City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 27441.,27441.
• Citation: 139 Idaho 65,72 P.3d 905
• Parties: CITY OF SANDPOINT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

72 P.3d 905

139 Idaho 65

CITY OF SANDPOINT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 27441.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, May 2003 Term.

June 19, 2003.

Bruce H. Greene, Sandpoint, for appellant. Mr. Greene waived oral argument.

Scott W. Reed, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Mr. Reed argued.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment holding that because the City of Sandpoint had established a functioning street department, it and not the Sandpoint Independent Highway District has control over all of the streets within the city limits. We reverse the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a continuation of an ongoing dispute between the City of Sandpoint (City) and the Sandpoint Independent Highway District (Highway District) over which entity has responsibility for the maintenance of the City's streets. The City was initially organized as a village in 1900, and is presently a municipal corporation. The Highway District was formed in 1930, and its boundaries are nearly coterminous with those of the City. The Highway District includes approximately 1220 feet of roadway that is outside the City, and there is a small area in the northern end of the City that is outside the Highway District. In prior litigation between the parties, this Court held "that the Highway District has exclusive general supervisory authority to maintain the streets within the Highway District absent a showing by the City that it has a functioning street department." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994).

On May 17, 2000, the City passed various resolutions concerning the establishment of a street department as a division of the City's Public Works Department. The resolutions expanded the duties of that Department to include "total maintenance, construction, reconstruction, repair, storm water management, snow removal, sanding, and traffic control of the City's highway and street system"; established standards and specifications for streets and rights-of-way within the City; established a permit system for encroachments on streets and public rights-of-way within the City; and authorized the Street Department to acquire by lease or purchase two motor graders, a front end loader, a snow blower, a water/de-icer truck, and a sander truck.

On May 18, 2000, the City commenced this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that it has a functioning street department and therefore has exclusive general supervisory authority for the maintenance, construction, repair, reconstruction, storm water management, snow removal, sanding and traffic control of the public streets within the City. On August 4, 2000, the City filed an amended complaint adding two more causes of action. By one it sought to enjoin the Highway District from exercising any supervisory control of any nature over the public streets within the City. By the other it sought to impound monies raised by the Highway District pursuant to a special levy instituted in January 2000, to require the Highway District to pay certain funds to the City, and to enjoin it from making any levy upon real property within the City.

The Highway District responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Because it presented matters outside the complaint in support of that motion, the district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment. The City also moved for summary judgment. After oral argument on the motions, the district court issued an order denying the Highway District's motion and granting the City's motion in part. The district court ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the City had a functioning street department and that, under the applicable statutes, the City therefore had responsibility for the maintenance of all public streets within its boundaries. The district court reserved ruling on issues regarding the Highway District's taxing authority. After the district court certified the partial summary judgment as final, the Highway District timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Id.

Idaho Code § 40-1333 provides: "Cities, with city highway systems, shall be responsible for the construction, reconstruction and maintenance of highways in their respective city systems, except as provided in section 40-607, Idaho Code."¹ A "city system" means "all public highways within the corporate limits of a city, with a functioning street department, except those highways which are under federal control, a part of the state highway system, part of a highway district system or an extension of a rural major collector route as specified in section 40-607, Idaho Code." IDAHO CODE § 40-104 (2002).

Likewise, Idaho Code § 40-1310 provides: "The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway system...." A "highway district system" is defined as "all public highways within each highway district, except those included within the state highway system, those under another state agency, those included within city highway systems of incorporated cities with a functioning street department, and those under federal control." IDAHO CODE § 40-109 (2002). In addition, Idaho Code § 50-1330 limits the jurisdiction of some highway districts. It provides that in a county with highway districts,² the highway district board of commissioners "shall have exclusive general supervisory authority over all public streets and public rights of way under their jurisdiction within their district, excluding public streets and public rights of way located inside of an incorporated city that has a functioning street department." Thus, the above statutes, insofar as is relevant to this case, provide that a city with a functioning street department has jurisdiction over all public highways within its corporate limits, except those highways that are part of a highway district system, and a highway district has jurisdiction over all public highways within the highway district, except those included within a city highway system of an incorporated city with a functioning street department.

The district court held that the City had a functioning street department because "it has established a department responsible for maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic control of streets within Sandpoint's city limits." The district court further held that the creation of such street department automatically vested the City with jurisdiction over the streets within its boundaries, including those that had previously been within the boundaries of the Highway District.

The Highway District argues that the creation of the street department did not automatically grant the City jurisdiction over all city streets. It relies upon Idaho Code § 50-1301, which defines a "functioning street department" as follows: "A city department responsible for the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic control of a public highway or public street system and which receives funds from the highway distribution account to local units of government pursuant to section 40-709, Idaho Code." The Highway District focuses on the phrase "responsible for the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic control of a public highway or public street system." It argues that the City's Public Works Department cannot be a functioning street department because it is not responsible for the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic control of any streets. According to the Highway District, the City's Public Works Department cannot become responsible for any streets that were within the Highway District boundaries unless the Highway District first loses its jurisdiction over those streets, such as by dissolution of the Highway District³ or by detachment from the District.⁴ Thus, the issue is what triggers the City's right to exercise jurisdiction over the streets within its city limits.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). It must begin with the literal words of the statute, Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (2001). If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2002). If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended...