Clark v. Baines

• Decision Date: 05 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 73287-6.,73287-6.
• Citation: 150 Wash.2d 905,84 P.3d 245
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Piety Ann CLARK, Respondent, v. Wayne A. BAINES and "Jane Doe" Baines, husband and wife, Petitioners.

84 P.3d 245

150 Wash.2d 905

Piety Ann CLARK, Respondent, v. Wayne A. BAINES and "Jane Doe" Baines, husband and wife, Petitioners.

No. 73287-6.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued November 13, 2003.

Decided February 5, 2004.

Wayne Clark Fricke, Tacoma, for Petitioners.

Otto Steve Matsch, Tacoma, for Respondent.

SANDERS, J.

Following Wayne A. Baines's entry of an Alford¹ plea to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation, the complaining witness, Piety Ann Clark, sued Baines for sexual battery and outrage. Baines counterclaimed for malicious prosecution of Clark's civil action. On Clark's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Baines's counterclaim after concluding the record of Baines's Alford plea conclusively established probable cause for Clark's civil action. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. We hold an Alford plea cannot be used as the basis for collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS

In 1997, Baines worked as a part-time, state-provided caregiver for Clark, who is legally blind. On October 2, 1997, Clark contacted the Pierce County Sheriff's Office and alleged Baines had raped her on several occasions and had threatened her with a gun. On October 6, 1997, the State charged Baines with first degree rape with a firearm enhancement.² At his arraignment Baines pleaded not guilty.

Sixteen months later the State amended the charges to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation.³ In a written statement, the State explained:

The State is not saying that a sexual assault of some sort did not occur, however, there is a significant problem with the credibility of the victim. The victim is legally blind, however, after speaking with witnesses, some of whom have seen her driving, it appears that she can see to a far greater degree than she will admit to. Her sight would have been an issue at trial.

A conviction as charged would be furhter [sic] doubtful becuase [sic] there is strong evidence that the victim and the defendant may have engaged in a mutual sexual relationship in which the victim was rejected.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 20.

On February 24, 1999, Baines entered an Alford plea to both counts in the amended information in exchange for the State's recommendation of one day in jail with one year of probation. In a document titled "STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ON PLEA OF GUILTY," Baines explained his decision to accept the State's offer:

Although I maintain my innocence I am entering into this plea agreement because after reviewing the facts and law with my attorney I believe a jury would find me guilty of the crime charged in the Amended Information if the case proceeded to trial and I desire to take advantage of the State's recommendation.

CP at 22. Baines's attorney told the court that Baines was not agreeing to the facts, but had agreed to enter an Alford plea to avoid the risk of a first degree rape conviction. The court accepted Baines's Alford plea and followed the State's sentencing recommendation.

On May 13, 1999, Clark filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Pierce County against Baines for sexual battery and outrage. Baines filed an answer in which he denied Clark's allegations and counterclaimed for malicious prosecution of Clark's civil action.⁴

On March 9, 2000, Clark moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of Baines's counterclaim. She argued Baines could not maintain his malicious prosecution counterclaim because the criminal case had not terminated on the merits in his favor. Clark also claimed Baines could not prove her allegations were not based on probable cause. Baines argued whether Clark's allegations in her civil action were based on probable cause depended on their truthfulness, which was a disputed question of material fact that could not be decided on summary judgment and the inquiry could not be factually or legally precluded by the result in the criminal case.

On April 14, 2000, the trial court granted Clark's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed Baines's counterclaim by giving his Alford plea in the criminal case preclusive effect in the civil case. The trial court stated:

The issue is whether a plea of guilty which is a Newton or Alford plea to reduce [sic] charges is sufficient to establish the probable cause required as a complete defense to malicious prosecution, and I believe that under these circumstances, given the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty in the criminal action, that it is sufficient to act as a bar in this case to a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. So it will be on that basis that I grant the motion for summary judgment.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 20-21.

