Com. v. Sylvester

• Decision Date: 29 June 1987
• Citation: 509 N.E.2d 275,400 Mass. 334
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Roland SYLVESTER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 275

509 N.E.2d 275

400 Mass. 334

COMMONWEALTH v. Roland SYLVESTER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued April 6, 1987.

Decided June 29, 1987.

Robert L. Sheketoff, Boston, for defendant.

Fern L. Nesson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, aggravated rape, and kidnapping. The defendant was sentenced to a term of natural life on the murder conviction, a concurrent life term on the rape conviction, and a concurrent term of 9 1/2 to 10 years on the kidnapping conviction, all to be served at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole (now Cedar Junction). The defendant filed timely appeals of his convictions. The defendant contends that trial counsel's failure to raise objections to the trial judge's charge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He challenges the jury instructions as creating a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in various respects. He claims that the instruction on joint venture diluted the Commonwealth's burden of proof and that the instructions with regard to voluntary intoxication not only erroneously required a higher level of intoxication but also shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. He finally claims that the jury verdict is flawed as it is impossible to ascertain whether it was unanimous.

On April 26, 1984, the defendant and John Murray ¹ met the victim at "The Raft," a lounge in Lowell, and later drove her to the defendant's apartment. In a statement that the defendant gave to the police, ² he claimed that both men had consensual intercourse with the victim then forced her to have sex with them. They then tied a bandanna around her mouth, forced her into the defendant's car, drove her to the river, pulled her from the car, bound her hands and feet and threw her into the river. He further stated that they watched her struggle for about five minutes until she disappeared under the surface of the water and they left. In his testimony at trial the defendant repudiated his statement and claimed that he never had intercourse with the victim, that he drove Murray and the victim to the river but fell asleep and did not know what happened to the victim until later when Murray responded to his inquiry about the victim by saying that she was "floating down the river."

Because the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, we will review the convictions under the broad standard of G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there is a "substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice has occurred." Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584, 433 N.E.2d 425 (1982).

1. Jury Instructions. a. Voluntary intoxication. The defendant claims that the judge's charge required the jury to find extreme drunkenness before considering intoxication in relation to premeditation. He further claims that the charge imposed a requirement that the jury find significant impairment before weighing the effect of the voluntary intoxication on the defendant's mental state with regard to extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Commonwealth contends that the instructions merely directed the jury to consider what effect the intoxication, if any, had on the defendant's capacity to deliberate or to reason. Since the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder by reason of both premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, we need only consider either ground and, therefore, we analyze the instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty.

While voluntary intoxication cannot be used to excuse criminal conduct, Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 455, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (1984), the jury may consider the defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether the defendant murdered with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649, 433 N.E.2d 446 (1982). Furthermore, the jury may consider evidence of the defendant's intoxication with regard to whether the prosecution has proved specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, where specific intent is an element of the crime. Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 593-594, 476 N.E.2d 947 (1985). ³

The defendant claims that the judge's charge on intoxication as it relates to extreme atrocity or cruelty was erroneous as it required the jury to find "significant impairment" before they could consider that factor. ⁴ In Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 685, 405 N.E.2d 927 (1980), this court held that a defendant's mental state is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant's acts were "so shocking as to amount to extreme atrocity or cruelty." "Impairment of a defendant's ability to make a decision in a normal manner may have a direct bearing on the degree of murder, and consequently, on the issue of extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id. at 686, 405 N.E.2d 927. Consequently, evidence of intoxication triggers the defendant's entitlement to the jury's determining "as one of the circumstances or facts in the case whether the defendant was so intoxicated at the time the murder was committed that his criminal culpability should be reduced." Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 649, 433 N.E.2d 446 (1982). Mental impairment, whether it be from mental illness or intoxication, is one factor for the jury to consider in relation to extreme atrocity or cruelty. See Commonwealth v. Perry, supra; Commonwealth v. Gould, supra. We have, however, previously upheld a charge instructing the jury "that mental impairment due to intoxication could be relevant to the manner in which murder was committed only if the jury found that [the defendant's] mental capacity was 'substantially' reduced by consumption of alcohol." Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 880, 507 N.E.2d 699 (1987). There is no material difference between the charge here and the one upheld in Commonwealth v. Sinnott, supra.

The defendant further claims that the language of the instruction referred to above shifted the burden of proof to the defendant . We disagree. "[I]ntoxication is not a defense to murder in the first degree that the Commonwealth must disprove. In this respect, it is quite unlike that narrow category of defenses (such as self-defense) that by their very nature negate essential elements of the crime and for this reason their nonexistence must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Costello, 392 Mass. 393, 405, 467 N.E.2d 811 (1984). Moreover, "we have expressly disavowed any intent to ... 'transform an evidentiary factor which the jury can consider into an entirely new element of the crime of murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty.' " Commonwealth v. Sinnott, supra, 399 Mass. at 879-880, 507 N.E.2d 699, quoting Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 228, 449 N.E.2d 658 (1983).

With regard to the charge of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge in the present case clearly stated that the impairment was merely a factor to be considered in determining "whether or not, given the totality of all of the circumstances, those facts indicate extreme atrocity or cruelty." He included an extensive charge on the Commonwealth's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of the defendant's innocence, and the fact that "[t]he defendant has no burden of disproving anything." Thus, viewing the instructions as a whole, on this aspect of the case, they did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.

b. Joint enterprise. The defendant claims that the judge's charge regarding joint venture diluted the Commonwealth's burden of proof, particularly by illustrating joint venture with a case, Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 30, 340 N.E.2d 524 (1976), where the Appeals Court upheld a conviction because there was evidence, "although scanty," that would permit the jury to infer that the defendant was acting as a "lookout." Id. at 31-32, 340 N.E.2d 524. ⁵ The Commonwealth claims that the instruction was in fact more favorable to the defendant than required.

Under a theory of "joint venture," the prosecution must prove that the defendant "intentionally assisted the principal in the commission of the crime and that he did this, sharing with the principal the mental state required for that crime." Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 26, 478 N.E.2d 727 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 307-308, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973). This court has held that the "jury may infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense." Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 470, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). In the present case, the judge charged the jury extensively on "joint venture" (covering seventeen pages of transcript). He instructed that mere acquiescence in the crime was not enough. ⁶ In response to the jury question during deliberation, the judge cautioned the jury that mere presence would not suffice.

Federal courts have rejected the use of instructions in conspiracy cases which state that "slight evidence" is enough to support a finding that an individual was a member of a conspiracy . ⁷ United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 13 n. 3 (1st Cir.1984). United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846, 100 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed.2d 59 (1979) (Malatesta II ). The Federal courts found that the use of the words "slight evidence" might imply that the degree of proof was less than for other crimes, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In view of the charge as a whole in the present case, however, the judge's reference to "scanty evidence" did not create an impression that the degree of proof was less than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, there was no error.

2. Verdict unanimity. The defendant...