Clark v. State
Decision Date | 17 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 49A02-9905-CR-377.,49A02-9905-CR-377. |
Citation | 727 N.E.2d 18 |
Parties | Johnny CLARK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mark Small, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Kostas A. Poulakidas, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant Johnny Clark (Clark) appeals the trial court's order denying his Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment. According to Clark, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his probation revocation proceedings once the record of proceedings for his direct appeal was filed with this court. We affirm.
Following a jury trial for Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B felony, Possession of Cocaine, a Class D felony, and Possession of Marijuana, a Class A Misdemeanor, Clark was found guilty and sentenced on September 16, 1997, to a total of ten years imprisonment. The trial court suspended eight and a half years of the sentence, credited Clark with 173 days served and placed him on probation for three years.1 Clark initiated an appeal of his convictions and on February 23, 1998, filed the record of proceedings.
On April 20, 1998, a notice of probation violation, alleging three separate violations, was filed in the trial court.2 Following a hearing on July 23, 1998, but before Clark's direct appeal was decided, the trial court revoked Clark's probation and imposed the executed sentence. Although Clark appealed the revocation of his probation, it was eventually dismissed. On February 17, 1999, Clark's conviction was affirmed by this court in a memorandum decision.
On April 14, 1999, Clark filed an Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(6) Motion to Vacate Order Revoking Probation. In his motion, Clark argued that because the record of proceedings for the direct appeal had been filed with this court, the trial court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over his case and therefore, was not able to consider the alleged probation violation. The trial court denied Clark's motion and this appeal ensued.
T.R. 60(B)(6) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final order or final judgment if the judgment is void. According to Clark, the order revoking his probation is void because at the time the court entered the order, the direct appeal was pending before this court, and therefore, the trial court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over his case.
Initially, we note that there is no evidence that Clark was admitted to bail pending the appeal of his conviction. See I.C. § 35-33-9-1 (). As a result, the judgment of his conviction was not stayed and his sentence began to run from the time of sentencing. See I.C. § 35-33-9-5(a) (); I.C. § 35-38-3-2(d) ().3 Therefore, we limit our discussion to the particular circumstances of this case where the execution of a defendant's sentence has not been stayed and the defendant has begun serving his sentence pending the appeal.4
A trial court has statutory authority to revoke a defendant's probation and order an executed sentence if a defendant violates the conditions of his probation at any time during the probationary period. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g) (). However, as a general rule, once an appeal is perfected the trial court loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind.1995),
reh'g denied; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 3(A) ( ). A judgment made when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Bradley, 649 N.E.2d at 106.
Although Clark does not refer us to a specific case discussing the trial court's power to revoke probation when the direct appeal is pending, under different circumstances this court, as well as our supreme court, has found certain orders void because the trial court had been divested of jurisdiction during an appeal. See, e.g., Timmons v. State, 543 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ind.1989)
( ); Bright v. State, 259 Ind. 495, 496, 289 N.E.2d 128, 129 (1972) ( );5
Powers v. State, 579 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ( ), trans. denied; Beard v. State, 176 Ind.App. 348, 350, 375 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1978) ( ). The policy underlying the rule is to facilitate efficient presentation and disposition of the appeal and prevent the simultaneous review of a judgment by both a trial and appellate court. Powers, 579 N.E.2d at 83.
While we recognize the general rule, we also note that certain exceptions have been created, permitting a trial court to retain jurisdiction notwithstanding an appeal. Bradley, 649 N.E.2d at 106. For example, a trial court may retain jurisdiction to reassess costs, correct the record, enforce a judgment, continue with a trial during an interlocutory appeal concerning venue, or preside over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal. Id. In Bradley, the court found that the trial court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal trial during the pending appeal of the denial of bail, because the bail appeal was entirely independent of the trial and the trial would not intermeddle with the subject matter of the appeal. Id.
Here, we find the reasoning of Bradley applicable. The direct appeal is independent of the probation revocation hearing. The probation revocation hearing does not occur until after the criminal trial has been completed and the sentence imposed; it is civil in nature and requires a different level of proof. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(e) ( ); Morgan v. State, 691 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct.App.1998) ( ). Further, an appeal from an order revoking probation may be taken apart from the criminal trial. See IND.CODE § 35-38-2-3(i) ( ).
Additionally, the probation revocation hearing will not intermeddle with the subject matter of the criminal appeal. The only possible issues which the appellate court could have addressed were those surrounding the conviction and sentence. An order revoking probation would have changed only the nature of the sentence and not the sentence itself. See Morgan, 691 N.E.2d at 468
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