City of Seattle v. Quezada
| Decision Date | 03 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 58710-2-I.,No. 58336-1-I.,58336-1-I.,58710-2-I. |
| Citation | 174 P.3d 129,142 Wn. App. 43 |
| Parties | CITY OF SEATTLE, Petitioner, v. Jesus QUEZADA, Respondent. City of Seattle, Respondent, v. Scott Winebrenner, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Theodore Wayne Vosk, Law Offices of Vosk & Velasquez, Bellevue, WA, Schoen R. Parnell, Attorney at Law, Kenmore, WA, Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Law Offices of Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 In unrelated prosecutions, the trial court found Jesus Quezada and Scott Winebrenner guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) after revoking their deferred prosecutions. Under RCW 46.61.5055, the court is required to impose an enhanced sentence for DUI based on the number of statutorily designated "prior offenses" occurring "within seven years" of the defendant's arrest for the current offense. We conclude that under the plain meaning of the term, "within seven years" designates the period both before and after the arrest for the current offense. We further conclude that the revoked deferred prosecution for the current offense does not count as a prior offense for sentencing purposes. Because the superior court miscalculated the defendant's prior offenses in each of these cases, we reverse both decisions and remand for resentencing.
¶ 2 Jesus Quezada was convicted of DUI in 2001. In 2003, following a second charge of DUI arising from an arrest in 2002, he entered into a deferred prosecution in Seattle Municipal Court. See RCW 10.05.010. In 2005, after a third charge of DUI, Quezada pleaded guilty to reckless driving.
¶ 3 Based on the reckless driving conviction, the trial court revoked Quezada's 2003 deferred prosecution and found him guilty of DUI. At sentencing, the City of Seattle argued that because Quezada had an alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 and "two or more" prior DUI offenses, the court was required to impose an enhanced minimum sentence that included 120 days in jail and 150 days of home monitoring. See RCW 46.61.5055(3)(b). The trial court rejected this argument, concluding that the 2001 DUI was Quezada's sole prior offense, which mandated an enhanced minimum sentence including 45 days in jail and 90 days of electronic home monitoring. See RCW 46.61.5055(2)(b).
¶ 4 On RALJ appeal, the superior court affirmed the determination that Quezada had only one prior offense.1 We granted the City's motion for discretionary review.
¶ 5 Scott Winebrenner was charged with DUI in 2001 and entered into a deferred prosecution. In 2005, after being charged with a second DUI, Winebrenner pleaded guilty to reckless driving. In December 2005, based on the reckless driving conviction, the trial court revoked Winebrenner's 2001 deferred prosecution and found him guilty of DUI. At sentencing, the City of Seattle argued that both the 2001 deferred prosecution and the 2005 reckless driving conviction constituted prior offenses for purposes of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. The trial court concluded that Winebrenner had no prior offenses.
¶ 6 On RALJ appeal, the superior court reversed, agreeing with the City that RCW 46.61.5055 required the inclusion of both the 2001 deferred prosecution and the 2005 reckless driving conviction as prior offenses for purposes of sentence enhancement. We granted Winebrenner's motion for discretionary review and linked Winebrenner's and Quezada's appeals for disposition.
¶ 7 The City contends the sentencing court erred when it determined that Quezada's 2001 DUI conviction was his sole prior offense at the time of the 2005 DUI. We agree that under RCW 46.61.5055, the court was required to count both the 2001 DUI and the 2005 reckless driving convictions as prior offenses. But we reject the City's claim that the revoked 2003 deferred prosecution for the current offense constituted a third prior offense.2
¶ 8 In order to address the issues raised in these appeals, we must construe the terms "prior offense" and "within seven years" as used throughout RCW 46.61.5055. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. State v. Hahn, 83 Wash.App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996). Our duty is "to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature." Hahn, 83 Wash.App. at 831, 924 P.2d 392. But when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the legislative intent is clear and no further construction is permitted. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). A statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable. State v. Leyda, 157 Wash.2d 335, 352, 138 P.3d 610 (2006). Over the years, the Legislature has provided increasingly detailed instructions to implement its intent for sentencing those who commit DUI offenses.
