Cohen v. State of NY

• Citation: 720 N.E.2d 850,94 N.Y.2d 1,698 N.Y.S.2d 574
• Parties: MICHAEL COHEN et al., as Members of the New York State Legislature, Respondents, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 14 October 1999
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

94 N.Y.2d 1

720 N.E.2d 850

698 N.Y.S.2d 574

MICHAEL COHEN et al., as Members of the New York State Legislature, Respondents, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued August 24, 1999.

Decided October 14, 1999.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Preeta D. Bansal, Peter H. Schiff, Victor Paladino and Julie M. Sheridan of counsel), for appellant.

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, L. L. P., New York City (James D. Herschlein and Phillip A. Geraci of counsel), and Wolfson & Carroll (John W. Carroll of counsel), for respondents.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges LEVINE, CIPARICK, WESLEY

and ROSENBLATT concur with Judge BELLACOSA; Judge SMITH dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, J.

This appeal by the State comes directly to this Court (CPLR 5601 [b] [2]) from a Supreme Court judgment of unconstitutionality of chapter 635 of the Laws of 1998. The Act is challenged solely on a facial basis. We reverse and declare the statute constitutional. It does not violate article III, § 6 of the State Constitution, nor does it breach the governmental separation of powers doctrine. Also, it does not impinge on other constitutional protections asserted by plaintiffs.

I.

On December 18, 1998, the Legislature passed and the Governor approved chapter 635. It states in pertinent part:

"1. * * * if legislative passage of the budget as defined in subdivision three of this section has not occurred prior to the first day of any fiscal year, the net amount of any such bi-weekly salary installment payments to be paid on or after such day shall be withheld and not paid until such legislative passage of the budget has occurred * * *.

"3. `Legislative passage of the budget', solely for the purposes of this section * * * shall mean that the appropriation bill or bills submitted by the governor * * * have been finally acted on by both houses of the legislature in accordance with article seven of the state constitution and the state comptroller has determined that such appropriation bill or bills that have been finally acted on by the legislature are sufficient for the ongoing operation and support of state government and local assistance for the ensuing fiscal year" (L 1998, ch 635, §§ 1, 2, amending Legislative Law § 5 [emphasis added]).

Plaintiffs include individuals who were in office and voted against passage of chapter 635, and others who were not yet in office at the time of its passage. These 14 individuals started a hybrid CPLR article 78/declaratory judgment lawsuit in April 1999 seeking: (1) a declaration of unconstitutionality of chapter 635; (2) a declaration of the unconstitutional nature of certain of the Governor's actions; and (3) a permanent injunction against the withholding of legislative salaries. During the course of the litigation in the nisi prius court, plaintiffs limited their case to a pure declaratory judgment action, with requested relief directed solely at the constitutionality of the statute. The submissions of the respective parties were treated accordingly as cross motions for summary judgment.

Supreme Court held that chapter 635 violated the separation of powers doctrine and article III, § 6 of the New York State Constitution, but did not identify any particular constitutional provision as the flaw in its separation of powers conclusion.

The State defendants answer with six appellate arguments. They demonstrate cogently that: (1) chapter 635 complies with article III, § 6 of the New York State Constitution; (2) it conforms to separation of powers principles; (3) the specified role given to the Comptroller does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of responsibility; (4) the statute does not interfere with plaintiffs' First Amendment rights; (5) it does not impair their Federal Contracts Clause rights; and (6) it does not violate plaintiffs' due process rights.

At this appeal stage of the controversy, we take judicial notice that the 1999-2000 budget negotiations concluded in early August 1999 with Legislative concordance and Gubernatorial acquiescence; Comptroller certification that the appropriations bills were sufficient to cover the State's approved expenditures followed, within hours after enactment.

II.

