Commonwealth v. Magnus M.

• Citation: 461 Mass. 459,961 N.E.2d 581
• Decision Date: 06 February 2012
• Docket Number: SJC–10875.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MAGNUS M., a juvenile.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

461 Mass. 459

961 N.E.2d 581

COMMONWEALTH

v.MAGNUS M., a juvenile.

SJC–10875.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Submitted Nov. 7, 2011.Decided Feb. 6, 2012.

Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Craig R. Bartolomei (Amy E. Winston with him) for the juvenile.

Barbara Kaban, Erica Cushna, & Gloria Tan, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

CORDY, J.

This case, here on the reservation and report of a single justice, requires us to decide whether G.L. c. 119, § 58, empowers a Juvenile Court judge to continue a delinquency case without a finding and place the juvenile under the supervision of the probation department, notwithstanding a jury's prior verdict of delinquency. Based on the text of the statute, its placement within the broader statutory scheme, and the underlying philosophy of our juvenile justice system, we conclude that it does.¹

1. Background. The facts are not in dispute. On February 10, 2010, the juvenile was charged in a complaint with being a delinquent child for having violated G.L. c. 266, § 16, by breaking and entering a motor vehicle in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony. He was arraigned and entered a plea of “not true.”

In May, 2010, the juvenile elected to be tried on the complaint by a jury. The trial commenced and concluded on September 29, 2010, with the jury returning a verdict of “delinquent.” That same day, the judge who presided at the trial issued an order, over the Commonwealth's objection, that the juvenile's case be continued without a finding to April 19, 2011, and that the juvenile be placed under the supervision of the probation department with certain conditions.² The judge concluded that this disposition was authorized by G.L. c. 119, § 58 ( § 58), and was “consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile delinquency system.”

The first paragraph of § 58 reads, in relevant part: “At the hearing of a complaint against a child the court shall hear the testimony of any witnesses who appear and take such evidence relative to the case as shall be produced. If the allegations against a child are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, he may be adjudged a delinquent child, or in lieu thereof, the court may continue the case without a finding and, with the consent of the child and at least one of the child's parents or guardians, place said child on probation....”

The Commonwealth asks that we interpret § 58 as “restrict[ing] the authority of the Juvenile Court to continue delinquency proceedings without a finding only when the child tenders a pretrial plea or submission.” To that end, it urges us to interpret the introductory phrase of § 58—“[a]t the hearing of a complaint”—as limiting the application of its first paragraph to pretrial proceedings. In presenting its argument as such, the Commonwealth does not address the more relevant question whether § 58 allows a judge to continue a juvenile delinquency complaint without a finding after a jury trial. We proceed to address both questions, concluding that § 58 is not confined to pretrial proceedings and does attach to jury trials.³

2. Discussion. When interpreting any provision governing juvenile delinquency proceedings, we are guided by the two legislative pronouncements housed within G.L. c. 119, § 53. See Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1959) ( Metcalf ). The first is the mandate to construe the sections liberally so that children “as far as practicable, ... shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.” G.L. c. 119, § 53. The second is the clear directive that proceedings against children “shall not be deemed criminal proceedings.” Id.

From these pronouncements, the principal aim and underlying philosophy of our juvenile justice system become clear. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 666–667, 374 N.E.2d 272 (1978) ( Police Comm'r ); Metcalf, supra at 651–652, 156 N.E.2d 649. This is not a punitive scheme strictly akin to the adult criminal justice system. Rather, it is primarily rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences between juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward “the correction and redemption to society of delinquent children.” Metcalf, supra at 651, 156 N.E.2d 649. See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.3 at 18 (2d ed. 2006) (“The rationale of [the dual system for adult and juvenile offenders] is diminished culpability: deviant behavior of children may be regarded as generally less culpable than similar adult behavior for the reason that a child's capacity to be culpable ... is not as fixed or as absolute as that of an adult”). As a result, we have allowed “certain basic changes in the traditional method of dealing with criminal offenders,” Metcalf, supra, and empowered Juvenile Court judges with “very broad discretion ... with regard to disposition.” Police Comm'r, supra at 667, 374 N.E.2d 272.⁴

