Commonwealth v. Plasse
| Decision Date | 10 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | SJC-12486 |
| Citation | 114 N.E.3d 64,481 Mass. 199 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Cayla S. PLASSE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Edward Gauthier, Greenfield, for the defendant.
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Lisa Newman-Polk, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 259, 962 N.E.2d 711 (2012), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). While the exercise of this "quintessential judicial power" is never an easy task, Rodriguez, supra at 266, 962 N.E.2d 711, it is made all the more difficult when the crime and subsequent noncompliance with probation are related to the effects of drug addiction.
The issue here arises from the judge's imposition of a sentence of incarceration following the defendant's repeated addiction-related violations of probation over a period of several years. The defendant requested the sentence in order to participate in a secure residential drug treatment program, but, after several months of serving her sentence, sought release from the alleged unlawful restraint, as well as a new sentencing hearing. She now appeals from the denial of the motion she filed pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001); the defendant contends that the judge erred in considering the rehabilitation program when setting the length of her sentence of incarceration. We conclude that in the circumstances presented, the judge did not abuse his discretion.1
1. Background. a. Initial disposition. In August 2013, the defendant stole items valued at more than $250 from a chain department store. A complaint issued approximately one month later charging her with larceny, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), and with using disguises to obstruct execution of the law, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 34. At a plea colloquy, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt with respect to the larceny charge.2 The judge then continued the matter without a finding for one year, from December 2013 through December 2014. Upon the successful completion of the one-year period of probation, the charge was to be dismissed.3
At that time, the defendant was twenty-one years old. The continuance was conditioned on the successful completion of two programs: "Stoplift," an Internet-based program designed to prevent shoplifting recidivism, and a program involving intensive supervision by the probation service known as level three "community corrections." The latter includes office visits, group meetings, and drug and alcohol screenings.
b. Probationary violations. We summarize the course of the probationary violations over the next three years as follows.
In January 2014, one month after the initial continuance was imposed, the probation service filed its first notice of violation.4 The notice related to the defendant's noncompliance with the requirements of the community corrections program and her failure to pay court-ordered fees. A second notice of violation was filed in March 2014, following a drug screening in which the defendant tested positive for the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). At a hearing concerning both of these violations, the defendant, represented by counsel, stipulated to the underlying facts. The defendant was found in violation of the terms of probation and reprobated, and the continuance -- as it was initially imposed -- remained in effect.
In April 2014, the defendant reported to the probation service and her drug screen returned a positive result for the presence of THC and cocaine. Approximately one week later, the defendant again tested positive for the presence of THC and cocaine, as well as for amphetamine and morphine. The probation service filed its third and fourth notices of violation. Counsel was appointed, and the defendant was held pending a final violation hearing. At the final violation hearing in May 2014, the judge again found the defendant in violation of the terms of probation. This time, he modified the terms of probation, requiring a substance abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation, that the defendant remain drug and alcohol free,5 and that she participate in a residential treatment program. The judge also extended the probationary period until May 2015. The defendant subsequently entered into the specified drug treatment program.
In October 2014, a warrant issued for the defendant's arrest when the probation officer became aware that she had left the court-ordered residential treatment program without authorization. The defendant was brought into court, at which time her drug screening results again were positive. She was found in violation, and was reprobated, without any further modification of the length or terms of probation.
In November 2014, another warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest, due to her failure to report to her probation officer on two occasions. The warrant remained outstanding until she came to court one month later, when she tested positive for the presence of cocaine and THC. Following a hearing in December 2014, the judge found the defendant in violation, reprobated her, and amended the conditions of probation for a second time, to require that the defendant complete a different residential drug treatment program. He also extended the defendant's term of probation until December 2015. The defendant was held in custody for several weeks until a bed became available in that program.
In January 2015, the defendant entered the second residential treatment program and remained there for approximately three months before transitioning to a sober living program. She was expelled from the sober living house shortly thereafter, as a result of using drugs. The defendant failed to report to the probation service as required, and another warrant was issued for her arrest.
At a July 2015 hearing, the judge found the defendant in violation of the terms of her probation. He again modified the terms of probation to require the defendant to reside at a third residential drug treatment program. The defendant entered that program, but later was asked to leave because of drug use. A warrant again issued for the defendant's arrest. She ceased contact with her probation officer, and with the court, for the next thirteen months.
The defendant eventually telephoned her mother, who had been actively coordinating with her probation officer in an attempt to locate the defendant throughout the prior year. The defendant reported to her mother that her drug use had spiraled out of control and that she had "hit rock bottom." In October 2016, police officers located and arrested the defendant.
As of the time of the October 2016 hearing, the defendant had been in violation of the terms of her probation during most of the three years of the repeatedly extended continuance. The probation service requested that the judge vacate the continuance and enter a finding of guilt, revoke the defendant's probation, and sentence her to a term of incarceration of eighteen months. Her probation officer reported that the defendant's family agreed that she was in "great need for treatment," in addition to needing to be held accountable for her crime.
Defense counsel represented that the defendant agreed she was "not a good candidate for probation," and that she needed a more structured environment in which to obtain treatment. Counsel therefore requested that the defendant be sentenced to a term of incarceration of "at least nine months," a period of time that he stated was sufficient for her to be assigned to, and then complete, the structured and intensive treatment program known as "Howard Street."6
Noting the defendant's failure to complete several residential treatment programs and his concern that many in her position "don't make it," the judge concluded that the defendant presented one of the rare cases in which all efforts at rehabilitation, other than incarceration, had been unsuccessful. He stated that a sentence of incarceration would be imposed "not to punish [the defendant] but to make sure that she gets through a program and is back out on the street safe and alive." Consequently, the judge revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced her to two years' incarceration in a house of correction for the underlying offense, pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1). In calculating the length of the sentence, the judge noted that the defendant would be credited with two months of "time served," took into account the potential "good time" credits that she could earn toward early release, and considered her eligibility for parole after serving one-half of the sentence. In doing so, he appeared to have reasoned that the defendant would serve approximately nine to ten months of the two-year sentence, a period of time adequate to complete the program that the defendant had requested.
Months later, represented by new counsel, the defendant sought release from the alleged unlawful restraint, as well as a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30. She argued that the judge had erred in considering rehabilitative programming in determining the appropriate length of incarceration. The motion was denied. The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court on our own motion.7
2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. We review the denial of a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 for abuse of discretion or error of law. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 681-682, 80 N.E.3d...
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