Wallace W. v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 09 August 2019
• Docket Number: SJC-12669
• Citation: 482 Mass. 789,128 N.E.3d 581
• Parties: WALLACE W., a juvenile v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

482 Mass. 789

128 N.E.3d 581

WALLACE W., a juvenile

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC-12669

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued April 4, 2019.

Decided August 9, 2019

Peter A. Hahn, Newton (Lauren E. Russell, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the juvenile.

Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney (Heidi Sylvanowicz, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

K. Hayne Barnwell, Boston, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

KAFKER, J.

The recent amendment to G. L. c. 119, § 52, excludes from the definition of "[d]elinquent child," and thus from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, children who commit "a first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment." The meaning of the term "first offense" under the statute is the central issue of this case.

A delinquency complaint issued against the juvenile that charged him with a misdemeanor that carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment of less than six months. He moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that because he had not previously been adjudicated delinquent for any offense, the charge was a "first offense" under § 52 and must be dismissed. A Juvenile Court judge denied the motion, concluding that because the juvenile had previously been charged with a separate offense for which probable cause had been found, the new charge was not the juvenile's "first offense" under the amended statute. The juvenile filed a petition for relief in the county court, and the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court.

For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that the amendment to § 52 was plainly designed to give juveniles a "second chance" with regard to a "first offense of a misdemeanor" that carries a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment or a fine (six months or less misdemeanor). In other words, the Legislature intended to excuse a juvenile's first isolated instance of such misconduct. This means that the Juvenile Court may not exercise jurisdiction where the juvenile's first offense is one such misdemeanor. Once a juvenile has committed his or her "first offense," however, the Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses not otherwise excluded under § 52, including subsequent six months or less misdemeanors. We further conclude that, consistent with the purpose of the statute and the rule of lenity, the term "first offense" under § 52 means a first adjudication of delinquency.

We recognize, however, that, as a practical matter, this interpretation presents certain challenges. Because the statute excludes a "first offense" of a six months or less misdemeanor from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, it is difficult to establish that a first offense has ever occurred. Indeed, where a juvenile's commission of a six months or less misdemeanor constitutes his or her "first offense," it would be dismissed under § 52 before ever reaching the adjudicatory stage of the proceeding. Because there would be no record of an adjudication of delinquency, every subsequent commission of a six months or less misdemeanor would seemingly have to be dismissed as a "first offense" under § 52. As we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to create this type of "Catch-22" situation, but rather intended to excuse only a first offense while providing the Juvenile Court with jurisdiction over repeat juvenile offenders, we define here the means by which a first offense, even one that did not result in a prior delinquency adjudication, may be proved and recorded such that the Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over subsequent offenses.

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment vacating the order denying the juvenile's motion to dismiss the delinquency complaint and remanding the matter to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^{1 ,2}

Background. For the purposes of this appeal, the parties agreed to the following facts. In late August 2018, the juvenile was arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 10. Following the juvenile's arrest, the arresting officer filed an application for a delinquency complaint. The court activity record information (CARI) database revealed that the juvenile had a court history that included several dismissed drug charges, a dismissed charge of operating a motor vehicle without authority, and an open case for breaking and entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony. Probable cause had been found on one or more of these previous charges. A delinquency complaint on the new charge subsequently issued, and the juvenile was scheduled for arraignment.

Prior to arraignment, the juvenile moved to dismiss the complaint under G. L. c. 119, § 52, arguing that because he did not have any prior delinquency adjudications, and because the maximum punishment for unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle is a fine, see G. L. c. 90, § 20, the charge was a "first offense of a misdemeanor" under § 52. Accordingly, he argued, the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter. The motion judge disagreed, concluding that the new charge was not the juvenile's "first offense" under the statute because a clerk-magistrate had made a prior finding of probable cause on at least one of the juvenile's prior offenses. The judge denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and proceeded with the arraignment.

The juvenile thereafter filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3 ; the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court.

Discussion. 1. Statutory background. The Juvenile Court "is a court of limited jurisdiction, which has no ... authority in the absence of a specific statutory authorization" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 167, 40 N.E.3d 544 (2015). The Juvenile Court's statutory authorization to govern delinquency proceedings is found in G. L. c. 119, §§ 52 et seq. See G. L. c. 218, § 60. The court may only exercise jurisdiction, however, over delinquency complaints charging juveniles with offenses identified under § 52's definition of the term "[d]elinquent child." G. L. c. 119, §§ 52 - 58. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 642–643, 715 N.E.2d 455 (1999) ("a child can be adjudicated a delinquent only after proceedings upon a complaint alleging the child to be a delinquent child within the meaning of § 52").

The scope of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings underwent a substantial change in July 2018, after the Legislature enacted St. 2018, c. 69, entitled "An Act relative to criminal justice reform" (criminal justice reform act or act). For over one-half century prior to the enactment of the criminal justice reform act, the term "[d]elinquent child" was broadly defined as "a child between seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth." G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 1960, c. 353, § 1. The criminal justice reform act considerably narrowed this definition by excluding children below the age of twelve and children who commit any civil infractions, or violate any municipal ordinances or town bylaws. Most relevant to this appeal, the amendment also excluded children who commit "a first offense of a misdemeanor" meeting the statutory definition. St. 2018, c. 69, § 72. The act did not define the term "first offense" or explain how such a first offense may be proved.

2. Meaning of "first offense of a misdemeanor" language. The parties offer competing interpretations of what this "first offense of a misdemeanor" language means. As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the exclusion of "a first offense of a misdemeanor" applies only, as the Commonwealth contends, to the commission of a single six months or less misdemeanor, or, as the juvenile argues, to the juvenile's first offense of every six months or less misdemeanor. More specifically, the Commonwealth argues that the exclusion under § 52 is a one-time exclusion from jurisdiction over the first time a juvenile commits a six months or less misdemeanor. The juvenile, on the other hand, argues that the exclusion applies to the first time a juvenile commits each individual six months or less misdemeanor. Under the juvenile's interpretation, a juvenile could conceivably commit every individual six months or less misdemeanor once without the Juvenile Court ever having jurisdiction. We conclude the Commonwealth's interpretation of this aspect of the statute to be correct.

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Millis Pub. Sch. v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 775, 89 N.E.3d 1170 (2018). When interpreting a statute, our primary duty is to "effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it." Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018), quoting Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737, 7 N.E.3d 459 (2014). To that end, we begin with the statutory language. See International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983) ("the primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute"). We also consider the "cause of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76–77, 948 N.E.2d 1239 (2011), quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490, 910 N.E.2d 889 (2009). In so doing, however, we are careful to "avoid any construction of...