In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Baines's Alford plea preclusively established probable cause for Clark's civil action. Clark v. Baines, 114 Wash.App. 19, 26, 55 P.3d 1180 (2002). Baines petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 149 Wash.2d 1009, 69 P.3d 875 (2003).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Huff v. Budbill, 141 Wash.2d 1, 7, 1 P.3d 1138 (2000). All facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tydings, 125 Wash.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 Wash.2d 784, 790, 16 P.3d 574 (2001).

ANALYSIS

Actions for malicious prosecution are not favored in the law, although they will be readily upheld when the proper elements have been established. See Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 558, 852 P.2d 295 (1993); Nichols v. Severtsen, 39 Wash.2d 836, 837, 239 P.2d 349 (1951) (citing Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash.2d 485, 496, 125 P.2d 681 (1942)). At common law a malicious prosecution claim arising from a criminal action requires the plaintiff to prove the following elements:

(1) that the prosecution claimed to have been malicious was instituted or continued by the defendant; (2) that there was want of probable cause for the institution or continuation of the prosecution; (3) that the proceedings were instituted or continued through malice; (4) that the proceedings terminated on the merits in favor of the plaintiff, or were abandoned; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury or damage as a result of the prosecution.

Hanson, 121 Wash.2d at 558, 852 P.2d 295 (quoting Peasley, 13 Wash.2d at 497, 125 P.2d 681); Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash.2d 582, 593, 664 P.2d 492 (1983); Banks v. Nordstrom, Inc., 57 Wash.App. 251, 255-56, 787 P.2d 953 (1990).

While actions for malicious prosecution began as a remedy for unjustifiable criminal proceedings, Washington law also recognizes this remedy where a civil suit has been wrongfully initiated. RCW 4.24.350(1); see, e.g., Hanson v. Estell, 100 Wash.App. 281, 286-87, 997 P.2d 426 (2000); Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wash.2d 956, 964, 603 P.2d 828 (1979); accord PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 889 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) ("The action of malicious prosecution, which began as a remedy for unjustifiable criminal proceedings, has been undergoing a slow process of extension into the field of the wrongful initiation of civil suits."). In Washington a malicious prosecution claim arising from a civil action requires the plaintiff to prove the same five elements listed above plus two additional elements: (6) arrest or seizure of property and (7) special injury (meaning injury which would not necessarily result from similar causes of action). Gem Trading, 92 Wash.2d at 963-64,603 P.2d 828; see also Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash.2d 211, 216-22, 266 P.2d 1047 (1954). Although the malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove all required elements, malice and want of probable cause constitute the gist of a malicious prosecution action, Hanson, 121 Wash.2d at 558,852 P.2d 295; as such, proof of probable cause is an absolute defense. Id.; Brin v. Stutzman, 89 Wash.App. 809, 819, 951 P.2d 291 (1998).

Baines argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because issues of material fact exist as to whether Clark had probable cause to file her civil action. He contends the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel to give his Alford plea preclusive effect in Clark's civil action. Although not entirely clear, Clark apparently contends the trial court did not apply collateral estoppel in granting Clark's motion for partial summary judgment.⁵ As such she frames the issue in this case as being not one of collateral estoppel, but rather, "whether [Baines's] plea of guilty to two counts of assault with sexual motivation, his statements in his plea documents, and the findings of the judge form `probable cause' for [Clark's] civil action against him." Br. of Resp't at 6.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating issues that have been raised and litigated by the party in a prior proceeding. Reninger v. Dep't of Corr., 134 Wash.2d 437, 449, 951 P.2d 782 (1998); see also Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 135 Wash.2d 255, 262, 956 P.2d 312 (1998). "`Collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy and prevents inconvenience, and even harassment, of parties.'" Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 Wash.2d 306, 311, 27 P.3d 600 (2001) (quoting Reninger, 134 Wash.2d at 449, 951 P.2d 782).

We have developed a four-part test to determine whether a previous litigation should be given collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent litigation. The party asserting collateral estoppel must prove: (1) the issue decided in...