¶ 9 Immediately before imposing sentence for a DUI conviction, the sentencing court must verify the defendant's current criminal history and driving record, including all previous convictions and orders of deferred prosecution. RCW 46.61.513(1), (3). RCW 46.61.5055 then directs the court to impose increasingly severe minimum penalties for the DUI conviction based on the number of the defendant's "prior offenses" that occurred "within seven years." Significantly, the Legislature has defined both of these terms.
¶ 10 A "prior offense" for purposes of DUI sentencing is one of the convictions specified in RCW 46.61.5055(12)(a),3 including DUI convictions and certain convictions resulting from an initial charge of DUI, such as Quezada's 2005 reckless driving conviction. See RCW 46.61.5055(12)(a)(v). Under the circumstances, the Legislature's definition of "prior offense" could not be clearer, and its application to the issues raised in these appeals leaves no room for further construction.
¶ 11 The Legislature's definition of "within seven years" is equally clear. "Within seven years" means that "the arrest for a prior offense occurred within seven years of the arrest for the current offense." RCW 46.61.5055(12)(b). Because the court applies this definition at the time of sentencing, the plain meaning of the term "within seven years" encompasses the period both before and after the arrest date for the current offense.
¶ 12 Because the arrest dates for Quezada's 2001 DUI and 2005 reckless driving convictions occurred within seven years of the 2002 arrest for his current DUI, he had two prior offenses.
¶ 13 Quezada and Amicus curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argue at great length that because the term "prior" is not defined in RCW 46.61.5055, it must be construed to have its general meaning of "preceding in time" when modifying "offense" and that the arrest for a "prior offense" must therefore precede the arrest for the current offense. Because Quezada's arrest for the 2001 DUI conviction was the sole arrest preceding the arrest for his 2003 DUI deferred prosecution, they maintain the sentencing court correctly determined he had only one prior offense.
¶ 14 But Quezada's arguments ignore the statutory definition of "within seven years." Moreover, they require removal of the word "prior" from its context in RCW 46.61.5055, where it is used solely in the term "prior offense." Such an analysis is ultimately irrelevant because the Legislature has the power to define crimes and set punishment. See State v. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d 765, 771, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). Here, the Legislature has exercised its prerogative to define the term "prior offense" precisely as it intended: the specific events listed in RCW 46.61.5055(12)(a). This definition is unambiguous and permits no further judicial construction. Consequently, the omission of a definition for the word "prior" is of no moment, and we need not speculate about its meaning in another context.
¶ 15 Quezada and Amicus contend that when a defendant's deferred prosecution for a DUI is revoked following commission of a second DUI, our construction leads to the "absurd" result of both offenses being sentenced with enhanced penalties, in effect, as second offenses under RCW 46.61.5055. Quezada also maintains that such an approach violates the Legislature's intent to "promote proportionate punishment."
¶ 16 But our reading is fully consistent with the Legislature's DUI sentencing scheme, which directs the sentencing court to impose enhanced penalties for multiple offenses based on the defendant's complete criminal history at the time of sentencing. Such an approach also minimizes the ability of a party to circumvent the Legislature's intent by manipulating sentencing dates for multiple offenses based on the date of arrest. Quezada has not cited any relevant authority suggesting that a defendant who commits multiple DUI offenses has a vested interest in having one of the offenses punished as though the other did not exist. The unambiguous statutory definitions of "prior offense" and "within seven years" in RCW 46.61.5055 further the Legislature's goal of protecting the public "from the grave danger of repeated drunken driving." City of Bremerton v. Tucker, 126 Wash.App. 26, 34, 103 P.3d 1285 (2005).
¶ 17 We note that the Legislature is well aware of how to specify DUI mandatory penalties based on a strictly chronological sequence of events. Former RCW 46.61.5051, a predecessor to the current DUI sentencing provisions, specified certain mandatory minimum penalties based on prior convictions "committed within five years before commission of the current violation." See Laws of 1994, ch. 275, § 4. The Legislature later...
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