Coats v. Dish Network, LLC

• Decision Date: 15 June 2015
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SC394
• Citation: 31 A.D. Cases 1289,2015 CO 44,350 P.3d 849
• Parties: Brandon COATS, Petitioner v. DISH NETWORK, LLC, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

350 P.3d 849

31 A.D. Cases 1289

2015 CO 44

Brandon COATS, Petitioner

v.DISH NETWORK, LLC, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC394

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 15, 2015

Attorneys for Petitioner: The Evans Firm, LLC, Michael D. Evans, Denver, Colorado, Thomas K. Carberry, Thomas Karel Carberry, Denver, Colorado, Campbell Law, LLC, John E. Campbell, St. Louis, Missouri, Wolf Legal, PC, Adam B. Wolf, San Francisco, California

Attorneys for Respondent: Martinez Law Group, P.C., Meghan W. Martinez, Ann Christoff Purvis, Elizabeth Imhoff Mabey, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Colorado: Colorado Department of Law, Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, David C. Blake, Deputy Attorney General, Michael Francisco, Assistant Solicitor General, Michelle Brissette Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Mining Association: Jackson Kelly PLLC, Laura E. Beverage, Meredith A. Kapushion, Denver, Colorado, Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, Michael D. Moberly, Charitie L. Hartsig, Phoenix, Arizona

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Civil Justice League: Husch Blackwell LLP, Christopher L. Ottele, Mary H. Stuart, Carrie Claiborne, Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association: Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Andrew D. Ringel, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association: Ryan Law Firm, LLC, Kimberlie K. Ryan, Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Patient and Caregiver Rights Litigation Project: Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Andrew B. Reid, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

Opinion

JUSTICE EID delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This case requires us to determine whether the use of medical marijuana in compliance with Colorado's Medical Marijuana Amendment, Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14, but in violation of federal law, is a “lawful activity” under section 24–34–402.5, C.R.S. (2014), Colorado's “lawful activities statute.” This statute generally makes it an unfair and discriminatory labor practice to discharge an employee based on the employee's “lawful” outside-of-work activities. § 24–34–402.5(1).

¶ 2 Here, petitioner Brandon Coats claims respondent Dish Network, LLC (“Dish”) violated section 24–34–402.5 by discharging him due to his state-licensed use of medical marijuana at home during nonworking hours. He argues that the Medical Marijuana Amendment makes such use “lawful” for purposes of section 24–34–402.5, notwithstanding any federal laws prohibiting medical marijuana use. The trial court dismissed Coats's complaint for failure to state a claim after finding that medical marijuana use is not “lawful” under Colorado state law. Coats appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.

¶ 3 In a split decision, the majority of the court of appeals held that Coats did not state a claim for relief because medical marijuana use, which is prohibited by federal law, is not a “lawful activity” for purposes of section 24–34–402.5. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 23, 303 P.3d 147, 152. In dissent, Judge Webb would have held that section 24–34–402.5 does protect Coats's medical marijuana use, because the term “lawful” as used in the statute refers only to Colorado state law, under which medical marijuana use is “at least lawful.” Id. at ¶ 56, 303 P.3d at 157 (Webb, J., dissenting).

¶ 4 We granted certiorari and now affirm. The term “lawful” as it is used in section 24–34–402.5 is not restricted in any way, and we decline to engraft a state law limitation onto the term. Therefore, an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a “lawful” activity under section 24–34–402.5. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion of the court of appeals.

I.

¶ 5 We take the following from the complaint. Brandon Coats is a quadriplegic and has been confined to a wheelchair since he was a teenager. In 2009, he registered for and obtained a state-issued license to use medical marijuana to treat painful muscle spasms caused by his quadriplegia

. Coats consumes medical marijuana at home, after work, and in accordance with his license and Colorado state law.

¶ 6 Between 2007 and 2010, Coats worked for respondent Dish as a telephone customer service representative. In May 2010, Coats tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), a component of medical marijuana, during a random drug test. Coats informed Dish that he was a registered medical marijuana patient and planned to continue using medical marijuana. On June 7, 2010, Dish fired Coats for violating the company's drug policy.

