City of Spokane v. Rothwell

• Citation: 166 Wn.2d 872,215 P.3d 162
• Decision Date: 03 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 81271-3.,81271-3.
• Parties: CITY OF SPOKANE, Petitioner, v. Lawrence J. ROTHWELL, Respondent. City of Spokane, Petitioner, v. Henry E. Smith, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

215 P.3d 162

166 Wn.2d 872

CITY OF SPOKANE, Petitioner, v. Lawrence J. ROTHWELL, Respondent.

City of Spokane, Petitioner, v. Henry E. Smith, Respondent.

No. 81271-3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 21, 2009.

Decided September 3, 2009.

Howard Francois Delaney, Jim A. Bledsoe, Margaret Kane Harrington, Spokane City Attorney's Office, Spokane, WA, Charles Kenneth Wiggins, Wiggins & Masters PLLC, Bainbridge Island, WA, for Petitioner.

Breean Lawrence Beggs, Center for Justice, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

Timothy J. Donaldson, Walla Walla City Attorney, Walla Walla, WA, Amicus Curiae (Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys).

J.M. JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 The city of Spokane asks this court to reverse a Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court judge who presided over the trials did not have jurisdiction because the election was not limited to city voters provided by former RCW 3.46.070 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the judge did not have de facto jurisdiction. We hold that former RCW 3.46.070 did not apply to district court judges sitting as part time municipal judges in municipal departments and that therefore this judge had de jure jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 This case involves the interplay of several now-repealed statutes in Title 3 RCW, which authorizes Washington's system of district and municipal courts. Generally, a district court has jurisdiction of all violations of city ordinances. RCW 3.66.060. But under former chapter 3.46 RCW (1961), cities had the option of establishing a municipal court as a department of the district court. Former RCW 3.46.010 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. Where such a municipal department was established, it had exclusive jurisdiction of matters arising from ordinances of the city. Former RCW 3.46.030 (2005), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12.

¶ 3 Spokane Municipal Court had been organized as a municipal department of the Spokane County District Court pursuant to former chapter 3.46 RCW.¹ See former SPOKANE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.01.010, .030 (repealed 2008); Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wash.2d 594, 602-03, 800 P.2d 359 (1990) (surveying the history of that department). The city of Spokane (City) and Spokane County (County) had a long-standing agreement that municipal court judges would be provided on a rotating basis from among the district court judges. See Nollette, 115 Wash.2d at 602-03, 800 P.2d 359. Since at least 2002, the County had designated all the district court judges collectively as the municipal department. See Spokane County, Wash., Code § 1.16.050, cited in Nollette, 115 Wash.2d at 602-03, 800 P.2d 359.

¶ 4 In 2002, all nine Spokane County District Court judicial positions were filled by election. Voters from the entire county were allowed to vote for each office. The ballot did not disclose that the district court judges would also be serving as part time municipal court judges. Judge Walker ran for position four on the district court, and she was elected by voters from the entire county.

¶ 5 Subsequently, Henry Smith and Lawrence Rothwell were both charged with crimes under the Spokane Municipal Code. At the time, the district court was allocating 3.7 full time equivalent hours of district court judge time to the municipal department, including some of Judge Walker's time.² Both cases were assigned to Judge Walker. Defendants filed pretrial motions to dismiss, challenging Judge Walker's jurisdiction. Judge Walker denied both motions. In 2005, both men were convicted and appealed to Spokane County Superior Court, which considered the cases together and affirmed.

¶ 6 Defendants moved for discretionary review in Division Three of the Court of Appeals, which granted review and consolidated the cases. In City of Spokane v. Rothwell, 141 Wash.App. 680, 170 P.3d 1205 (2007), a divided panel reversed. The majority held that Judge Walker was not properly elected to the position of municipal court judge and did not possess de facto authority and reversed defendants' convictions. Id. at 686-87, 170 P.3d 1205. The dissenting judge would have held that Judge Walker had de facto authority. Id. at 687, 170 P.3d 1205 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Conclusions of law involving the interpretation of statutes, and municipal ordinances are reviewed de novo. Nollette, 115 Wash.2d at 600, 800 P.2d 359.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 We must determine whether Judge Walker had jurisdiction over the defendants' cases under statutes governing municipal departments. Construction of a statute is a question of law. State v. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). Our objective is to determine legislative intent. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). Where the language of a statute is clear, legislative intent is derived from the language of the statute alone. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d at 346, 68 P.3d 282. The "plain meaning" of a statutory provision is to be discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, as well as from the context of the statute in which that provision is found, the related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d at 600-01, 115 P.3d 281.

