Com. v. Gaboriault

• Decision Date: 31 March 2003
• Citation: 785 N.E.2d 691,439 Mass. 84
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Brian J. GABORIAULT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

785 N.E.2d 691

439 Mass. 84

COMMONWEALTH v. Brian J. GABORIAULT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued January 10, 2003.

Decided March 31, 2003.

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David P. Hoose, Springfield, for the defendant.

Sharon L. Sullivan-Puccini, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, & COWIN, JJ.

IRELAND, J.

The defendant, Brian J. Gaboriault, was tried before a jury on two indictments charging murder in the first degree. He was found guilty based on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme cruelty or atrocity. He appeals from his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, asserting several claims of error. First, the defendant claims that the Miranda warnings he received prior to his confession were defective and his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Thus the defendant claims the trial judge erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement to police. Second, the defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in (1) withdrawing the issue of criminal responsibility from the jury's consideration; (2) failing to retain a sleep deprivation expert; (3) failing adequately to examine one of his own expert witnesses concerning the expert's opinion of the criminal responsibility of the defendant and; (4) failing to secure, and to apprise the defendant of, his right to appear at trial in an unmedicated state. Finally, the defendant also requests that we exercise our extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the defendant's degree of guilt. Because we find no merit to the defendant's claims of error and no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, we decline to exercise our § 33E power. We affirm the defendant's convictions and the order denying his motion for a new trial.

A. Facts.

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for discussion in conjunction with the issues raised. The facts of the defendant's brutal murders of eighteen year old Jennifer Pike (victim) and their infant son are largely undisputed. At the time of the murder, the defendant resided with the victims and his mother in an apartment in Fairhaven. The victim had begun dating the defendant two years earlier and had been living with the defendant for about one year. Their relationship was marked by the defendant's possessive and controlling behavior, and culminated in the victims' leaving the apartment in the days preceding the murders.

On July 6, 1996, while the defendant was at work, the victim took their baby and moved out of the apartment. The move was precipitated by increasingly disturbing behavior and threats by the defendant.¹ When the defendant heard that the victim had moved out, he became extremely agitated, asked friends to help look for her, and eventually arrived unannounced at the victim's sister's house looking for her. At some point, one friend heard him say that if the victim left him, he would "kill them all." On July 8, after arriving at the victim's parent's home and having dinner, the defendant talked to the victim about "getting back together." He promised her that he would receive counselling for his anger problems, and even had made an appointment for the next day.

Around 9 P.M., the defendant, his mother, and the victims returned to the apartment. Shortly thereafter, the victim told the defendant that, "[f]or the short time they were apart she felt like she was out of prison." Prior to returning home, the defendant had taken a large knife, wrapped it in a shirt, and placed it underneath a chair. During his confession to police, he explained that it was his plan "to take their lives" once they returned to the house.

While his mother was outside talking with a neighbor, the defendant began to stab the victim viciously. His mother heard the victim's screams, rushed in to find her being stabbed, and heard her say, "I'm dying. You're killing me." The defendant's mother proceeded to run out of the apartment and yell for someone to dial 911. After stabbing the victim seventeen times, the defendant left the room, and approached his baby lying on a bed in another room. He proceeded to stab the eight week old infant twice, the second time with such force that the knife remained lodged in the infant, impaling him to the bed.² It later took four officers to remove the dying infant from the bed, as the knife was firmly lodged in the mattress.

After removing his socks so as not to leave a bloody trail, the defendant fled the apartment. He next stopped at a friend's house and had a glass of juice with his friend's father, and eventually found his way to the cemetery where his father was buried.³ Police found him there on the morning of July 9. He received Miranda warnings from the officer who found him, Lieutenant Donald Joseph, who then contacted an officer known to the defendant, Detective Glenn Souza.⁴ During the ride to the station, the defendant indicated he wished to give a statement regarding the murders, but Detective Souza said to wait until they arrived at headquarters. On arrival, he was again given Miranda warnings. Immediately before, however, Detective Souza referred to the Miranda warnings as "just a formality." The defendant signed the Miranda form, stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to speak. However, the video camera in the interrogation room was not functioning properly and the interrogation was moved to another room, where the defendant was once again advised of his rights immediately before giving his full statement. In all, the defendant received his Miranda warnings three times prior to the videotaped confession in which he admitted to stabbing the victims.

B. Discussion.

1. Miranda warnings. The defendant first claims that the Miranda warnings were rendered inadequate by Detective Souza's description of them as a "formality." He claims that this word undercut the purpose of the rights, and relegated them to a mere preliminary ritual, devoid of substance or meaning. Additionally, the defendant claims that the word "formality" rendered the subsequent recitation in the second interrogation room invalid as well, as it created a notion in the defendant's mind that the rights were void of significance. We disagree.

In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a valid waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we "accept[] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, give[] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[] the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435 Mass. 743, 751, 761 N.E.2d 923 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 381 n. 8, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (1995). Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 725 N.E.2d 169 (2000), we held that the "history of art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] and our prior interpretations of its self-incrimination provisions ... lead to the conclusion that art. 12 provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution does." Id. at 859, 725 N.E.2d 169.

The judge found that immediately prior to the second recitation of the Miranda warnings to the defendant, Detective Souza indicated that the rights were a "formality."⁵ The circumstances surrounding this interrogation, taken as a whole, demonstrate that the use of the word "formality" did not render the Miranda warnings constitutionally inadequate. The defendant was read his Miranda warnings three times, and after all three readings, indicated a willingness to speak with the officers. The defendant also signed a Miranda card acknowledging the rights he was given, and prior to his statement never asked for an attorney or whether he could make a telephone call. Additionally, he was given more time to reflect on his waiver because of the malfunctioning video equipment in the first interrogation room. When he was brought to the second room, and read his Miranda warnings for the third time, he once again waived them. Although any use of words that characterize or minimize a suspect's Miranda rights should be avoided, we agree that in this situation, using the word "formality" did not coerce or mislead the defendant as to the rights he was waiving.⁶ We therefore find no reversible error.

Additionally, and closely related to the preceding claim of error, the defendant also contends that the entire Miranda procedure, when taken as a whole, rendered his waiver invalid. The defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 386, 668 N.E.2d 339 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 669, 651 N.E.2d 398 (1995) (Commonwealth has burden of proving validity of Miranda waiver beyond reasonable doubt). See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 366, 682 N.E.2d 591 (1997), and cases cited (court must examine totality of circumstances surrounding voluntariness of Miranda waiver). The judge's findings on voluntariness are entitled to substantial deference. See Commonwealth v. Brum, 438 Mass. 103, 113, 777 N.E.2d 1238 (2002); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85, 731 N.E.2d 1066 (2000).

While making extremely thorough and well-reasoned findings, the judge carefully considered the totality of the evidence and concluded the defendant's waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Based on the videotape recording of the defendant before, during, and after his statement, and also on witness testimony, the judge found that the defendant was coherent and not under the influence of any drug or alcohol. The judge also found that the defendant was given his Miranda warnings three times, that there was no evidence of coercion or trickery...