¶ 7 Coats then filed a wrongful termination claim against Dish under section 24–34–402.5, which generally prohibits employers from discharging an employee based on his engagement in “lawful activities” off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours. § 24–34–402.5(1). Coats contended that Dish violated the statute by terminating him based on his outside-of-work medical marijuana use, which he argued was “lawful” under the Medical Marijuana Amendment and its implementing legislation.

¶ 8 Dish filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Coats's medical marijuana use was not “lawful” for purposes of the statute under either federal or state law.

¶ 9 The trial court dismissed Coats's claim. It rejected Coats's argument that the Medical Marijuana Amendment made his use a “lawful activity” for purposes of section 24–34–402.5. Instead the court found that the Amendment provided registered patients an affirmative defense to state criminal prosecution without making their use of medical marijuana a “lawful activity” within the meaning of section 24–34–402.5. As such, the trial court concluded that the statute afforded no protection to Coats and dismissed the claim without examining the federal law issue.

¶ 10 On appeal, Coats again argued that Dish wrongfully terminated him under section 24–34–402.5 because his use of medical marijuana was “lawful” under state law. Dish likewise reiterated that it did not violate section 24–34–402.5 because medical marijuana use remains prohibited under federal law.

¶ 11 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed based on the prohibition of marijuana use under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012) (the “CSA”). Looking to the plain language of section 24–34–402.5, the majority found that the term “lawful” means “that which is ‘permitted by law.’ ” Coats, ¶ 13, 303 P.3d at 150. Applying that plain meaning, the majority reasoned that to be “lawful” for purposes of section 24–34–402.5, activities that are governed by both state and federal law must “be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.” Id. at ¶ 14, 303 P.3d at 151. Given that the federal CSA prohibits all marijuana use, the majority concluded that Coats's conduct was not “lawful activity” protected by the statute. The majority therefore affirmed the trial court's decision on different grounds, not reaching the question of whether the state constitutional amendment created a constitutional right for registered patients to use medical marijuana or an affirmative defense to prosecution for such use. Coats, ¶ 23, 303 P.3d at 152.

¶ 12 In dissent, Judge Webb argued that the term “lawful” must be interpreted according to state, rather than federal, law. He argued that the majority's interpretation failed to effectuate the purpose of the statute by improperly narrowing the scope of the statute's protection. Id. at ¶ 47, 303 P.3d at 156 (Webb, J., dissenting). Finding that the Medical Marijuana Amendment made state-licensed medical marijuana use “at least lawful,” Judge Webb concluded that Coats's use should be protected by the statute. Id. at ¶ 56, 303 P.3d at 157 (Webb, J., dissenting).

¶ 13 We granted review of the court of appeals' opinion¹ and now affirm. The term “lawful” as it is used in section 24–34–402.5 is not restricted in any way, and we decline to engraft a state law limitation onto the term. Therefore, an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a “lawful” activity under section 24–34–402.5. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion of the court of appeals.

II.

¶ 14 We review de novo the question of whether medical marijuana use prohibited by federal law is a “lawful activity” protected under section 24–34–402.5. DuBois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 43 (Colo.2009).

¶ 15 The “lawful activities statute” provides that “[i]t shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours” unless certain exceptions apply. § 24–34–402.5(1) (emphasis added). An employee discharged in violation of this provision may bring a civil action for damages, including lost wages or benefits. § 24–34–402.5(2)(a).

¶ 16 By its terms the statute protects only “lawful” activities. However, the statute does not define the term “lawful.” Coats contends that the term should be read as limited to activities lawful under state law. We disagree.

¶ 17 In construing undefined statutory terms, we look to the language of the statute itself “with a view toward giving the statutory language its commonly accepted and understood meaning.” People v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo.1992). We have construed the term “lawful” once before and found that its “generally understood meaning” is “in accordance with the law or legitimate.” See id. (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1279 (1986)). Similarly, courts in other states have construed “lawful” to mean “authorized by law and not contrary to, nor forbidden by law.” Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 821 (N.D.1998) (defining “lawful” as used in similar lawful activities provision); In re Adoption of B.C.H., 22 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind.2014) (“Upon our review of the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘lawful custody,’ ... ‘lawful’ means ‘not contrary to law.’ ”). We...