Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Health of Braintree

• Decision Date: 19 July 1993
• Citation: 616 N.E.2d 78,415 Mass. 876
• Parties: CLEAN HARBORS OF BRAINTREE, INC. v. BOARD OF HEALTH OF BRAINTREE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 78

616 N.E.2d 78

415 Mass. 876

CLEAN HARBORS OF BRAINTREE, INC. v. BOARD OF HEALTH OF BRAINTREE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Norfolk.

Argued April 8, 1993.

Decided July 19, 1993.

Bruce A. Singal, Boston, for defendant.

Francis S. Wright, Boston, for plaintiff.

Scott Harshbarger, Atty. Gen., & Peter Sacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Atty. Gen., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The board of health of Braintree (board) appeals from an order of a judge in the Superior Court granting Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. (Clean Harbors), relief from a judgment ordered by this court and entry of a new judgment in Clean Harbor's favor. We granted the board's application for direct appellate review and we now affirm.

Clean Harbors commenced this litigation in 1987, seeking a declaration that it was not required to obtain a site assignment pursuant to G.L. c. 111, § 150B (1990 ed.), for a hazardous waste treatment and storage facility it was then operating in Braintree. A judge in the Superior Court ruled that the requirements of G.L. c. 111, § 150B, were not applicable because Clean Harbors was a facility in operation before the statute became effective, and granted summary judgment in favor of Clean Harbors. Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Health of Braintree, 409 Mass. 834, 835, 570 N.E.2d 987 (1991) (Clean Harbors I ). On appeal, we held that § 150B applied to Clean Harbors and ruled that, in order to continue operations, Clean Harbors must apply for and receive a site assignment from the board. Id. at 838, 570 N.E.2d 987. In response to the board's motion for entry of a final judgment after rescript, a Superior Court judge ordered Clean Harbors to file an application with the board for a site assessment pursuant to § 150B. ¹ Before the site assignment proceedings were completed, however, the Legislature amended G.L. c. 111, § 150B, by providing in relevant part that G.L. c. 111, §§ 150A and 150B, "shall not apply to any hazardous waste facility ... which was licensed as such ... as of May first, nineteen hundred and eighty." St.1992, c. 23, § 18 (the amendment).

Relying on the amendment, Clean Harbors filed a motion in the Superior Court on April 29, 1992, seeking relief from the Superior Court judgment and a stay of any further site assignment proceedings before the board. The board opposed Clean Harbors' motion, arguing that the amendment was unconstitutional, and that it did not apply to Clean Harbors. After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed Clean Harbors' motion and ordered entry of a new judgment declaring that Clean Harbors was not required to obtain a site assignment under § 150B.

1. The board first argues that the amendment violates arts. 48 and 63 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. The board is a municipal agency of the town of Braintree. In Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 610, 459 N.E.2d 80 (1983), we recognized a "long-standing and far-reaching prohibition on constitutional challenges by governmental entities to acts of their creator State." We have followed this rule in a variety of contexts. See Brookline v. The Governor, 407 Mass. 377, 386, 553 N.E.2d 1277 (1990) (Liacos, C.J., concurring) (municipality cannot challenge constitutionality of State statute based on its enactment as "outside" section of the general appropriation act); Trustees of Worcester State Hosp. v. The Governor, 395 Mass. 377, 380, 480 N.E.2d 291 (1985) (takings claim barred since governmental entities cannot challenge constitutionality of State statutes); Spence v. Boston Edison Co., supra (agency not permitted to bring due process and equal protection claims). We conclude, therefore, that the board's claims under arts. 48 and 63 are barred by the same prohibition relied on in Spence v. Boston Edison Co., supra. "Agencies, which are creations of the State, may not challenge the constitutionality of State statutes." Id. at 610, 459 N.E.2d 80, citing Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196, 43 S.Ct. 539, 540, 67 L.Ed. 943 (1923).

2. The board reads G.L. c. 29, § 7L (1990 ed.), as invalidating the amendment. ² We again pass over the question "whether § 7L is an unlawful attempt by one Legislature to dictate to subsequent Legislatures the manner in which constitutionally permissible legislative processes may work." Gordon v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 411 Mass. 238, 247, 580 N.E.2d 1039 (1991). Although part of St.1992, c. 23, made appropriations for the expenses of the Commonwealth, the amendment itself made no appropriation of any sort. In Gordon v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, supra, we considered a challenge to an outside section of the fiscal year 1992 budget (St.1991, c. 138). Although portions of the statute obviously made appropriations for the Commonwealth, we read the requirements of § 7L as applying to the outside section rather than the appropriations act as a whole. Proceeding in the same manner we conclude that § 7L does not apply to the amendment, since that law makes no appropriation whatsoever.

