Commonwealth v. Noonan

• Decision Date: 21 July 2014
• Docket Number: MICR1992-01300
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Bryce Noonan No. 127473
• Court: Massachusetts Superior Court

Commonwealth
v.
Bryce Noonan

No. 127473

No. MICR1992-01300

Superior Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex

July 21, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA OR FOR A NEW SENTENCE

Kenneth W. Salinger, Justice

Twenty years ago Bryce Noonan resolved an indictment for first degree murder by pleading guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder. Noonan admitted that he participated in repeatedly beating James Margeson, including with rocks and sticks, and that the beating caused severe head injuries that killed Margeson. Noonan was seventeen years old when he committed this crime.

Noonan now moves to vacate his plea, arguing it was not made intelligently and voluntarily because he wrongly believed that if convicted of first degree murder he would be imprisoned for life with no chance of parole, and also because he did not understand the elements of second degree murder. Alternatively, Noonan seeks a new sentence of time served, arguing he is being illegally imprisoned for life with no real possibility of parole. Since Noonan pleaded guilty before a judge who has since retired, his motion was assigned to another judge. The Court concludes that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing and that Noonan's motion is without merit.

1. Summary of Decision

Noonan's guilty plea was valid even though he could not have known that the maximum penalty for a juvenile who commits murder would later be reduced due to new constitutional interpretations by the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court. Noonan says he pleaded guilty to second degree murder to avoid the possibility of being convicted of first degree murder and thus subjected to a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, that such a sentence would have been unconstitutional because Noonan committed this crime as juvenile, and that Noonan would not have pleaded guilty if he knew that the threatened sentence for first degree murder was unconstitutional. The central premise of this argument is incorrect, however. At the time Noonan pleaded guilty, the mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole could constitutionally have been imposed if Noonan had instead been convicted of first degree murder. It was not until years later that imprisoning a juvenile offender for life with no chance of parole was held to constitute an unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. The fact that there has now been a material change in the law does not invalidate Noonan's plea bargain with the Commonwealth.

Nor does Noonan's claimed confusion regarding the elements of second degree murder during the plea colloquy make his guilty plea unintelligent or unjust. Noonan voluntarily and intelligently admitted to facts sufficient to establish all the elements of second degree murder. It is therefore immaterial whether those elements were properly explained to Noonan before his guilty plea was accepted.

Noonan's assertion that his sentence is unconstitutional because he has no meaningful opportunity to obtain parole is also without merit. Although Noonan filed his motion in April 2014, he relies on outdated information to argue that as of June 2013 the Parole Board's guidelines did not distinguish between juvenile and adult offenders and that the Board had never granted parole to a juvenile offender serving a life sentence. Since then the Board updated its guidelines to take into account the distinctive attributes of youth when considering parole requests by inmates who committed crimes as juveniles. Consistent with its new guidelines, the Board has granted parole, sometimes subject to conditions, to at least seven inmates sentenced to life in prison for a second degree murder committed as juvenile and to an additional inmate sentenced to life in prison for a first degree murder committed as a juvenile. Noonan has not shown that inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed when they were less than 18 years of age have no meaningful opportunity to obtain release from prison.

Finally, the fact that Noonan's first two bids for parole were denied provides no ground for the Court to release Noonan by resentencing him to time served. The Court may not second-guess the Board's reasoning in denying Noonan parole. It would violate the constitutional separation of powers for the Court to truncate Noonan's sentence on the ground that the Board erred in denying him parole.

2. No Evidentiary Hearing

The Court exercises its discretion to decide Noonan's motion without a hearing because the motion raises no substantial issue that requires further fact finding and Noonan has not shown that an evidentiary hearing would " add anything to the information that has been presented in the motion and affidavits." Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348-49, 813 N.E.2d 465 (2004) (new trial motion); accord Lykus v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 160, 163, 732 N.E.2d 897 (2000) (motion for post-conviction correction of sentence); Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(c).

