Com. v. Bigwood

• Citation: 133 N.E.2d 585,334 Mass. 46
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Clifford BIGWOOD.
• Decision Date: 09 April 1956
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 585

133 N.E.2d 585

334 Mass. 46

COMMONWEALTH v. Clifford BIGWOOD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 6, 1956.

Decided April 9, 1956.

Joseph A. Melley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chelsea, for commonwealth.

Joseph J. Balliro, Boston, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, COUNIHAN and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

QUA, Chief Justice.

This case comes to us upon report purportedly under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 278, § 30, of the late chief justice of the Superior Court, after detailed findings by him to the effect that the defendant is a defective delinquent, an order that he be committed to the department for defective delinquents at Bridgewater, and a stay of further proceedings. In view of the requirement of § 30 that the defendant must have been 'convicted,' and in view of what we shall say presently, we incline to the opinion that the case is not properly here by report. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163, 139 N.E. 647. But as the practical result will be the same we think it proper to discuss the case on the merits.

The proceeding started in the Boston Juvenile Court with a complaint against the defendant charging him with the offence of 'contributing to the delinquency of a child, under the age of seventeen.' G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 119, § 63, as appearing in St.1932, c. 95, § 1. The definition of a delinquent child appears in G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 119, § 52, as amended by St.1948, c. 310, § 3. On November 13, 1953, the Juvenile Court, after a trial, found the defendant guilty, but imposed no sentence, and later on February 15, 1954, continued the case generally. In the meantime, on December 4, 1953, a probation officer of that court applied therein for a commitment of the defendant to a department for defective delinquents in accordance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 113, as then appearing in St.1952, c. 608, § 1. On February 15, 1954, after commitment for observation, after the return of a sworn medical certificate that the defendant was mentally defective and ought to be committed to a department for defective delinquents, and after hearing, the court found that the defendant was 'a suitable subject for the Department of Defective Delinquents' and ordered him committed accordingly. The defendant appealed from the order of commitment to the Superior Court. So far as appears no attempt was made to appeal from the finding of guilty, and it would seem that in the absence of a sentence there could have been no such appeal. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 218, § 59, as most recently amended by St.1948, c. 248 § 1; c. 278, § 18. Renado v. Lummus, 205 Mass. 155, 91 N.E. 144. The Superior Court, after hearing without jury, on January 28, 1955, made express findings of the facts necessary to be shown for commitment of a defective delinquent ¹ and ordered the defendant committed as such.

Before the order of the Superior Court St.1954, c. 685, had gone into effect, this statute made changes in G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 113, as appearing in the statute of 1952, principally in the description of the crimes with which a person must be charged in court before application can be made for his commitment as a defective delinquent. The category of such offences was limited to those more likely to affect the public safety, but no change was made in the detailed definition of what must be established to show a person to be a defective delinquent. Both statutes contain the provision that commitment as a defective delinquent 'shall be a final disposition of any criminal offense charged' and both contain provisions for appeal to the Superior Court from an order of commitment as a defective delinquent and for the framing of jury issues there 'if the appellant so requests.' Both provide that pending such appeal the appellant shall be held in a defective delinquent department 'to abide the final order of the court.' Both also provide that if after observation and examination the person is found not to be mentally defective he shall be returned to the court from which he was committed for observation 'for a different disposition of the case.'

This § 113 of c. 123 in both forms is part of a long chapter entitled 'Commitment and Care of the Insane and Other Mental Defectives' which deals extensively with various forms of insanity and mental deficiency. A defective delinquent is simply one kind of person of impaired mentality who needs confinement in an institution adapted to his condition. The place of § 113 in our statutory system was illuminated with ample citation of authority in Dubois, petitioner, 331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E.2d 920. We think it sufficient to add now that in our opinion one effect of charging the defendant with a crime under this section is to furnish the occasion for bringing up in court the issue of his mental condition. The provision that his commitment as a defective delinquent 'shall be a final disposition of any criminal offense charged' does not mean that his commitment is a sentence for an offence. Rather it means that the complaint for the offence is dismissed. It would be strange indeed if commitment for an indefinite time for any form of mental deficiency should be a punishment for crime.

It follows that the criminal complaint against the defendant was finally disposed of when he was committed by the Superior Court as a defective delinquent. That court had jurisdiction over that matter even if at the time the court acted, because of the change in the statute, an application for commitment could not have been made upon a complaint for the offence with which the defendant was originally charged. MacLennan v. MacLennan, 311 Mass. 709, 712, 42 N.E.2d 838. See Sawyer v. Northfield, 7 Cush. 490, 494-495; Wilson v. Head, 184 Mass. 515, 517 69 N.E. 317, and cases cited; McAdam v. Federal Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 537, 541, 193...