Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, B091035
Decision Date | 26 October 1995 |
Docket Number | No. B091035,B091035 |
Citation | 39 Cal.App.4th 1078,46 Cal.Rptr.2d 141 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8400, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,448 Rosemary WAGGENER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. |
Kosnett & Durchfort and David E. Durchfort, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael H. Manning, Van Nuys, and Wendi Wagner Breddan, Van Nuys, for defendant and respondent.
The question presented in this case is whether jurors are employees within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act ( ), or are otherwise subject to the provisions of the Act, such that the Act provides the exclusive remedy to a juror injured while on jury service.
Plaintiff and appellant Rosemary Waggener alleges that she was injured when, while serving as a juror in a criminal trial, she slipped and fell exiting a jury box in Los Angeles Superior Court. Plaintiff sued defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles for negligence and premises liability, seeking to recover damages for lost wages, hospital and medical expenses, and other unspecified damages.
The County moved for summary judgment, contending that the Act provides the sole and exclusive forum for redress of plaintiff's complaints against the County. The trial court, concluding that plaintiff was an "employee" of the County within the meaning of the Act, granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's determination that she was an employee of the County for purposes of the Act. We affirm the judgment.
The Act provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who suffers an injury arising out of or in the course of his or her employment. (Lab.Code, § 3600.) The Act is to be construed liberally "with the purpose of extending [its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment." (Lab.Code, § 3202.)
Labor Code section 3351 defines an "employee" as "... every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, ..." Specifically included within the definition of the term "employee" are, for example, all elected and appointed paid public officers (Lab.Code, § 3351, subd. (b)) and all persons incarcerated in a state penal or correctional institution while engaged in assigned work (Lab.Code, § 3351, subd. (e)). Moreover, Labor Code section 3357 provides that "Any person rendering The Legislature has also identified other categories of persons who perform public or quasi-public services but who do not otherwise fit within the common law definition of the term "employee," and has mandated their inclusion within the workers' compensation system. (See, e.g., Lab.Code, §§ 3362.5 [deputized citizens] 3600.6 [disaster service workers].)
service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded herein, is presumed to be an employee."
Jurors are not specifically mentioned in the Act. Thus, they are neither designated as persons who do not fit the traditional definition of employees who are nevertheless included within the workers' compensation system, nor as employees specifically excluded from the provisions of the Act. We are therefore called upon to determine whether a juror is an employee for purposes of the Act in the absence of a specific pronouncement by the Legislature.
Plaintiff relies exclusively on a series of out-of-state cases which have held that a juror is not an employee for purposes of those states' workers' compensation laws. In Lockerman v. Prince George's County (1977) 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177, for example, the Supreme Court of Maryland focused on the relationship of jurors to the County which calls them to serve. The court noted that the one element common to all employment relationships is the voluntary concurrence of the parties--that is, a contract. The court observed that voluntary assent is wholly lacking in the relationship of juror to the County which he or she serves, because a citizen summoned for jury duty simply cannot decline to appear and serve. (Id., 377 A.2d at p. 1181; accord In re O'Malley's Case (1972) 361 Mass. 504, 281 N.E.2d 277; Silagy v. State of New Jersey and Mercer County (1969) 105 N.J.Super. 507, 253 A.2d 478; Hicks v. Guilford County (1966) 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240; Board of Com'rs of Eagle County v. Evans (1936) 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225, 226.) As another court noted, (Board of Com'rs of Eagle County v. Evans, supra, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225, 226.) Moreover, (Hicks v. Guilford County, supra, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243.) The foregoing cases uniformly conclude that jurors are not employees, and are not subject to the provisions of their states' respective workers' compensation laws, because their relationship to the County does not fit squarely within the common law definition of the employment relationship.
Our Supreme Court, however, has cautioned against adhering to a rigid contractual analysis to determine whether a person rendering services to another is an employee for purposes of the Act. Thus, in Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150 (hereafter Arriaga), the Supreme Court reiterated that (Arriaga, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1061, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150.) When viewed in this light, we think it clear that jurors are "employees" for purposes of the Act.
The purpose of the Act is to protect individuals against the special risks of employment. (Arriaga, supra, 9 Cal.4th, at p. 1061, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150; In applying the foregoing principles, our courts have extended coverage of the Act to a city job applicant injured "as part of a 'tryout' competition for the position of 'refuse crew worker,' " although he was obviously not an "employee" in the contractual sense at the time of the injury. (Laeng, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p....
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...for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.' (Lab.Code, § 3202.)" (Waggener v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1080, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 141.) The workers' compensation law is generally viewed by the Legislature and by the courts as the exclusive re......
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