3. The board next argues that the amendment violates the doctrine of separation of powers articulated in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In LaGrant v. Boston Hous. Auth., 403 Mass. 328, 331, 530 N.E.2d 149 (1988), we held that "agencies ... have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a State statute when it is alleged that the statute represents legislative encroachment on judicial power in violation of art. 30." We, therefore, address the merits of this claim.

In Clean Harbors I, we construed G.L. c. 111, § 150B, as it was originally enacted and, "[a]fter examining the statutory history of local site assignment provisions," held that § 150B applied to the Clean Harbors facility. Id. at 835, 570 N.E.2d 987. We also declined to read a "judicially manufactured grandfather clause" into § 150B. Id. at 838, 570 N.E.2d 987. Subsequent to our decision, the Legislature responded by amending § 150B, and by stating that § 150B should not apply to facilities that were licensed as of May 1, 1980. We are therefore presented with a statute enacted subsequent to our decision which was based on the court's perception of legislative intent. While the amendment effectively nullified our decision in Clean Harbors I, it was not impermissible under art. 30.

Two recently decided cases explain why this is so. In Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt Beverages, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 409 Mass. 336, 567 N.E.2d 183 (1991) (Mass. Wholesalers I ), we interpreted the "bottle bill," as originally enacted, and held that unclaimed "deposits" belonged to the bottlers and distributors. Thereafter, the Legislature amended the bottle bill, making it clear that bottlers and distributors were to hold the unclaimed deposits in separate accounts on behalf of consumers and, if abandoned, on behalf of the Commonwealth. Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt Beverages, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 411, 412, 609 N.E.2d 67 (1993) (Mass. Wholesalers II ). In Mass. Wholesalers II, we held: "The plaintiffs' right to the deposits created under the original bottle bill, as interpreted in Mass. Wholesalers [I], supra, does not translate into a similar right to these deposits under the bottle bill, as now amended." Id. at 417, 609 N.E.2d 67. We noted: "[W]hatever interpretation we might give would not affect the Legislature's power to amend or clarify the statute, giving it whatever interpretation the General Court might desire." Id., quoting Answer of the Justices, 375 Mass. 790, 793, 374 N.E.2d 1345 (1978). Just as the Legislature properly amended the bottle bill to accomplish what it originally intended after our decision in Mass. Wholesalers I, the Legislature could also properly amend § 150B to accomplish what it had originally intended, as no rights had vested under our decision in Clean Harbors I.

4. The board next argues that the amendment violates § 8 of art. 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth (Home Rule Amendment). ³ A municipality has standing to assert this claim. See Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 384 Mass. 718, 719, 429 N.E.2d 691 (1981) (city and mayor challenged appropriations under Home Rule Amendment); Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 48, 360 N.E.2d 623 (1977) (town challenged statute under Home Rule Amendment). We shall assume without deciding that a board of a municipality has such standing as well.

The Home Rule Amendment preserves the right of municipalities to self-government in "local matters," but preserves the Commonwealth's right to legislate with respect to State, regional, and general matters. Gordon v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, supra 411 Mass. at 244, 580 N.E.2d 1039. "To this particular end, the Home Rule Amendment is to be narrowly construed." Id. The Legislature may act on matters of State, regional, or general concern, even though the action may have special effect on one or more individual cities or towns. Id. at 245, 580 N.E.2d 1039. Hadley v. Amherst, supra 372 Mass. at 50, 360 N.E.2d 623. Opinions of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 787-788, 250 N.E.2d 547 (1969). In Opinions of the Justices, supra at 788, 250 N.E.2d 547, a majority of the Justices opined that legislation for a multi-purpose stadium, a third vehicular tunnel, a Worcester toll road, and an arena was "at least regional and ha[d] some Statewide effect." In Hadley v. Amherst, supra 372 Mass. at 50, 360 N.E.2d 623, this court held that "sewer systems, with their effect on water quality in a particular area, are a matter of State, regional, or general concern." In Gordon v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, supra 411 Mass. at 245, 580 N.E.2d 1039, we were concerned with legislation providing for the transfer of control over the Suffolk County house of correction and held: "[T]he transfer legislation predominantly concerns State, regional, and...