¶ 9 Statutes must be construed so that all the language is given effect and no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). The court must also avoid constructions that yield unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. Id. Courts may not read into a statute matters that are not in it. Id. We do not favor repeal by implication, and where potentially conflicting acts can be harmonized, we construe each to maintain the integrity of the other. Anderson v. Dep't of Corrections, 159 Wash.2d 849, 858-59, 154 P.3d 220 (2007). But where the conflict is irreconcilable, a more recent statute takes priority over an older statute. Id. at 861, 154 P.3d 220.

¶ 10 From its inception, the statutory scheme governing municipal departments provided specific procedures by which they could be staffed with judges. The City could appoint or elect its own full time municipal judges. See former RCW 3.46.050 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. The statute did not limit who was eligible to be appointed or elected, but only city voters could vote for municipal judges. See former RCW 3.46.070 (setting forth procedures "where an election is held for the position of municipal judge"). Alternately, the municipal court could be staffed with part time judges—but the pool of potential judges was limited and the procedure was different: "appointment of part time municipal judges shall be made from the judges of the district by the mayor in such manner as the city legislative body shall determine." Former RCW 3.46.060 (1984), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12.

¶ 11 Spokane chose to staff its municipal court entirely by the second option. See Nollette, 115 Wash.2d at 602, 800 P.2d 359 (noting 1978 districting plan provided that all of the justices of the district court would function as part time municipal judges). In Nollette, we held that a duly elected district court judge could obtain the office of municipal court judge only through the procedures prescribed by statute—at the time, appointment by the mayor. Id. at 604-05, 800 P.2d 359. Under this arrangement, the mayor had the exclusive power to appoint municipal court judges from among the district court judges. Id. at 605, 800 P.2d 359 (the districting plan only established the relevant pool of judges eligible to serve as part time municipal court judges; under former RCW 3.46.060 the city selected the judges from that pool).

¶ 12 After Nollette, the legislature enacted an additional provision: "[n]otwithstanding RCW 3.46.050 and 3.46.060, judicial positions may be filled only by election...."³ Former RCW 3.46.063 (1993), repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 227, § 12. This new "only by election" provision irreconcilably conflicted with former RCW 3.46.060's earlier-enacted provision for appointment "by the mayor."⁴ The language in former RCW 3.46.063 "[n]otwithstanding ... 3.46.060" suggests the legislature knew it was creating a conflict. Although repeal by implication is disfavored, we cannot give equal effect to two irreconcilably conflicted provisions. However, we can partially harmonize the statutes by implying a repeal only of the conflicting language.⁵

¶ 13 Former RCW 3.46.063 does not irreconcilably conflict with all of former RCW 3.46.060. The first clause of former RCW 3.46.060 defines who is eligible to serve as a part time municipal judge: "appointment of part time municipal judges shall be made from the judges of the district." In contrast, former RCW 3.46.063 addresses only the procedure for selecting from among the pool of persons eligible to be appointed—but says nothing about who is in that pool. Cf. State v. Abrams, 163 Wash.2d 277, 287-88, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008) (distinguishing between substantive and procedural clauses in severance analysis and noting that when this court has found procedural provisions to be unconstitutional, we have severed them and upheld the substantive remainder of the statutes).

¶ 14 Minus the conflicting procedural clause, the balance of former RCW 3.46.060 can be harmonized with former RCW 3.46.063. By agreement between the City and County, all district court judges were part time judges in the municipal department. Thus, upon the election of district court judges, the municipal court positions were filled "by election," as required by former RCW 3.46.063. That is exactly what happened in Judge Walker's case. She was elected to the district court and, as a consequence of her election, became a part time municipal court judge; no other procedure was required, consistent with former RCW 3.46.063.

¶ 15 The only remaining question, then, is the...