With these principles in mind, we turn now to the language and structure of § 58, presuming “as we must, that the Legislature intended what the words of the statute say.” Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713, 905 N.E.2d 90 (2009), quoting Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687, 488 N.E.2d 401 (1986). “Where a statute fails to specifically define its terms, ‘we give them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose.’ ” Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 361, 937 N.E.2d 441 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369, 361 N.E.2d 1239 (1977). We also interpret “words in a statute ... in light of the other words surrounding them.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428, 319 N.E.2d 901 (1974).

Because neither party contests that the plain language of § 58 provides for a continuance without a finding in some circumstances, we first focus our attention on the central dispute: does the phrase “[a]t the hearing of a complaint” encompass trial proceedings? The words “hearing” and “trial” are commonly ascribed different meanings,⁵ yet they may, at times, “overlap.” McArthur Bros. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 140, 83 N.E. 334 (1908). Given the context of the phrase, which properly informs our interpretation, we conclude that the Legislature intended such overlap in this instance.

The Legislature did not refer solely to a “hearing” in § 58. Rather, it referred to “the hearing of a complaint,” and couched the language used to describe such a hearing in terms indicative of a trial: at this proceeding, “the court shall hear the testimony of any witnesses who appear and take such evidence relative to the case as shall be produced,” and, to adjudge a child delinquent, “the allegations against [the] child [must be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” G.L. c. 119, § 58. Although parties may present witnesses and evidence at a variety of pretrial hearings, including those at which a guilty plea is proffered, the inclusion of the reasonable doubt standard is significant. “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is not a common standard in most pretrial hearings and is not the standard employed to determine whether a judge may accept a guilty plea. It is, however, the standard employed to determine whether the Commonwealth at trial has proved that a child is delinquent. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 376 Mass. 632, 635–636 n. 4, 382 N.E.2d 725 (1978). The most natural reading of its appearance in § 58, then, is that the phrase “the hearing of a complaint” encompasses trials, and, consequently, that the statute permits a judge to grant a continuance without a finding after a trial on a juvenile delinquency complaint. See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, supra at § 1.73 at 331 (“A continuance without a finding is a permissible dispositional option either where there has been an admission to sufficient facts or a trial”); K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 60.45 (3d ed. 2007) (“If there is a trial on a complaint and the child is adjudged a delinquent child, the judge may continue the case without a finding”).

The structure of § 58 further supports this conclusion. Section 58 is separated into three paragraphs, with the provisions at issue appearing in the first. The second and third paragraphs delineate the various sentencing options available once a child has been adjudged a delinquent child (second paragraph) or a youthful offender (third paragraph).⁶

Read together, these paragraphs evoke a clear progression. In the first paragraph, the Legislature dictates the manner in which a juvenile may be adjudged delinquent: the complaint must be heard, the testimony of witnesses and evidence may be taken, and the allegations must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. G.L. c. 119, § 58. Once these conditions are met and the juvenile is formally adjudged delinquent, the second paragraph takes effect and the judge may place the case on file, place the child in the care of a probation officer, or commit the child to the Department of Youth Services. Id. To apply the first paragraph solely to pretrial proceedings and the second to posttrial proceedings would disrupt the logic of this statutory scheme. It would also, in effect, remove from G.L. c. 119 any provision governing a trial whereby a child may be found delinquent after the presentation of witnesses and evidence, based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, if the first paragraph of § 58 is confined to pretrial pleas or submissions, the provisions of G.L. c. 119, § 55B—which purport to govern pretrial pleas—would be rendered redundant. In that section, the Legislature has dictated that a child “shall plead not delinquent ... provided, however, that a child with whom the...