The Court reaches this conclusion after carefully reviewing and considering the transcript of Noonan's guilty plea colloquy in February 1994, Noonan's affidavit (concerning his decision to plead guilty and the physical and mental abuse he suffered as a child), the affidavit of Attorney Patricia Garin (concerning the Parole Board's policies and decisions regarding offenders sentenced to life in prison for crimes committed as a juvenile), Noonan's other exhibits, and the arguments in Noonan's sixty-seven-page memorandum of law.

No evidentiary hearing is warranted because Noonan's motion is without merit even assuming that the facts and opinions submitted in support of his motion are all true and credible. See Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 44, 957 N.E.2d 1089 (2011) (affirming denial of evidentiary hearing on this ground); accord Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 349, 361, 853 N.E.2d 1079, rev. denied, 447 Mass. 1112, 856 N.E.2d 181 (2006) (" If the theory of the motion, as presented by the papers, is not credible or not persuasive, holding an evidentiary hearing to have the witnesses repeat the same evidence . . . will accomplish nothing" (quoting Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 348-49)). For the purpose of deciding this motion, therefore, the Court credits the affidavits and exhibits that Noonan submitted in support of the motion.^[1]

3. Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea

" A motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b) is the proper vehicle by which to seek to vacate a guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 344, 5 N.E.3d 530 (2014). Such a motion " is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge[.]" Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106, 907 N.E.2d 664 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 318, 649 N.E.2d 750 (1995). " A judge may grant the defendant's motion only 'if it appears that justice may not have been done.'" Id., quoting Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b).

" Due process requires that 'a guilty plea should not be accepted, and if accepted must be later set aside, ' unless the contemporaneous record contains an affirmative showing that the defendant's plea was intelligently and voluntarily made." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 Mass. 100, 102, 330 N.E.2d 155 (1975). The Commonwealth has " the burden of showing the voluntary and intelligent nature" of Noonan's guilty plea. Huot v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 91, 99, 292 N.E.2d 700 (1973); accord, e.g., Furr, 454 Mass. at 107. " A guilty plea is intelligent if it is tendered with knowledge of the elements of the charges against the defendant and the procedural protections waived by entry of a guilty plea. A guilty plea is voluntary so long as it is tendered free from coercion, duress, or improper inducements." Scott, 467 Mass. at 345 (internal citation omitted). Noonan also argues that his guilty plea was not made knowingly. " For guilty plea purposes, 'knowing' is synonymous with the 'intelligent' requirement." Commonwealth v. Hunt, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 616, 619 n.5, 900 N.E.2d 121 (2009). " Use of the term 'knowing' is but another way of describing the longstanding requirement that a guilty plea be made intelligently, i.e., with understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences of his plea." Commonwealth v. Hiskin, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 633, 638, 863 N.E.2d 978 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

a. Risk of Life-Without-Parole Sentence

Although Noonan pleaded guilty to a charge of murder in the second degree to avoid being sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole if convicted of first degree murder, and did so without anticipating that the maximum allowable penalty for a juvenile who commits first degree murder would be reduced years later to the same penalty that Noonan accepted for second degree murder, that does not mean that Noonan's guilty plea was either unintelligent or involuntary. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-58, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (guilty plea to avoid death penalty valid even though death penalty was later deemed unconstitutional).

Noonan makes no claim that the pressure of facing a more severe punishment for first degree murder, standing alone, means that his plea was involuntary or coerced. Most plea bargains allow an offender to avoid a more severe penalty. That fact does not make an otherwise voluntary guilty plea unlawful. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55; Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 709, 856 N.E.2d 857 (2006); Commonwealth v. Leate, 367 Mass. 689, 694, 327 N.E.2d 866 (1975). Instead, Noonan asserts that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent because he mistakenly believed that he was avoiding a real chance of being sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole. This claim is without merit.

Noonan's guilty plea was neither involuntary, unintelligent, nor unjust merely because he--like virtually the...