City of Seattle v. Williams
| Decision Date | 12 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 49670-6,49570-0 and 49569-6,s. 49670-6 |
| Citation | 101 Wn.2d 445,680 P.2d 1051 |
| Parties | The CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Jonathan R. WILLIAMS, Petitioner. The CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Elvira NUGENT, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction--Jury--Right to Trial by Jury--Waiver--Advisement of Rights. In order to show an effective waiver of a jury trial in a court of limited jurisdiction the record must not only show a knowing and intelligent waiver, but must also show that the defendant was advised of his constitutional right to trial by jury. A local court rule providing for waiver in the absence of a demand for a jury trial is invalid.
2. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction--Jury--Right to Trial by Jury--Advance Notice--Validity--Withdrawal of Waiver. A defendant may be required to indicate at the time of arraignment whether he chooses a jury trial provided that any waiver is in writing and accompanied by an advisement of constitutional rights and a period of at least 10 days to change his mind. Withdrawal of a waiver after the 10-day period lies within the discretion of the court but should be granted unless the purpose of withdrawal is delay or withdrawal would unduly impede the cause of justice.
3. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction--Certiorari--Effect of RALJ on Interlocutory Review. Statutory certiorari is available to review interlocutory decisions in courts of limited jurisdiction even though a final judgment in the case may be appealed under RALJ. In deciding whether to grant such a review, a superior court must consider whether completion of a case and appeal of the interlocutory ruling would constitute an adequate remedy at law within the meaning of RCW 7.16.040.
4. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction--Certiorari--Finality of Decision. A superior court decision after issuing a statutory writ to review an interlocutory decision of a court of limited jurisdiction is final and the issue may not be raised again in a later RALJ appeal.
5. Appeal and Error--Courts of Limited Jurisdiction--Certiorari--Appellate Review. A superior court decision on a statutory writ of review to a court of limited jurisdiction is subject to discretionary review by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court under RAP 2.3 but is not appealable as a matter of right under RAP 2.2.
6. Certiorari--Criminal Law--Indigents--Review of Statutory Writ. A statutory writ of review in superior court involving a criminal case in a court of limited jurisdiction is a criminal case for purposes of RAP 15.2, which deals with public funding of indigent appeals, and an indigent defendant has a right to review of the superior court action at public expense.
Robert Goldsmith, Mark Leemon, Seattle-King County, Public Defender Ass'n, Seattle, for petitioner.
Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Augustin R. Jimenez, Elizabeth M. Rene, Douglas B. Whalley, Asst. City Attys., Seattle, for respondent.
In these two consolidated cases, defendants seek review of the Seattle Municipal Court's denial of their demands for jury trials. Secondary issues involve the scope of statutory writs as a means of review of interlocutory decisions after the implementation of the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ).
The facts in these cases are similar. At arraignment, defendants signed forms indicating they did not request jury trials. Both were nominally represented by counsel at arraignment. Their attorneys for arraignment submitted affidavits stating, in effect, that they did not advise defendants to permanently waive their jury trial rights, but to postpone the decision until they talked with their trial attorneys.
More than 10 days after arraignment, and shortly before their scheduled bench trials, defendants requested jury trials. Their requests were denied on the ground that they failed to comply with Seattle Municipal Court Rule 2.08, which precludes a jury trial unless demanded within 10 days of arraignment. Both defendants petitioned for writs of review in the King County Superior Court. The petitions were granted and the cases consolidated for oral argument, which was heard on January 21, 1983. On March 9, 1983, an order was filed affirming the municipal court's decisions. The defendants filed notices of appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the cases were later transferred to this court.
The procedural facts of each case will be presented separately. Defendant Elvira Nugent was charged with a misdemeanor pursuant to the Seattle Municipal Code. At her November 2, 1982, arraignment in Seattle Municipal Court, a group advice-of-rights procedure was conducted. The arraignees were advised of their constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial. The record indicates that defendant Nugent was late and was not present at the group advice-of-rights session.
When the defendant's case was called, the following colloquy took place between Nugent and the prosecutor:
The form referred to by the prosecutor was a written plea of not guilty signed by the defendant. The portion of this form where defendant indicated her preference for a bench trial reads as follows:
At this time I /do not request a jury trial. I understand that either I or my attorney may demand a jury trial within ten days (10) excluding today and including the next day that Court is in session in the event the 10th day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Court Holiday.
A bench trial was set for November 29, 1982. On November 19, 1982, Nugent secured counsel to represent her at trial through the public defender's office. On November 24, 1982, defendant filed a jury demand with the municipal court. The request was denied. On November 29, 1982, the scheduled trial date, Nugent petitioned for a writ of review.
Turning now to defendant Jonathan R. Williams, his charge was of various misdemeanors in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code. He was arraigned on October 9, 1982. There is no indication in the record that an advice-of-rights procedure took place as in defendant Nugent's case.
When Williams' case was called, the following colloquy took place between him and the prosecutor:
Williams signed a written plea of not guilty, and indicated on the form that he was not requesting a jury trial. This form is essentially the same as that signed by defendant Nugent.
A bench trial was set for November 22, 1982. On November 16, 1982, Williams secured counsel to represent him at trial through the public defender's office. On November 19, 1982, defendant filed a demand for a jury trial. The motion was denied. On November 22, 1982, the scheduled trial date, Williams petitioned for a writ of review in superior court.
Both respondent and petitioners agree that the defendants, who are accused of misdemeanors, are entitled to jury trials. As we recently stated in Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 99-100, 653 P.2d 618 (1982):
It is our conclusion that, under the concept embodied in the constitution of Washington, enacted as it was in light of the laws of the territory existing at that time, no offense can be deemed so petty as to warrant denying a jury if it constitutes a crime.
* * *
... As for those offenses which carry a criminal stigma and particularly those for which a possible term of imprisonment is prescribed, the constitution requires that a jury trial be afforded unless waived.
(Italics ours.)
The first issue before us is whether the defendants waived their constitutional right to jury trials. Our recent decision in Seattle v. Crumrine, 98 Wash.2d 62, 65, 653 P.2d 605 (1982), provides guidance for making this determination.
In company with the United States Supreme Court, we are now committed to the principle that waiver of an important constitutional right, such as the right to trial by jury, cannot be assumed from a silent record even though the defendant was represented by counsel. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); State v. Wicke, 91 Wn.2d 638, 591 P.2d 452 (1979); State v. Rinier, 93 Wn.2d 309, 609 P.2d 1358 (1980). The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
After the effective date of the RALJ, it became necessary for the record to show in a criminal prosecution in ...
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