Commonwealth v. Scott

• Decision Date: 08 February 2013
• Docket Number: SJC–11094.
• Citation: 464 Mass. 355,982 N.E.2d 1166
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Lanny Steed SCOTT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

464 Mass. 355

982 N.E.2d 1166

COMMONWEALTH

v.Lanny Steed SCOTT.

SJC–11094.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued Oct. 2, 2012.

Decided Feb. 8, 2013.

Michael J. Fellows, Northampton, for the defendant.

Dianne M. Dillon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

Based on the confinement of and physical assault on his girl friend in her apartment, the defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of kidnapping, G.L. c. 265, § 26; assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, § 15B ( b ); assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, G.L. c. 265, § 13A ( b ) (i); assault and battery, G.L. c. 265, § 13A ( a ); and malicious destruction of property, G.L. c. 266, § 127. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed his convictions in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. Scott, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 1123, 2011 WL 253182 (2011). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review, limiting our review to the defendant's conviction of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury.

The sole issue before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish “serious bodily injury” within the meaning of G.L. c. 265, § 13A ( b ) (i) (statute).¹ Because we conclude that the evidence, which consisted primarily of medical records not explained by any expert witness, would not have permitted a rational jury to find that the victim suffered “serious bodily injury” resulting in “impairment of” an organ, the defendant's conviction of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury cannot stand.

Background. The jury could have found the following. In October, 2006, the victim and the defendant, who had two children, were no longer living together, but continued to maintain regular contact. On October 23, 2006, at approximately 11:30 p.m., the defendant knocked on the victim's door and she let him into the apartment. The defendant accused her of being involved with another man. When the victim admitted as much, the defendant punched her in the face and the victim fell to the floor. He picked her up, and they moved into the bedroom where they sat side by side on the bed. The defendant was “working himself up” as he sat on the bed; he then leaned over and punched the victim in the middle of her stomach.

Throughout that night and into the next day, the defendant refused to let the victim leave the apartment. Although the defendant periodically calmed down, and he and the victim spent some of the time lying next to each other on the bed, at various points over the course of twelve hours, the defendant punched the victim in the eye, hit her in the face with a can of soda, punched her in the stomach a second time, dragged her, and threatened her with a knife. When police arrived at the apartment in response to a 911 call, the defendant fled. The victim was taken to a hospital and evaluated. According to medical records admitted in evidence, the victim was diagnosed as having a “grade II” laceration of her liver.

Prior proceedings. The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the two punches the defendant delivered to the victim's stomach resulted in a laceration of her liver, which constituted a serious bodily injury because her liver (an organ) was impaired. The defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the evidence were denied. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges.

Discussion. 1. The statute.General Laws c. 265, § 13A ( b ) (i), sets forth an enhanced penalty for the commission of an assault and battery causing “serious bodily injury,” defined as “bodily injury that results in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.” G.L. c. 265, § 13A ( c ). See note 1, supra. The issue is whether the injury to the victim's liver qualifies as a “serious bodily injury.” We read the statute as setting forth three distinct routes for establishing serious bodily injury. The Commonwealth may prove that a defendant caused bodily injury that resulted either in (1) a permanent disfigurement; (2) loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb, or organ; or (3) a substantial risk of death.²

2. Impairment of an organ. Here, only the second prong of the statute, impairment of an organ, is implicated. The Commonwealth sought to establish that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim when he punched her in the stomach, resulting in the impairment of an organ, her liver. Whether a rational jury could have found that the victim's liver was impaired requires that we determinethe meaning of the term “impairment” in the context of the statute.

We interpret statutory language to give “effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature” unless to do so would achieve an “absurd” or “illogical” result. Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 251, 661 N.E.2d 931 (1996). “Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” Opinion of the Justices, 313 Mass. 779, 781–782, 47 N.E.2d 260 (1943). However, the construction of a word or phrase may vary from its plain meaning when such a meaning would “involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” Id. at 782, 47 N.E.2d 260. Technical terms or those that have acquired a particular meaning within the law should be read in a manner that is consistent with that meaning. Id.

When the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 265, § 13A, using “impairment” to define a class of “serious” injuries, it employed a term that appears in a variety of legal contexts and whose meaning in the statute could therefore be viewed as ambiguous.³ It is apparent from the language of the statute as a whole, however, that “impairment” as used in G.L. c. 265, § 13A ( b ) (i), draws its meaning from the medical context, where definitions emphasize an injury's impact on the structure of a part of the victim's anatomy and its ability to serve its usual role in the body. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 956 (28th ed. 2006) (World Health Organization defines “impairment” as “any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiologic, or anatomic structure or function”). See also American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5 (6th ed. [464 Mass. 359]2008) (defining “impairment” as “a significant deviation, loss, or loss of use of any body structure or body function in an individual with a health condition, disorder, or disease”). An impairment of an organ, therefore, occurs when damage to the structure of the organ is significant enough to compromise its ability to perform its function in the victim's body. Likewise, impairment of a limb occurs when, because of significant damage to its structure, its capacity to perform its usual function is compromised. An impairment of a bodily function arises when a part or system of the body (other than an organ or limb) is significantly impeded in its ability to fulfil its role.⁴

The degree of “impairment” contemplated by the statute is best understood when considered with the neighboring word in the same phrase, “loss,” as well as the words in the other two clauses, “permanentdisfigurement” and “substantial risk of death.” See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428, 319 N.E.2d 901 (1974) (“words in a statute must be considered in light of the other words surrounding them”); Commonwealth v. John T. Connor Co., 222 Mass. 299, 302, 110 N.E. 301 (1915) (“the scope of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the operation of other associated words”). The loss of a limb, organ, or bodily function would have a substantial impact on a victim on a par with injuries causing permanent disfigurement or risking death. See Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 313, 86 N.E.2d 65 (1949) (“if reasonably possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to accomplish its manifest purpose”). These conditions connote significant effects on the body.

We therefore reject the standard urged by the Commonwealth, that any injury will constitute an “impairment” under G.L. c. 265, § 13A, if it is “more than merely transient and trifling.” See Commonwealth v. Lord, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 265, 269 n. 7, 770 N.E.2d 520 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 621, 78 N.E.2d 697 (1948). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baro, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 218, 219, 897 N.E.2d 99 (2008) (serious bodily injury where victim suffered fractured bones on side of face, “orbital blow out fracture,” bleeding within sinuses and nasal cavity, and loss of sight in right eye for one and one-half months); Commonwealth v. Jean–Pierre, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 162, 162–163, 837 N.E.2d 707 (2005) (impaired bodily function where punch broke victim's jaw and required victim to be fed through tube for six weeks).

3. Sufficiency of the evidence. We next address whether the evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury, that is, injury resulting in the impairment of the victim's liver. We conclude that because the jury could not, without speculation, have found from the evidence presented that the nature and extent of the injury to the victim's liver was serious enough that it had a significant effect on the structure and function of her liver, the element of serious bodily injury was not established.

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we consider whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, ...