City of Miami Beach v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 10 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1609,96-1609
• Citation: 702 So.2d 1329
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2750 CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, Petitioner, v. Kent Harrison ROBBINS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1329

702 So.2d 1329

22 Fla. L. Weekly D2750

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, Petitioner, v. Kent Harrison ROBBINS, Respondent.

No. 96-1609.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

Dec. 10, 1997.

John Dellagloria, North Miami, for petitioner.

Apgar & Pelham and Thomas Pelham, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Before NESBITT, COPE and SORONDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After the Miami Beach City Commission passed an ordinance which rezoned landowner Kent Harrison Robbins' property as well as the two blocks adjacent to his property, Robbins petitioned for certiorari review to the circuit court, appellate division, claiming that the Commission's decision constituted reverse spot zoning. ¹ The circuit court reviewing the Commission's determination granted the petition and quashed the rezoning ordinance as it pertained to Robbins' property. The City now petitions this court for certiorari review of the circuit court's decision. See Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 626 (Fla.1982). Our review is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). We deny the petition sought.

Reverse spot zoning occurs when a zoning ordinance prevents a property owner from utilizing his or her property in a certain way, when virtually all of the adjoining neighbors are not subject to such a restriction, creating, in effect, a veritable zoning island or zoning peninsula in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification. Reverse spot zoning is invalid, as it is confiscatory. See Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla.1957); City Comm'n v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); City of Coral Gables v. Wepman, 418 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Olive v. City of Jacksonville, 328 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); City of Miami v. Schutte, 262 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). See also 7 Fla. Jur.2d Building, Zoning & Land Controls § 161(1997).

The circuit court, reviewing the Commission's decision rezoning the blocks at issue, concluded that the surrounding property was "a vast sea of RM-2 and other types of zoning." Therefore, it reasoned, singling out the three blocks in question as the ordinance under review had done, created a "veritable island of RM-1 zoning". The City points to proposed amendments to the comprehensive plan ² as well as a study by local architectural experts, as providing support for its decision to downzone the property at issue. However, as Robbins demonstrated, at the time the Commission acted, the State had not yet approved the proposed amendments to the comprehensive plan ³, and the City had not yet acted on the proposed architectural study. Thus, we agree with the circuit court's analysis that at the time the Commission enacted the ordinance at issue, there was not substantial competent evidence to demonstrate why this property was being treated differently from all its similarly situated neighbors.

We do note, however, that this decision does not bar further action by the Commission as to this property. As observed in Turkey Creek Inc., v. City of Gainesville, 570 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990):

It is a general rule that a zoning classification which has been judicially approved will be upheld under the doctrine of res judicata "until a change in conditions warrants a different result." Starkey v. Okaloosa County, 512 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accord City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So.2d 473 (Fla.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 543, 2 L.Ed.2d 532 (1958). A former judgment sanctioning a zoning classification is regarded as res judicata if there exists in the prior and current actions identity between the parties, or those in privity with them, and identity of the causes of action.

Thomson v. Petherbridge, 472 So.2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Identity of causes of action "means an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the action." Prevatt, 97 So.2d at 477. Therefore, a party challenging the validity of a prior judgment may show that the facts essential to the prior judgment have significantly changed so as to defeat a finding of res judicata. As stated by the Supreme Court,

In fast growing [geographical] areas ... changes occur with great rapidity; it cannot, therefore, be said that, even where the same parties are involved, an adjudication of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance at any given time is necessarily res judicata or constitutes an estoppel by judgment in subsequent litigation between the same or different parties. (Emphasis added.)

In the three years since the Commission's decision, the State has approved the amendments to the comprehensive plan that the City here relies upon, and the City has demonstrated its intention to utilize the...