City of Independence v. Peterson

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before SWOFFORD, P. J., PRITCHARD, C. J., and DIXON; PRITCHARD
• Citation: City of Independence v. Peterson, 550 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. App. 1977)
• Decision Date: 04 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. KCD,KCD
• Parties: CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, Respondent, v. Gerald D. PETERSON, Appellant. 28662.

Page 860

550 S.W.2d 860

CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, Respondent, v. Gerald D. PETERSON, Appellant.

No. KCD 28662.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District.

April 4, 1977.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied May 2, 1977.

Application to Transfer Denied June 14, 1977.

Michael E. Reardon, Kansas City, for appellant; Duncan & Russell, Kansas City, of counsel.

James S. Cottingham, City Counselor, Charles E. Sandage, Asst. City Counselor, Independence, for respondent.

Before SWOFFORD, P. J., PRITCHARD, C. J., and DIXON, J.

PRITCHARD, Chief Judge.

Appellant had been convicted upon three counts in the Municipal Court of the City of Independence, Missouri, for violation of traffic ordinances in failing to stop for three red traffic signal lights, and was there fined a total of $350.00 for the three offenses. On appeal to the circuit court, he was again convicted in a trial to the court of the three charges and was sentenced to 30 days confinement in jail on each offense, to run consecutively.

Appellant's first point is that the informations failed to set forth the material elements of the offenses as described in the city ordinances. Specifically, he contends that the informations failed to allege that the traffic lights were "official traffic devices placed under the provisions of this chapter." (Chap. 18, Art. 4, § 18.064, City of Independence, Missouri Code of Ordinances.) In Point II, it is argued that the City did not prove that the traffic signals were "official" or that they were "placed under the provisions of this chapter." These related points will be considered together.

The information of Uniform Traffic Ticket, No. 174727, charged appellant of the violation, "Failed to stop for the Red Signal Light at Winner and Sterling"; No. 174728, Failed to stop for a Red Signal Light at 15th Street and Sterling"; and No. 174731, "Failed to stop for a Flashing Red Light at Ash and 24 Highway." § 18.064 provides: "Obedience to Traffic-Control Devices. Drivers of all vehicles except authorized emergency vehicles on official emergency trips are required to observe the instructions of all official traffic devices placed under the provisions of this chapter. Such devices shall include * * * all mechanical traffic signals, * * *. Such devices shall be held to have the same authority as the personal direction of a police officer. " Each of the informations here allege the violations of "Art. No. 4 Sec. No. 18 Para 064."

Analogously, there are many civil cases, involving questions of negligence in the disobedience of traffic control devices, which hold that there is a rebuttable presumption that they were erected legally by the appropriate governing authority. See the extensive annotation, 3 A.L.R.3rd, 180, 287, § 11, where, on the effect in civil cases of violation of a claimed unauthorized stop sign, it is said that the weight of authority is that "the party relying upon such disregard need not prove that the signaling device was authorized and maintained by virtue of, and in accordance with, statutory or administrative authority, and unless the other party proves a lack of such authority, there is a presumption of due authorization upon which the party asserting a disregard of the signal may rely." See also the earlier annotation, 164 A.L.R. 8, 212, et seq., and the there cited case of Hartley v. McKee, 86 S.W.2d 359, 365(12) (Mo.App.1935), where it was contended that an instruction to the jury was in error because there was no evidence that stop signs were duly erected by proper authority. The court said, "We think there is no merit in this contention for the reason that there was no issue or dispute as to the existence of stop signs at the boulevard in question." The same issue was in Sponsler v. Schroeder, 72 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Mo.App.1934), and the court said, "We think, under the circumstances here, the court should presume that the erection of the stop sign at the intersection in question was duly authorized. This is so especially in view of the fact that defendant permitted the proofs made by plaintiff as to the presence of the stop sign at the intersection, and the failure of defendant to stop his car in compliance therewith, to go in without any objection or suggestion that there was no showing that the erection of the stop sign had been authorized." (The same is true here. Appellant made no objection to the evidence of the presence of the traffic control devices, that appellant went through the red lights, nor was there any suggestion at that time that they were not lawfully erected.)

Prosecutions for violation of a city ordinance are in this state regarded as a civil action with quasi-criminal aspects. Kansas City v. Howe,416 S.W.2d 683 (Mo.App.1967); Kansas City v. Martin, 369 S.W.2d 602 (Mo.App.1963). These holdings not only make the above civil cases applicable with reference to the existence of a rebuttable presumption of lawful placing of traffic devices, but make relevant criminal cases from other jurisdictions which have applied the presumption. In State v. Cooper, 129 N.J.Super. 229, 322 A.2d 836 (1974) (cert. denied, 66 N.J. 329, 331 A.2d 28 (1974)), the defendant was convicted for failing to stop for a red traffic signal light, under a statute almost identical with § 18.064, supra. On appeal, he contended that the state failed to prove that the traffic signal was placed in accordance with law. In rejecting the contention the court noted its determination that there existed a presumption as to the official nature and proper placement of traffic control devices in civil case...