Commonwealth v. Gomez
| Decision Date | 24 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | 16-P-898 |
| Citation | 91 Mass.App.Ct. 1133,87 N.E.3d 115 (Table) |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William GOMEZ. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
The defendant, William Gomez, after a jury trial, was convicted of four charges: negligent operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor so as to endanger the public causing serious bodily harm, G. L. c. 90, § 24L(1) ; operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor with a child under fourteen in the vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24V(a ) ; wantonly or recklessly permitting bodily injury to a child in his care and custody, G. L. c. 265, § 13J(b ) ; and wilfully misleading a police officer in a criminal investigation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B. He now appeals his convictions, alleging multiple errors by the judge and the prosecutor. He also challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Background. 1. The Commonwealth's case. The jury were warranted in finding the following facts. On January 13, 2012, the defendant drove his car to pick up his friend, Luis Parraga, at Parraga's place of work. The defendant and Parraga had been friends for eight or nine years, having met through mutual friends, and the defendant once lived with Parraga for eight months. They frequently got together to drink alcohol. Parraga, an immigrant from Ecuador, did not own a car, did not have a driver's license, and did not know how to drive. He had never driven the defendant's car.
On that day, the defendant and Parraga drove to the home of Antonio, the defendant's brother. The defendant's five year old stepson, Alex,2 was also present. Although Alex had a booster seat that was available for the defendant to use when he had Alex with him, the defendant did not have the booster seat in his car on that day. The defendant drove to Antonio's home, where he, Parraga, and Antonio consumed "a lot" of alcohol.
Sometime later, the defendant abruptly left his brother's house after an argument. The defendant placed Alex in the back seat of his car, Parraga got in the front passenger seat, and the defendant drove away. Parraga, who was unfamiliar with the area, testified that the defendant was driving "very fast" down a street and that the car hit a pole. As the rear door on the driver's side was the only door that could be opened, Parraga and the defendant exited the car through it. Parraga, an undocumented immigrant, was scared of being arrested, and told the defendant he was going to leave. The defendant told him to "just go." Parraga was stopped by police a few blocks away; he told them he left the scene of the accident because he was nervous. He also told them that the defendant was driving, giving officers the defendant's name.
Police officers and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) responded to the scene after 911 calls from people living in the neighborhood. The defendant, whose speech was slurred and who smelled of alcohol, told the EMTs that he was not driving. He did not clearly answer their questions about Alex or how the accident had happened. He responded "no" when asked if Alex had been restrained prior to the accident. A responding officer also noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from the defendant. Asked if he had been driving, the defendant responded, "No, the other guy," and did not give Parraga's name.
Immediately following the crash, Alex had visible injuries to his forehead and began to vomit. He was taken by ambulance to Boston Children's Hospital, where scans showed a blood clot in his head and injuries to his bowel. During the ambulance ride, Alex was disoriented and vomited continuously. He was admitted to the intensive care unit and immediately taken to the operating room. Due to a hole in his intestine, pieces of his bowel needed to be removed. He was also placed on a breathing machine. After being released a week later, Alex was readmitted for further emergency surgery due to a bowel blockage that had developed. During that time, Alex was unable to eat food or drink liquids. The physician testified that Alex's injuries were "life-threatening" and that "he would have died had he not had surgery."
2. The defendant's case. The defendant testified in his own defense. He stated that he had known Parraga for three or four years, had lived with him for a period of time, and that they worked together. He claimed that on the day of the crash, he told Parraga, whom he had let drive his car previously, to drive because Parraga seemed less drunk than he was. He stated that it appeared that Parraga was awake prior to the crash, but the crash was so sudden that the defendant could not tell if Parraga was sleeping in the moments just before. The defendant testified that after the crash, Parraga wanted to leave, so he told Parraga to "just go" because he was focused on Alex. He told the responding officer that the driver was "the other guy that was with me," but did not provide Parraga's name. He stated that when asked who the driver was, he gave the police officers Parraga's nickname, and told one officer that the driver's name was Luis. He also admitted that he was negligent for not calling his wife to pick him up at his brother's house, and for not having an appropriate booster seat for his stepson to sit in.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to prove (1) that he was the driver of the vehicle, (2) that Alex suffered a serious bodily injury, and (3) that he wilfully intended to mislead the police.
Because the defendant's argument is limited to the claim that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty at the end of the Commonwealth's case, "we consider only the evidence introduced up to the time that the Commonwealth rested its case, and the defendant first filed his motion [ ]." Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150 (1976). "The sole question raised ... is whether ‘there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt to warrant the submission of the case[ ] to a jury.’ " Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Altenhaus, 317 Mass. 270, 271 (1944). We must determine "whether the evidence, in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth ... is sufficient ... to permit [any rational trier of fact] to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged." Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 740 (1975). "Inferences drawn from the evidence are permitted if reasonable, possible, and not unwarranted because [the inferences are] too remote." Commonwealth v. Murphy, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 904 (1991), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 739 (1989).
a. Operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor. To establish the defendant's guilt for operating under the influence in a negligent manner causing serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant "(1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way, (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (4) operated a motor vehicle recklessly or negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered, and (5) by such operation so described caused serious bodily injury." Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 463 (2010). See G. L. c. 90, § 24L(1). As noted above, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence as to the first and fifth elements.3
Regarding the first element, operation, there was direct evidence, through Parraga's testimony, that the defendant was driving the vehicle prior to the crash. In addition, there was other evidence presented from which a jury could infer that the defendant was driving, namely that it was the defendant's car, that Parraga did not have a license and did not know how to drive, and that the crash occurred near the defendant's brother's house, an area with which Parraga was unfamiliar. Insofar as the defendant argues that the only evidence that he was the driver was presented through the testimony of Parraga, who he alleges had "reasons to lie," and points to evidence he claims proves that Parraga was the driver, his argument is misplaced. The jury were entitled to credit Parraga's testimony. See Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass 267, 272 (1992).
In addition, the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden of proof regarding the fifth element of G. L. c. 90, § 24L(1), requiring the Commonwealth to prove that someone suffered serious bodily injury. Serious bodily injury is an injury that "creates a substantial risk of death ... or the loss or substantial impairment of some bodily function for a substantial period of time." G. L. c. 90, § 24L(3), inserted by St. 1986, c. 620, § 17. Here, there was testimony that Alex would have died of his injuries without surgical intervention. On the way to the hospital, Alex vomited continuously, requiring medical intervention to keep his airway and breathing unobstructed. In addition, after the surgery, Alex's gastrointestinal system was unable to function normally for nearly a month, during which time he was unable to eat or drink. Thus, the evidence of serious bodily injury was sufficient to submit that issue to the jury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jean-Pierre, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 162-164 (2005) (); Commonwealth v. Baro, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 218, 219-220 (2008) ().
b. Impeding a criminal investigation. With regard to a violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, under the "misleading" prong, as relevant to this case, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant "(1) wilfully mis[led] (2) a police officer (3) with the intent to impede, obstruct, delay, harm, punish, or otherwise interfere thereby with a criminal...
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