City of Moorpark v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 12 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. B093952,B093952 |
| Citation | 43 Cal.App.4th 728,50 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 43 Cal.App.4th 728 43 Cal.App.4th 728, 61 Cal. Comp. Cases 207, 5 A.D. Cases 497, 7 NDLR P 441, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1776, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3019 CITY OF MOORPARK, et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Ventura, Respondent; Theresa L. DILLON, Real Party in Interest. |
Cheryl J. Kane, City Attorney, City of Moorpark; and Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Harold A. Bridges and Heather C. Beatty, Los Angeles, for Petitioners.
Armstrong & North, and William J. Armstrong, San Jose, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Maury Mills Jr., Ventura, for Real Party in Interest.
Brad Seligman, Berkley, and Elaine Feingold; Christopher Ho, San Francisco, and Joseph Posner, Encino, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
No appearance for Respondent.
Steven C. Owyang, Ann M. Noel, San Francisco, as Amici Curiae.
An employee is injured at work. After recovering from her injury she is terminated from her employment. May she sue her employer in court for discrimination because of her physical disability? Yes. Under Government Code section 12993, subdivision (a) she is not barred from doing so by the workers' compensation laws.
This matter comes to us by way of a writ petition filed in response to the superior court overruling a demurrer.
For the purpose of review, we look to the facts of the complaint. (White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 765, 120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222 [].)
Theresa Dillon worked for the City of Moorpark (City) as an administrative secretary. She suffered a work-related injury to her knee and filed a workers' compensation claim.
After Dillon recovered from knee surgery, her doctor released her to return to work in February of 1994. Dillon's supervisor, however, told her she had been terminated from employment.
In the middle of March of 1994, Dillon informed City that she would like her job back. She told City she would be able to do her work if the City made certain accommodations. Dillon's former supervisor wrote her and said City would not rehire her.
Dillon filed a charge of discrimination with the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission. She received a letter from the Commission which authorized her to bring a civil lawsuit. (Gov.Code, § 12965, subd. (a).) Dillon filed an action against City and two former supervisors alleging discrimination because of her physical disability; wrongful termination; breach of implied-in-fact contract of employment and infliction of emotional distress.
City and the two supervisors filed demurrers to the complaint in which they argued that respondent superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because the workers' compensation laws are the exclusive remedy for such claims. (See Lab.Code, §§ 132a, 3600, 3601, 3602.) To support this contention, they stated that Dillon filed a workers' compensation petition that alleged her injury arose out of her employment and, as such, she was being unlawfully discriminated against for filing a compensation claim. 1
Respondent superior court overruled the demurrers to the causes of action for discrimination and wrongful termination. It sustained the demurrers to the cause of action for breach of contract without leave to amend. It sustained, with leave to amend, the demurrers to the cause of action for infliction of emotional distress. 2 City sought relief by way of a petition for writ of mandate.
Courts of Appeal do not normally grant hearings on petitions seeking extraordinary relief in matters which arise out of the overruling of a demurrer. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273-1274, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66.) The issues tendered here, however, are of such importance that they merit pre-trial review. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1037, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 133.) We have therefore stayed the proceedings pending review of the writ petition, and have issued an order to show cause.
City argues that Dillon's sole remedy is found in Labor Code section 132a. 3 It mentions the so-called "compensation bargain" of workers' compensation law, which it argues governs Dillon's grievance. Under the compensation bargain, an employer assumes absolute liability for any employee's claims for work-related injury, disability or death, without regard to fault. In exchange, the employee accepts limits upon the amount of damages. (E.g., see Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 15-16, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054; Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 664, 667, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34.)
Since its inception in 1913, the Workers' Compensation Act has afforded workers of this state a means to swiftly secure compensation for work-related injuries. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) (1 Herlick, Cal. Workers' Compensation Law Practice (4th ed. 1990) § 1.1, p. 3.)
The intent of the Workers' Compensation Act is to furnish employees with the means to seek compensatory damages for the diverse kinds of injuries which they may suffer at job sites. (Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1061, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150.) (Waggener v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1080, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 141.)
The workers' compensation law is generally viewed by the Legislature and by the courts as the exclusive remedy for any employee who suffers injury that arises out of his or her employment. (Lab.Code, §§ 3600, 3602; Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054; Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d 743.) The rule of liberal application is to be applied even where doing so would deny a party the right to seek a remedy at law. (Arriaga v. County of Alameda, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1065, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150.)
Section 132a of the Labor Code proclaims that it is the "policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment." Courts have held that this provision of the Labor Code affords an employee a remedy for discrimination arising from, or attributable to, the occurrence of an industrial injury. (Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 668, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564.)
Appellate courts have ruled that an employee's claim of disability discrimination, arising out of a work-related injury, is preempted by the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation law. (E.g., see Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 666, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34; Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 981, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541; Usher v. American Airlines, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1526, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 335.)
In Langridge, plaintiff attempted to sue her employer, a school district, under the Fair Employment Housing Act (FEHA). She alleged the school district discriminated against her because of her physical disability. (Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 666-667, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34.) The Court of Appeal held that, because the employee's claim of discrimination arose out of a work-related injury, her claim was barred by the workers' compensation doctrine of exclusivity. (Id. at p. 669, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34.)
At the time of Langridge's claim of discrimination, Government Code section 12993, subdivision (a) read: "Nothing contained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any provisions of the Civil Rights Law or any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age."
On January 1, 1994, the Legislature amended the statute to include the following phrase: "... unless those provisions provide less protection to the enumerated classes of persons covered under this part." (Gov.Code, § 12993, subd. (a), emphasis added.)
Dillon and her Amici distinguish Langridge from the instant case. It is their position that under the 1994 amendment, persons who have become disabled at their place of employment may now seek redress under the FEHA. (See California Employment Law Reporter (January 1995, Issue No. 1) 1, 3-4.)
In response, City and its Amici contend that when the Legislature drafted amendments to Government Code section 12993, it intended to amend only those laws that prohibited discrimination in housing. They point out that the amendment was necessary to bring California's housing laws into conformance with federal laws. California could thus continue to receive federal funds with which to enforce housing law violations. City requests we look behind the statute and determine the raison d'etre for section 12993. It argues that legislative history shows the statute does not mean what it says.
This argument ignores the hoary maxim that the plain language of a statute proscribes its interpretation by the courts. (Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (1947) 47 Col.L.Rev. 527 (hereafter Reading of Statutes ).) "When statutory language is clear and unambiguous,...
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