Ciamar Marcy, Inc. v. Monteiro Da Costa

• Decision Date: 09 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1202,86-1202
• Citation: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1422,508 So.2d 1282
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1422 CIAMAR MARCY, INC., a dissolved Delaware corporation and Julio Del Rey, individually and as shareholder and director of Ciamar Marcy, Inc., Appellants, v. Renato M. MONTEIRO DA COSTA, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1282

508 So.2d 1282

12 Fla. L. Weekly 1422

CIAMAR MARCY, INC., a dissolved Delaware corporation and Julio Del Rey, individually and as shareholder and director of Ciamar Marcy, Inc., Appellants, v. Renato M. MONTEIRO DA COSTA, Appellee.

No. 86-1202.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

June 9, 1987.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 1987.

Barone & Feliu and Nathaniel Barone, South Miami, for appellants.

Bunnell, Denman & Woulfe and Melanie G. May, Kenneth S. Dobkin, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendants [Ciamar Marcy, Inc. and Julio Del Rey] from an adverse final judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff [Renato M. Monteiro Da Costa] after a non-jury trial in an action sounding in: (1) wrongful repossession of a vessel under a lease agreement, and (2) conversion of certain personal property. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

At the outset, we see no merit in the defendant's first three points on appeal. There has been no error shown in (a) the trial court's narrowing of the issues to be tried in this non-jury trial which was made during the course of the parties' opening statements, see Grapeland Heights Civic Ass'n v. City of Miami, 267 So.2d 321, 322 (Fla.1972); Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So.2d 623, 626-27 (Fla.1956); Hillsborough County v. Sutton, 150 Fla. 601, 8 So.2d 401, 402 (1942); Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So.2d 545, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); (b) the finding of wrongful repossession of the subject vessel by the defendants, see Quest v. Barnett Bank of Pensacola, 397 So.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Curfman, 386 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Waters, 273 So.2d 96, 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); and (c) the $10,000 compensatory damage award for the conversion of the plaintiff's personal property sued upon below. See Heintzelman's Truck Center, Inc. v. Gibson, 409 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for review denied, 419 So.2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1982); Doral Country Club, Inc. v. Lindgren Plumbing Co., 175 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 179 So.2d 212 (Fla.1965).

The defendant's point on appeal concerning the propriety of the $10,000 punitive damages award also has no merit. We reach this result based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.

First, the rule in Florida appears to be that punitive damages are always recoverable in intentional tort cases where malice is one of the essential elements of the tort. The underlying rationale for this rule is that the proof of malice required to make out the cause of action is also sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the defendant to permit the jury to award punitive damages as punishment. See, e.g., City of Hollywood v. Coley, 258 So.2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (false arrest and malicious prosecution); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (assault and battery); Holland v. Glass, 213 So.2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (assault and battery); Wrains v. Rose, 175 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (false arrest and malicious prosecution).

Second, the intentional tort of conversion, which we deal with in the instant case, does not contain malice as one of its essential elements, as the tort may be established upon a showing of the taking by the defendant of personal property belonging to the plaintiff upon a mistaken belief as to the legal right of the defendant to the converted property. This being so, the rule in conversion cases is that punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable where the evidence shows that the taking was accomplished under a mistaken belief that the defendant had a legal right to the property. General Finance Corp. of Jacksonville v. Sexton, 155 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). An exception to this rule is recognized, however, where there is some evidence in the record of actual malice or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights by the defendant in asserting dominion over the plaintiff's property--as this proof places the case squarely under the intentional tort-malice rule in which punitive damages are recoverable. Buie v. Barnett First Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 266 So.2d 657 (Fla.1972) (repossessor with knowledge that debtor not really in default made jury question as to punitive damages); Medel v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami, 365 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (summary judgment for defendant on punitive damages reversed), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 75 (Fla.1979); Bank of Miami v. Tambourine, 218 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (boat repossession similar to the instant case; evidence sufficient to support jury verdict on punitive damages).

Third, there is more than sufficient evidence in this record that the taking of the plaintiff's vessel and the personal property aboard the vessel was accomplished by the defendant Del Ray with reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights. The evidence discloses that the defendant failed to make the slightest inquiry which would have shown that the payments under the subject boat mortgage had been made by the plaintiff and that the mortgage was not in default;...