Christensen v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 30 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. SC12–2078.,SC12–2078.
• Citation: 140 So.3d 498
• Parties: Robert L. CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner, v. Mary Jo BOWEN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

140 So.3d 498

Robert L. CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner,

v.Mary Jo BOWEN, et al., Respondents.

No. SC12–2078.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 10, 2014.

Rehearing Denied May 30, 2014.

Raoul G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh and Jesse Luke Green of White & Case LLP, Miami, FL; Warren B. Kwavnick of Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, Fort Lauderdale, FL; George Alexander Vaka of Vaka Law Group, P.L., Tampa, FL; and Dennis Richard O'Connor of O'Connor & O'Connor, LLC, Winter Park, FL, for Petitioner.

Stephen John Pajcic, III and Thomas Fitzpatrick Slater of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A., Jacksonville, FL; William A. Bald of Dale, Bald, Showalter, Mercier & Green, P.A., Jacksonville, FL; and S. Sammy Cacciatore, Jr. of Nance, Cacciatore, Hamilton, Berger, Nance & Cacciatore, Melbourne, FL, for Respondents.

LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Bowen v. Taylor–Christensen, 98 So.3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which it certified to be of great public importance:

MAY A PERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY DIRECTS THAT TITLE BE ISSUED IN HIS NAME AS CO–OWNER, BY COMPLETING A SWORN APPLICATION FOR TITLE IN CONJUNCTION

WITH THE PURCHASE OF A VEHICLE, AVOID LIABILITY UNDER THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE BY CLAIMING THAT HE NEVER INTENDED TO BE THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE AND FURTHER CLAIMING THAT HE RELINQUISHED CONTROL TO A CO–OWNER OF THE VEHICLE?

Id. at 145. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows:

MAY A PERSON WHOSE NAME IS ON THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF A VEHICLE AS CO–OWNER AVOID VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE BY ASSERTING THAT HE NEVER INTENDED TO BE THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE AND FURTHER CLAIMING THAT HE RELINQUISHED CONTROL TO A CO–OWNER OF THE VEHICLE?

We answer this question in the negative and hold that a person whose name is on the certificate of title as co-owner is a beneficial owner with the right to control the vehicle.

BACKGROUND

Robert Christensen paid the purchase price for a Chrysler PT Cruiser on April 29, 2003, and the certificate of title was placed in the name of both Mary Taylor–Christensen and Robert Christensen as co-owners. They were married at the time, but were involved in dissolution of marriage proceedings. Both Christensen and his then wife Taylor–Christensen signed the application for certificate of title, under penalty of perjury, to have the title issued to them jointly as “owner” and “co-owner.” Christensen did not receive the certificate of title because it was mailed to the wife's address, but the certificate of title was issued in the name of both Christensen and his wife, as “Mary G. Taylor–Christensen or Robert L. Christensen.” Although Christensen did not have a key to the vehicle or use the vehicle, and did not reside with Taylor–Christensen or have access to her garage where the vehicle was kept, the title to the vehicle was in his name as co-owner.

Approximately twenty-two months after the vehicle was purchased, Taylor–Christensen negligently struck and killed Thomas Bowen while driving the vehicle. At the time of the accident, the title remained in the names of both Taylor–Christensen and Christensen and the vehicle was being operated with his consent. After the accident, Mary Jo Bowen, as executor of her husband's estate, filed an action for wrongful death against both Taylor–Christensen and Christensen. Bowen alleged that Christensen, as an owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable for Taylor–Christensen's negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Christensen, however, contended that he was not vicariously liable under the beneficial ownership exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. He testified during trial that his intent was to purchase the vehicle as a gift for his wife and that he had no involvement with the vehicle after it was purchased.

Bowen moved for a directed verdict on the issue of ownership, but the trial court denied the motion. The jury was instructed that “[a]n owner of a vehicle is one who has legal title to the vehicle and who has a beneficial ownership with the right of control and authority over its use.” The jury subsequently found that Christensen was not an owner of the vehicle. Bowen appealed the denial of the motion for directed verdict to the Fifth District, and the district court, on rehearing, reversed the trial court's ruling. The Fifth District held that Christensen was liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because he retained an identifiable property interest in the vehicle for himself by having his name placed on the title as co-owner, and that his subjective intent in signing the purchase and title documents was insufficient to defeat vicarious liability of a titleholder. The district court then certified to this Court the previously quoted question, and this review followed.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

The rephrased certified question presents a pure question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Rando v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 39 So.3d 244, 247 (Fla.2010). Further, the issue in this case concerns an order entered on a motion for directed verdict, which is also reviewed de novo. Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So.3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine and Beneficial Ownership Exception

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine serves to ensure financial recourse to members of the public who are injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by imposing strict vicarious liability on those with an identifiable property ownership interest in the vehicle. See Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla.1990). The underlying rationale of the doctrine is that if a vehicle owner, who has control over the use of the vehicle, exercises his or her control by granting custody of the vehicle to another, the owner commits himself or herself to the judgment of that driver and accepts the potential liability for his or her torts. S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 634 (1920) (quoting Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210, 215 (1905)).

A narrow exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been recognized in cases where the titleholder lacks the beneficial ownership of a vehicle. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 64 (Fla.2000) (“In Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So.2d 385, 385–86 (Fla.1958), the Court made it clear that, absent a conditional sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity or individual who possessed legal title would not be vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine were extremely limited.”). Under this “beneficial ownership” or “bare legal title” exception, a titleholder may avoid vicarious liability if the titleholder demonstrates that he or she does not have the authority to exert any dominion or control over the vehicle and therefore is not a beneficial owner of the vehicle. Id. at 63–65. In such circumstances, this Court has held that the titleholder holds only “naked legal title” in the vehicle. See Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635, 637 (Fla.1955).

The beneficial ownership exception was first recognized in Palmer nearly sixty years ago. In Palmer, a car dealership held title to a vehicle that was involved in an accident. Id. at 636. At the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle had already submitted the down payment, signed a conditional sales contract for the vehicle, and taken possession of the vehicle, but “bare” legal paper title remained with the dealership. Id. This Court held that the dealership possessed only naked legal title in the vehicle as security for payment of the full purchase price, and no longer had any authority over the use of the vehicle (i.e., beneficial ownership of the vehicle). Id. The Court further explained that the rationale for imposing vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not apply because the dealership could no longer exercise control over the use of the vehicle. As a result, the dealership was not an owner of the vehicle and was not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Id. Thus, under Palmer, a person or entity who holds bare paper title in a vehicle solely under a conditional sales agreement is exempted from vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

Subsequently, this Court extended the beneficial ownership exception recognized in Palmer to prohibit vicarious liability in the situation where an actual common law sale of a vehicle had occurred but formal title had not yet been transferred. See McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So.2d 738, 740 (Fla.1957). In McAfee, the titleholder left the vehicle with the operator of a filling station to sell. Id. at 739. A prospective buyer test drove the vehicle, gave the filling station operator less than the full purchase price, and departed in the vehicle. Id. The buyer collided with another vehicle before speaking with the titleholder regarding the sale. Id. This Court held that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the common law prerequisites for a sale and applied Palmer to conclude that the titleholder had transferred beneficial ownership of the vehicle to the buyer. Id. at 740.

However, shortly after deciding McAfee, this Court declined to further extend the exception. See Metzel, 102 So.2d at 386. In Metzel, the titleholder had title issued in her name for a vehicle that was purchased by her nephew because the seller objected to an eighteen-year-old signing the financing paperwork. Id. at 385. The nephew lived with the aunt and the aunt insured the...