This Court's well-established review power with respect to matters of this kind marks the boundaries of the analysis required to decide this appeal. Because the plaintiffs seek facial invalidation of chapter 635, they must initially overcome the presumption of constitutionality accorded to all enactments of a co-equal Branch of government (see, Dunlea v Anderson, 66 NY2d 265, 267-268

; see generally, City of New York v State of New York, 76 NY2d 479; Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 NY2d 358; see also, National Assn. of Ind. Insurers v State of New York, 89 NY2d 950, 952 [quoting Alliance of Am. Insurers v Chu, 77 NY2d 573, 585]). In seeking facial nullification, plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate that "in any degree and in every conceivable application," the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment (McGowan v Burstein, 71 NY2d 729, 733).

Statutes are quintessentially the product of the democratic lawmaking process. These threshold hurdles are, therefore, erected in the public interest to provide a prudent set of procedural safeguards for enactors and defenders of statutes. They are set in place doctrinally and precedentially because of a fundamental premise that "[b]alancing the myriad requirements imposed by both the State and the Federal Constitution is a function entrusted to the Legislature * * *, the elective representatives of the people" (Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 79

).

This Court's application of these principles, within standard constitutional review perspectives, convinces us that Supreme Court's decision fails to adhere to these rigorous considerations.

III.

Our analysis examines first a threshold component affecting this case—article III, § 6 of the State Constitution. It provides in pertinent part:

"Each member of the legislature shall receive for his services a like annual salary, to be fixed by law * * * Neither the salary of any member nor any other allowance so fixed may be increased or diminished during, and with respect to, the term for which he shall have been elected, nor shall he be paid or receive any other extra compensation."

This Court has examined the constitutionality of earlier legislative salary arrangements in relation to this fixed star. In New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Steingut (40 NY2d 250), the Court invalidated the system of awarding allowances to legislators for varied services in a particular fiscal year, as part of the budget process in that same year. This Court recognized that:

"the prohibition against increases and decreases in legislators' compensation and emoluments during their terms of office would serve two salutary purposes—(1) to avoid a conflict of interest by removing from legislators the authority to vote themselves financial benefits at the expense of the public treasury, and (2) to forestall the possibility of manipulation of legislators' votes by promises of reward or threats of punishment effectuated through changes in salaries or allowances" (New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Steingut, supra, at 258 [emphasis added]).

Significantly, the Court held that "the Constitution lays no constraint on the authority of one Legislature by enactment of general law to make provision prospectively for allowances to be received by the officers and members of the two houses during a succeeding legislative term or terms" (New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Steingut, supra, at 261 [emphasis added]).

Later, in Dunlea v Anderson (66 NY2d 265, supra), this Court upheld the salary increase for legislators in the 1985-1986 fiscal year, authorized by the Laws of 1984. The Court reaffirmed that article III, § 6 "does not prohibit one Legislature * * * from increasing the salaries of the next term's members. Neither its language nor the intention of its drafters compel a contrary interpretation" (Dunlea v Anderson, supra, at 268). Indeed, the Court noted that when the current article III, § 6 was approved, the Constitution was specifically amended to provide the flexibility of allowing a salary to be fixed by legislators themselves:

"The purpose of empowering the Legislature to determine its own compensation * * * was to avoid `repeat[ing] the error of inflexibility' that had resulted from `fixing the compensation of legislators and legislative leaders in the Constitution, and thus fail[ing] to provide for changing conditions and circumstances'" (Dunlea v Anderson, supra, at 268; see also, Finn v City of New York, 282 NY 153, 157).

Dunlea built on Steingut's holding that constitutional constraints do not generally prohibit prospective adjustments. It then distinguished Steingut by emphasizing that the judicially stricken allowances in the latter case were effective during the same fiscal year in which they were appropriated. The Court also observed that the selective awards could be directly tied to votes on particular bills and were within the unilateral control of one legislative house leader, not the Legislature itself as a bicameral Branch of the government (see, Dunlea v Anderson, supra, at 268

; see also, New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Steingut, supra, at 260).

We likewise adhere to Steingut's definitive holding and guidance, while acknowledging its key distinguishing features. Demonstrably, the "manipulation" potentiality cautioned against in Steingut is not present at all in this case. Here, the withholding-of-salary protocol is general and purely prospective (see, New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Steingut, supra, at 258

). Moreover, the statutorily authorized temporary withholding of net payments of legislative salaries operates by force of law and off a neutral...