City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt

• Decision Date: 24 July 1957
• Citation: 97 So.2d 473
• Parties: CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Preston G. PREVATT, as ancillary administrator in Estate of Edith L. Trees, Deceased, et al., Appellees. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Gilda DAHLBERG, a widow, and Polly Lux, a free dealer, Appellees. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. TEDLAND REALTY CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 473

97 So.2d 473

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Preston G. PREVATT, as ancillary administrator in Estate of Edith L. Trees, Deceased, et al., Appellees.

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Gilda DAHLBERG, a widow, and Polly Lux, a free dealer, Appellees.

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. TEDLAND REALTY CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 24, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 1957.

Ben Shepard, Joseph A. Wanick and Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for appellant.

Hoffman, Kemper & Johnson, Miami Beach, and Shutts, Bowen, Simmons, Prevatt & Julian, Miami, for appellees.

Warren, Klein & Moore and Sibley & Davis, Miami Beach, for intervenors.

DREW, Justice.

These zoning cases were consolidated for trial in the lower court and after trial a decree was entered favorable to the contention of the property owners that the zoning ordinance of the City of Miami Beach, which classified the three parcels of land involved in the litigation in the three suits as single family estates, was unconstitutional and void insofar as it applied to their lands. The trial court decreed that the property owners were entitled to use their lands in such manner as would permit the construction thereon of apartments or hotels and enjoined the city from enforcing the zoning ordinance insofar as it limited the use of several properties to single family estate purposes.

Following the entry of the decree of the lower court certain property owners in the affected area applied to the lower court for permission to intervene, which was denied. Certiorari was taken to this Court. The order denying the right of the property owners to intervene was quashed and the intervention was allowed. Wags Transportation System, Inc., v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 1956, 88 So.2d 751. Thereafter the city and the intervenors appealed and the three suits were consolidated by this Court for consideration and are disposed of by this single opinion.

The subject zoning ordinance of the City of Miami Beach was adopted December 3, 1930 pursuant to Chapter 9837, Special Acts of 1923, and at a time when the population of the City of Miami Beach was about 6,000. The several parcels of land involved in this litigation are a part of a strip of land approximately a mile and a half in length from north to south between the Firestone estate and the Royal York Hotel property and lying between Collins Avenue and the Atlantic Ocean. The 1930 ordinance classified this property in a manner which restricted its use to single family purposes. Its designation under the ordinance as single family estates has remained in effect from the date of the ordinance to this time. Similar land lying to the south of the aforementioned strip of land was classified in a like manner under the original zoning ordinance but in the case of City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., Fla.1949, 45 So.2d 681, this Court held on rehearing that such original ordinance, insofar as it applied to the land involved in that litigation (the old Firestone estate consisting of some 7 1/2 acres), was unconstitutional and void. The result of that decision was to reclassify the lands there in question for hotel and apartment house purposes. This decision was handed down in 1949 and marked the beginning of a long secries of cases obviously designed to open up all of the property above described north of the Firestone estate for hotels and apartments.

The next case which appeared before us involving portions of this land was City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, Fla.1953, 71 So. 2d 148, wherein we reversed a decree of the trial court which held the ordinance aforesaid unreasonable and unconstitutional as to ten separate parcels of land lying within this area of approximately a mile and a half. In that case we again approved and confirmed the 'fairly debatable' rule in zoning litigation which, it was argued, had been abandoned or overruled in City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Company, supra. On this subject and with reference to this rule, this Court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Mathews, in City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 493, 494:

'In the case of State ex rel. Office Realty Co. v. Ehinger, Fla., 46 So.2d 601, decided May 30, 1950, which is subsequent to the opinion on rehearing in City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., supra, this court went back to its original holding in the case of State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville [101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114], supra, and City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co. [147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364], supra, to the effect that with reference to zoning, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the municipality but will sustain the legislative intent of the ordinance if the matter is 'fairly debatable."

Reverting now to City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, supra, where we again affirmed and adhered to the 'fairly debatable' rule--from which we have not since departed--we said :

'The effect of the trial court's ruling was to hold that the ordinance was unreasonable and not 'fairly debatable'. In so holding did he properly appraise the evidence? In its highly controversial state did the trial court substitute his judgment for that of the City Council, and under the circumstances was he warranted in doing so? The leading case in the country on the question is Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016, but we do not have to leave our own State in search of law to settle the point. In addition to the last cited case, appellant relies on State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114, City of Miami Beach v. Elsalto Real Estate, Inc., Fla., 63 So.2d 495, Segal v. City of Miami, Fla., 63 So.2d 496, and State ex rel. Office Realty Co. v. Ehinger, Fla., 46 So.2d 601. Appellee relies on Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642, City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364, and City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., Fla., 45 So.2d 681.

'Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. approved the authority of a municipality to promulgate zoning regulations on the theory that the increase and concentration of population has developed and will continually require more restrictions in respect to the use of private property in urban centers. This case also promulgated the doctrine of legislative classification for zoning purposes and declared that if 'fairly debatable' it should be upheld. The argument in the case at bar revolves around this doctrine.' (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, involved in the Lachman case was the vital question of the effect of a decree concerning ten very substantial portions of land in this questionable area on the entire zoning ordinance of the City of Miami Beach. We recognize the basic responsibility of the City Council in determining the appropriate classification of the property in the City under its zoning ordinances and in weighing this vital point and the fact that the Council of the City has exercised its judgment in declaring the property to be properly zoned for residential estate purposes, we said in that case:

'The amount of property involved is so great that to change its classification would be to necessarily affect the entire general zoning plan of the city. These are matters for the city to settle an adjust and when they enter the picture the Court should not invade the city's authority absent a paramount constitutional right which is not shown in this case.' (Emphasis added.)

At the time the Lachman case was pending, we were also considering on certiorari the case of City of Miami Beach v. Kay, Fla. 1954, 71 So.2d 725. The property involved in the Kay litigation lay to the south and adjacent to the property which the City of Miami Beach was seeking to condemn and which is referred to in City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, supra, and City of Miami Beach v. Elsalto Real Estate, Inc., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 495. The property involved in the Lachman litigation adjoined the property then being condemned on the north. In the Kay case we held, on certiorari :

'If and when the title to such lots for park purposes is acquired, we think the case is ruled by the City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., last cited. * * * If, however, the City of Miami Beach should fail to acquire the property for park purposes, then this case would be ruled by City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, * * *'

The effect of that holding at that time and under the conditions then prevailing was to say that if the City of Miami Beach acquired the land it sought to condemn and converted it to park purposes, such land would constitute a buffer zone which would properly separate the hotel and apartment property to the south from the residential area to the north.

The case of City of Miami Beach v. Lachman made its second appearance in this Court in 1956 and was disposed of by per curiam opinion. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, Fla.1956, 85 So.2d 226. In the per curiam opinion we acknowledged our familiarity with the history of the zoning litigation of...