City of Denton v. Grim

• Decision Date: 29 August 2022
• Docket Number: 05-20-00945-CV
• Parties: CITY OF DENTON, Appellant v. MICHAEL GRIM AND JIM MAYNARD, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

CITY OF DENTON, Appellant v. MICHAEL GRIM AND JIM MAYNARD, Appellees

No. 05-20-00945-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

August 29, 2022

On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County Texas, Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08139

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Smith.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE.

Appellant City of Denton appeals a final judgment entered against it after a jury verdict in favor of appellees Michael Grim and Jim Maynard on their claims under the Texas Whistleblower Act (the Act).^[1] In four issues, the City argues the Act does not apply as a matter of law and the evidence is legally and factually insufficient. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Procedural Background

The facts are well known to the parties, and we do not detail them except as necessary to explain the basic reasons for our decision. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

Grim and Maynard sued the City in July 2017, claiming the City violated the Act in various respects regarding their employment. In their live pleading, Grim and Maynard claimed the City violated the Act by "terminating [them] on the basis of deliberately falsified accusations, and defaming them after the fact" in retaliation for their prior reports to City Attorney Anita Burgess about a leak of certain confidential information regarding the proposed Denton Energy Center (DEC),^[2] information that was provided by then-current city council member Keely Briggs to the Denton Record-Chronicle (DRC), the local daily newspaper, and was then published online. Grim and Maynard claim Briggs's disclosure to DRC violated the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), see Tex. Gov't Code §§ 551.001-.146, and the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA), see id., §§ 552.001-.376.

In its answer, the City generally denied appellees' claims and asserted various affirmative defenses but did not include a plea to the jurisdiction or mention immunity from suit or liability. According to the record before us, the City has not challenged jurisdiction or claimed immunity in the trial court or in this Court.

The case was tried to a jury. Fifteen witnesses testified, and more than eighty exhibits were admitted into evidence at trial.

At the close of appellees' case-in-chief, and again after both sides rested, the City moved for a directed verdict, arguing appellees failed to put on evidence they made a good faith report of a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or a public employee, with no mention of whether appellees' report had been made to an appropriate law enforcement authority. The trial court denied both motions.

During the formal charge conference, no objections were made to the charge, which instructed the jury, in part, "[a] party's conduct includes the conduct of its employees or of another who acts with the party's authority or apparent authority." The City did not object to that language and assigns no error regarding that instruction on appeal.

Over the City's objection,^[3] the court submitted one broad-form liability question for each appellee with related definitions and instructions, and the jury answered "yes" to both:

[Question 1 for Grim; Question 3 for Maynard]:

Was [appellee's] report of an alleged violation of law made in good faith and a cause of the termination of [his] employment?

The report was a cause of [his] termination if it would not have occurred when it did but for the report being made. [Appellee] does not have to prove the report was the sole cause of the termination. Rather, he must establish that he would not have been terminated had he not made a report of an alleged violation of law.

"Good faith," means that (1) [appellee] believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) his belief was reasonable in light of his training and experience.

Based on the jury's "yes" answers to both questions, the jury was also asked the following question for each appellee, to which the jury answered "no":

[Question 2 for Grim; Question 4 for Maynard]:

Would the City have taken the same action inquired about in [question 1 for Grim; question 3 for Maynard] against [appellee] when it did based solely on information, observation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that [appellee] made a report of violation of law?

The jury then assessed Grim's and Maynard's damages from their firings.

Both sides filed post-trial motions after the jury's verdict, and in the course of the parties' briefing, a question arose regarding the constitutionality of section 554.003(c)'s statutory caps-an issue not presented here.

The court denied the City's motion for JNOV, granted appellees' amended motion for judgment, and indicated that, as requested, the court would notify the attorney general regarding the question regarding constitutionality of the statutory caps.^[4] On July 31, 2020, the trial court entered a final judgment against the City and in appellees' favor in an amount totaling $2,759,195.49, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of five percent per annum. The City timely moved for a new trial, arguing there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings as to the elements that are now at issue in this appeal. After the motion for new trial was denied by operation of law, the City timely appealed.

II. Issues

The City presents four issues on appeal.^[5] Generally, the City maintains the Act does not apply as a matter of law because the reported violation of law was committed by Briggs, a person the City argues is not the employing governmental entity or its equivalent (first issue), and because the report was made to Burgess, a person the City argues is not an appropriate law enforcement authority (fourth issue). Additionally, the City argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that appellees' reports caused their firings (second issue) and that they had a good faith belief the conduct they reported was a violation of law (third issue). The City asks us to reverse and render judgment in its favor.

III. Applicable Standards

A. Standard and Scope of Review

"Statutory construction is a question of law for the court to decide[,]" and we "review legal questions de novo." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Our primary objective when construing a statute "is to determine the Legislature's intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the words chosen." Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. 2007)).

Generally, the "truest manifestation" of that intent is "what lawmakers enacted, the literal text they voted on." Id. (quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006)). "If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words according to their common meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids." Id. (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d at 917). "We use definitions the legislature prescribed and any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired." Id. (quoting City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008)). "Otherwise, '[w]ords not statutorily defined bear their common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result.'" Id. (quoting Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018)).

The proper points of error for evidentiary sufficiency challenges depend on whether the complaining party had the burden of proof, with legal sufficiency points of error designated as "no evidence points" or "matter of law points," and factual sufficiency points of error designated as "insufficient evidence points" or "great weight and preponderance points." See Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied). In this case, appellees had the burden of proof on the issues the City challenges in this appeal. See Tex. Gov't Code § 554.002(a) (public employee who sues under chapter 554 has burden of proof; except in some cases, a rebuttable presumption may apply); compare id. § 554.002(b) (describing employer's affirmative defense).

When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate that no evidence supports the finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam).^[6] To determine whether legally sufficient evidence exists to support the finding, we "must view the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). "Evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury finding when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact." Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016). The "final test for legal sufficiency" is "whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; see Office of Att'y Gen. v. Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d 183, 192 (Tex. 2020).

When a party challenges the factual...