Childers v. Yarborough
Decision Date | 28 May 2020 |
Docket Number | NUMBER 13-18-00125-CV |
Parties | STEVE CHILDERS, Appellant, v. JIMMY YARBOROUGH AND NILGUY, LLC, Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Kleberg County, Texas.
Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Tijerina
This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of an agreement dictating the "sharing of expenses and liabilities incident" to a water well owned in undivided interest by multiple co-tenants, including appellant Steve Childers. The water well is located on property owned by appellees Jimmy Yarborough and Nilguy, LLC (Yarborough). By a single issue, Childers appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment in Yarborough's favor. We reverse and remand.
On May 6, 1980, Jewel Higgenbotham conveyed five acres to James and Bonnie Richardson, along with "a 5/32nd interest in and to the Water Well [located on an adjacent property owned by Higgenbotham] . . . together with a ten (10) foot right of way and easement for the purposes of laying a water line from said well site and taking water therefrom." Pursuant to the deed, grantees agreed to The recorded deed also stipulated that it was "understood and agreed that the granting of this easement shall not preclude the grantor from granting an easement along the same course and distance to other landowners nearby." Higgenbotham sold the undivided interest in the water well to several other parties.
In 1994, the Richardsons, several others owning a undivided interest in the water well, and Steven Crandall, the then-owner of the property on which the water well was located, executed an "Agreement Relating to the Sharing of Expenses and Liabilities Incident to a Water Well" (Expenses and Liabilities Agreement). The effect of this agreement is in dispute, and it reads as follows:
On June 2, 1997, the Richardsons conveyed their deed to Childers, and the transfer of title included the interest in the well and easement access.
On November 3, 2009, Yarborough purchased the land on which the water well and easement were located from Crandall's estate.
On November 7, 2012, Childers attempted to access the well through a fence dividing his property from Yarborough's and discovered Yarborough had changed the locks. After Childers and Yarborough were unable to reach a resolution regarding water well access, Childers filed suit on September 21, 2016, claiming quiet title, trespass to try title, slander of title, and tortuous interference with property rights, among others.
Yarborough filed a motion for summary judgment on August 7, 2017, arguing that the Expenses and Liabilities Agreement "affirmatively and conclusively demonstrate[s] that [he] [is] not liable for any actions related to the water well." Yarborough asserted that Childers's ownership rights terminated upon the expiration of the agreement in 2014, as stipulated by the terms of the agreement. Childers countered that the agreement did nothing to "abrogate the co-tenants ownership right under the law to access or operate the well" after its prescribed expiration date, existing simply as a "cost sharing agreement . . . and nothing more." Following a hearing, the trial court granted Yarborough's motion. This appeal followed.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. 2018); Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016), aff'd, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017). The movant in a motion for summary judgment has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a (c); Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018) (citing Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)). In deciding whether a genuine issue precludes summary judgment, we must treat all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in its favor. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017).
Neither party challenges the validity or interpretation of the general warranty deeds involved. See Farm & Ranch Inv'rs, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 212 ( )(providing that general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor's interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest (citing Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958))). Instead, the parties dispute whether the Expenses and Liabilities Agreement constituted a limitation on and subsequent relinquishment of the signers'deeded rights as tenants in common; Yarborough's success on summary judgment is dependent on our resolution of this issue. See Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1963) ( ); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 469 S.W.2d 624, 631 ( ); Taylor v. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 2 S.W.2d 288, 296 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1928, writ dism'd w.o.j.); see also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 27.
"'A contract's plain language controls, not what one side or the other alleges they intended to say but did not.'" Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Primo, 512 S.W.3d...
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