City of Miami v. Cosgrove
Decision Date | 22 December 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 86-2015,86-2015 |
Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 5 CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, and Herbert Breslow, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Michael M. COSGROVE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Peter J. Hurtgen and Jean F. Reed, Miami, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Stinson, Lyons & Schuette and Thomas B. Bourque, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before HUBBART, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
We conclude that the exclusive remedy for noncompliance with Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1983), is injunctive relief as provided in Section 112.534, Florida Statutes (1983), and accordingly reverse the money judgment for the appellee, Michael M. Cosgrove.
Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1983), popularly known as the Policeman's Bill of Rights, gives to law enforcement and correctional officers certain detailed procedural rights and privileges and, pertinent to the present case, provides:
When Cosgrove was removed from his non-civil-service position as Assistant Chief of Police without notice or statement of reasons and returned to his permanent civil-service rank of Captain of Police, he sued the appellants for damages only, alleging that they had violated the above subsections. 1 1 A jury returned a verdict in Cosgrove's favor. On appeal, the appellants contend, inter alia, that relief under the Policeman's Bill of Rights is exclusively injunctive. Because we decide this issue in the appellants' favor, we need not reach any other issues raised by them or any issues raised by Cosgrove in his cross-appeal.
Section 112.534 of the Policeman's Bill of Rights provides as follows:
"Failure to comply.--If any agency employing law enforcement officers or correctional officers fails to comply with the requirements of this part, a law enforcement officer or correctional officer employed by such agency who is personally injured by such failure to comply may apply directly to the circuit court of the county wherein such employing agency is headquartered and permanently resides for an injunction to restrain and enjoin such violation of the provisions of this part and to compel the performance of the duties imposed by this part."
Section 112.534 is the only remedy provision of Part VI of Chapter 112, and thus the only express remedy provision applicable to alleged breaches of Section 112.532(4) and (5).
Clearly, Section 112.534 provides only for a suit for an injunction, not for an action for damages. The applicable rule of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius: where one thing is expressed and others are not, the Legislature is presumed to have intended to omit the items not expressed. This rule of construction is well established, see, e.g., Finkelstein v. North Broward Hospital District, 484 So.2d 1241 (Fla.1986); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla.1976); Baeza v. Pan American/National Airlines, Inc., 392 So.2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), as is its applicability to a statute which provides one remedy to the exclusion of others. 2 Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 21 A.D.2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 718, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929, 205 N.E.2d 196 (1965) ( ); see also Gunn v. Robles, 100 Fla. 816, 817, 130 So. 463, 463 (1930) (); Department of Professional Regulation v. Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, 475 So.2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (same). The rule is particularly applicable where, as here, the statute being construed creates a new right and prescribes a specific remedy for the enforcement of that right. See State ex rel. Reno v. Barquet, 358 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ( ); Burland, Reiss, Murphy, & Mosher, Inc. v. Schmidt, 78 Mich.App. 670, 673-74, 261 N.W.2d 540, 542 (1977) ( )(footnote omitted).
We thus think that the correct construction of Section 112.534 is that given it by our sister court in Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So.2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 431 So.2d 986 (Fla.1983), where it was decided that the plaintiff/law enforcement officers were required to bring their claims for reinstatement to the appropriate administrative board and were not entitled to avail themselves of the injunctive remedy of Section 112.534:
Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So.2d at 65. Section 112.534, then, is no more than a vehicle for enforcing the procedures established in the preceding sections of this part of the statute; it is not a vehicle for the restoration of substantive rights, whether the restoration is sought by mandamus, injunction, or, as here, an action for damages.
Cosgrove contends, however, that even if no action for damages lies, the appellants' claim in this respect, being raised for the first time on appeal, has been waived. We disagree. While generally we will not consider on appeal an issue not presented to the trial court, an exception exists where the issue for our consideration is one of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Swebilius v. Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, 365 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). The issue in this case--whether the Policeman's Bill of Rights empowers a trial court to entertain an action for damages--is, in our view, an issue concerning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction--that is, "the power of the court to deal with a class of cases to which the particular case belongs, and ... the power of the court to adjudge as to the general question involved before it." Swebilius v. Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, 365 So.2d at 1070 (...
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Diaz v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
...have found that section 112.532 does not create a private right of action for money damages. See City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam) (finding that section 112.534 provides the only express remedy for alleged violations of section 112.532,......
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