Clark v. United States

Docket Number4:21-CV-00127-JAR
Decision Date15 December 2021
PartiesSACOREY CLARK, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Sacorey Clark's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 25). Respondent United States of America has responded (Doc. 28), and Petitioner has replied. (Doc. 31). For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied.

1. BACKGROUND

On May 3, 2017, a jury convicted Petitioner Sacorey Clark of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). On May 9, 2018, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 180 months' imprisonment after determining that Petitioner qualified for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C § 924(e), a finding which the Eighth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Clark, 934 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). On February 2, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Doc. 1). This Court later granted Petitioner leave to file an amended motion (Docs. 24, 25).

The Court will construe Petitioner's filings liberally given his pro se status. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 106 (1976). Petitioner brings the following grounds for relief[1]:

Grounds One, Three, and Four (Rehaif 'Claims): In Grounds One, Three, and Four, Petitioner makes multiple arguments concerning application of the Supreme Court's decision m Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019).
Grounds Two and Five (ACCA Claims): In Grounds Two and Five, Petitioner contends that he does not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA and accordingly should not have received an enhanced sentence.
Grounds Six, Seven, and Eight (Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel): In Grounds Six, Seven, and Eight, Petitioner contends that appointed counsel for his direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make multiple "dead-bang winner" arguments.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

28 U.S.C. §2255

A § 2255 petitioner is entitled to relief when his or her sentence "was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011). Federal habeas relief is limited to rectifying "jurisdictional errors, constitutional errors, and errors of law." Raymond v. United States, 933 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2019). Errors of law, moreover, only constitute grounds for relief under § 2255 when such error "constitute[s] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). Petitioner bears the burden to prove he is entitled to relief. Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019).

An evidentiary hearing is required "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based." Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In multiple grounds for relief, Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). To prove ineffective assistance, Petitioner must show that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that Petitioner was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). It is Petitioner's "burden to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's actions constituted objectively reasonable strategy under the circumstances." Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The deficient performance standard is rigorous, and "[experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Accordingly, absent contrary evidence, courts "assume that appellate counsel's failure to raise a claim was an exercise of sound appellate strategy." United States v. Brown, 528 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

To show prejudice, Petitioner must establish "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "It is not sufficient for a defendant to show that the error had some 'conceivable effect' on the result of the proceeding because not every error that influences a proceeding undermines the reliability of the outcome of the proceeding." Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

III. TIMELINESS

Respondent contends that Petitioner's claims are stale under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), which establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas motions. The period begins tolling on the latest of four dates. (Doc. 28 at 8). The applicable date to Petitioner is "the date on which the judgement of conviction [became] final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). For defendants who file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, § 2255 finality attaches when the Supreme Court either affirms the conviction on the merits or denies the petition. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). For defendants who do not file a petition for writ of certiorari, § 2255 finality attaches when the deadline for such filing expires. Id. Supreme Court Rule 13.1 allows 90 days from entry of judgement in the court of appeals to file for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, when combined with the one-year period under § 2255(f), a defendant who does not seek Supreme Court review normally has one year and 90 days from the judgement of the appellate court to file a § 2255 motion. Reed v. United States, No. 1:20-CV-21 SNLJ, 2020 WL 2043829, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2020).

Respondent argues that Petitioner did not timely file a petition for writ of certiorari and therefore is subject to this one year and ninety-day window, running from the date the Eighth Circuit affirmed this Court's judgement. The following is the relevant timeline:

August 19, 2019 - Eight Circuit affirms the judgement of this Court. United States v. Clark, No. 4:16-CR-00107 (E.D. Mo.) (hereinafter "Clark Criminal Case"), Doc. 247.
October 30, 2019 - Eighth Circuit grants Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Rehearing, extending his deadline to December 2, 2019. Clark Criminal Case, Doc. 248.
November 26, 2019 - Petitioner certifies and mails Petition for Rehearing / Rehearing En Banc. United States v. Clark, No. 18-2119 (8th Cir.).
January 7, 2020 - Eight Circuit denies Petition for Rehearing / Rehearing En Banc. Clark Criminal Case, Doc. 250.
April 6, 2020 - Petitioner files Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which is placed on the docket on May 22, 2020 as No. 19-8530.
June 22, 2020 - Supreme Court denies Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Clark v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 148 (2020).
February 2, 2021 - Petitioner files Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1).

Respondent asserts that § 2255 finality attached 90 days after the Eight Circuit affirmed this Court's sentence on August 19, 2019. Under this timeline, Petitioner had until approximately November 17, 2020 to file his § 2255 motion. (Doc. 28 at 8-9). Respondent further claims that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari is not the correct date from which to calculate § 2255 finality because Petitioner tardily sought certiorari on April 6, 2020- 140 days after the Rule 13.1 cut-off period expired. (Doc. 28 at 9 n.4). Respondent makes the inference that the Supreme Court's summary denial of certiorari was due to untimeliness and thus should not "affect finality for purposes of Section 2255(f)(1)'s one-year limitations period." Id. (quoting United States v. Wheaten, 826 F.3d 843, 851 (5th Cir. 2016)).

On October 30, 2019, however, the Eighth Circuit granted Petitioner an extension of time to file a Petition for Rehearing. Clark Criminal Case, Doc. 248. Petitioner timely certified and mailed such petition on November 26, 2019.[2] United States v. Clark, No: 18-2119 EMSL (8th Cir.). The Eight Circuit subsequently denied the Petition for Rehearing on January 7, 2020. Clark Criminal Case, Doc. 250.

Per the committee notes to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35 and 41, the 1998 amendments to those rules were intended to stay the judgement of the appellate court upon a request for rehearing, specifically for purposes of extending the certiorari filing period. Fed. R. App. P. 35 Committee Notes on Rules-1998 Amendment; Fed. R. App. P. 41 Committee Notes on Rules-1998 Amendment (emphasis added) ("The Committee's objective is to treat a request for a rehearing en banc like a petition for panel rehearing so that a request for a rehearing en banc will suspend the finality of the court of appeals' judgement and delay the running of the period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari''). Supreme...

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