 905 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citing Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983)). The Court views any factual disputes in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), and “must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “Where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each summary judgment motion must be evaluated independently to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Willert Home Prod., Inc. v. Driveline Retail Merch., Inc., 4:20-cv-01151-MTS, 2022 WL 485278, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2022). “[T]he filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the merits.” Wermager, 716 F.2d at 1214.
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and must identify the portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude” summary judgment. Wierman v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party will not withstand summary judgment with “[m]ere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond [his or her] own conclusions.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526 (8th Cir. 2007). But, where sufficient evidence supports a factual dispute, it is up to the jury to resolve the dispute at trial. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
For summary judgment purposes, a court must tether its analysis to the legal elements of the claims at issue. “[E]mployment discrimination cases are often fact intensive and dependent on nuance in the workplace.” Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011). The facts in this case are voluminous; the majority are in dispute, amounting to a “he-said-she-said” type situation. Because there remain genuine disputes of material fact relevant to each claim, summary judgment is improper. And, after considering Bi-State's affirmative defenses, Doc. [127-1] at 18- 22, the Court finds that none entitles them to judgment as a matter of law.
Turning to the sexual harassment claims against Bi-state, Jordan alleged two forms: hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment.[5] To prove quid pro quo harassment, evidence must show (1) Jordan was a member of a protected class; (2) Jordan was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) Brew's harassment was based on sex; and (4) that “submission of unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or [that] refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment.”[6] Butler v. Crittenden Cty., Ark., 708 F.3d 1044, 1049 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Newton v. Cadwell Labs., 156 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1998)). To prove hostile work environment, evidence must show that (1) Jordan was a member of a protected group; (2) Jordan was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) Brew's harassment was based on sex; (4) his harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of Jordan's employment. E.E.O.C. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 683 (8th Cir. 2012). Because the alleged harassment was committed by Jordan's supervisor, Bi-state may be strictly or vicariously liable for Brew's sexual harassment.[7] Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 428 (2013); Crawford v. BNSF Ry. Co., 665 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2012).
“Regardless of whether [Jordan's] claim is styled as hostile work environment or quid pro quo sexual harassment, the law is clear that the frequency and type of conduct is of the utmost importance in determining whether sexual harassment has occurred.” Brown v. Adams & Assocs Inc., 4:19-cv-01864-MTS, 2020 WL 7360336, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2020). Exactly those things are in dispute here. There are significant disputes as to Brew's conduct-how often he interacted one-on-one with Jordan, the frequency of his inappropriate conduct, the severity of his conduct, and whether he made the comments and passes of which Jordan complains. Pye, 641 F.3d at 1018 (). And whether Brew's “conduct rose to the level of sexual harassment is usually a factual determination for the jury, ” especially considering the...
To continue reading
Request your trial