Commonwealth v. Ulani U.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-12986
• Citation: 487 Mass. 203,166 N.E.3d 430
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. ULANI U., a juvenile, & another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

487 Mass. 203

166 N.E.3d 430

COMMONWEALTH

v.ULANI U., a juvenile, & another.¹

SJC-12986

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth..

Argued January 6, 2021.

Decided April 12, 2021.

Joseph N. Schneiderman for the juvenile.

Katherine E. Burdick, for Juvenile Law Center, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Melissa Allen Celli, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

CYPHER, J.

This case concerns the application of the rules of criminal procedure regarding criminal contempt, Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 and 44, and their use in the Juvenile Court. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43, as appearing in 466 Mass. 1501 (2013); Mass. R. Crim. P. 44, 378 Mass. 920 (1979). The sixteen year old juvenile was before the Juvenile Court judge for a hearing on alleged violations of conditions of her release. After the judge set bail, the juvenile called the judge, among other things, a "dumb, white bitch." The judge found the juvenile in criminal contempt for her statement. At a subsequent sentencing hearing on the charge of contempt, taking place after a separate complaint had issued alleging common-law criminal contempt with the judge who presided over the hearing named as the complainant, the judge sentenced the juvenile to ninety days -- the maximum sentence under rule 43.

The juvenile timely appealed, and we subsequently granted her application for direct appellate review. The juvenile argues that (1) under G. L. c. 119, § 53,² it was error for the judge to hold her in summary criminal contempt, and (2) the judge violated requirements of summary criminal contempt proceedings, see rule 43, and therefore the judge should have proceeded against her in a nonsummary contempt proceeding pursuant to rule 44, the procedures of which the judge also violated. We conclude that the judge abused her discretion by not taking the juvenile's status as a child into account when she imposed the ninety-day criminal contempt sentence and that the judge did not comply with the requirements of rule 43 or rule 44.³ We therefore vacate the judgment of contempt.⁴

Background. 1. Hearing on alleged violations of conditions of release. In 2017, a delinquency complaint issued against the juvenile from the Juvenile Court, alleging attempted escape from a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility and malicious destruction of property greater than $250. The juvenile was released on recognizance with pretrial conditions of release. However, in August 2017, she allegedly violated the conditions of her release by running away from a Department of Children and Families (DCF) group home.

At the hearing on these alleged violations, the Commonwealth alleged that the juvenile was a flight risk because she ran away from her group home and because she cut off her global positioning system (GPS) monitor imposed from a different case. The Commonwealth requested bail of one dollar and that the juvenile be released only to DCF. The Commonwealth acknowledged that "DCF is reluctant or does not bail out their juveniles"; therefore, the request for bail of one dollar in effect meant a request for a detention order. See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.22 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing certain issues present with bail for juveniles). See also A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 1012, 1013 n.2, 103 N.E.3d 742 (2018). The juvenile argued against bail, and she also addressed the court herself, requesting to avoid DYS commitment and to be granted "[one] more chance to go back to the program" where she had been living. The judge imposed bail of one dollar and restricted the juvenile's release to DCF.⁵ Children often do not have funds with which to post bail, and as DCF acknowledged, it does not post bail on behalf of children in its custody. The juvenile replied:

"This is my first case. Like, I don't understand why I can't get sent back to my program. This is my first case.... My first case, girl. You don't even know me like that. You don't know me, girl. Give me the fucking papers. Fuck you.... Bitch, fuck you.... And DCF ain't paying my bill, you dumb, white bitch.... You dumb bitch."

After a recess, the judge found that calling her "a dumb, white bitch" was contemptuous conduct. She appointed trial counsel to represent the juvenile in the contempt matter, the juvenile apologized, and counsel did not present any evidence. The judge found the juvenile in criminal contempt, and she continued the matter for sentencing. A separate complaint issued alleging common-law criminal contempt with the presiding judge named as the complainant.

2. Hearing on contempt sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the judge ordered the juvenile committed to DYS for ninety days, which is the maximum possible sentence for summary criminal contempt. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 (a) (4). Trial counsel had requested that the juvenile be committed to time served of one week, noting that her other attorney was "doing a pysch eval for her in another court" and that "maybe there was a reason why she acted the way she did."

3. Hearing on motion to rewrite court order and to address court. The juvenile thereafter moved to rewrite the court order and to address the court. She wrote a letter of apology to the judge and apologized in court. The judge told the juvenile, in part, "[S]aying you're sorry ... doesn't mean that the sentence I've imposed goes away. You have to understand that when you speak like that it has consequences. And sometimes those consequences are negative consequences."

In response to a concern raised by the Commonwealth that a delinquency commitment would require DYS to have custody of the juvenile until she was eighteen, the judge ordered a revised mittimus to commit the juvenile to DYS for ninety days as a stipulation without bail.

4. Hearing on motion to vacate and motion to stay execution of sentence. The juvenile subsequently sought relief from the contempt judgment and sentence, asserting that (1) the judge did not comply with the requirements of summary or nonsummary contempt proceedings; (2) the ninety-day sentence did not account for, and was not proportionate to, her juvenile status; and (3) the ninety-day sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment. At the hearing on the juvenile's motion to vacate and her motion to stay execution of sentence, the judge resentenced the juvenile to time served and released her to her social worker.

5. Hearing on motion to correct record. The juvenile next moved to correct the record, arguing that the docket inaccurately reflected a stipulation to contempt. She contended that she did not stipulate to being found in contempt and that there was not a colloquy of the rights she was waiving, nor was there a written stipulation to the contempt. The judge denied the motion after a hearing. The juvenile appealed, and the case is now before us on direct appellate review.

Discussion. The juvenile argues that even though the judge resentenced her to time served and she has turned eighteen, the case presents a live controversy "because [she] has a continuing stake in avoiding any collateral consequences from an invalid adjudication of criminal contempt." We agree. See Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 769, 136 N.E.3d 1179 (2020) (presence of record can influence officer's decision whether to charge juvenile with crime, and "juvenile adjudications can be predicate offenses for sentencing enhancements"); Commonwealth v. Oswaldo O., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 552-553, 116 N.E.3d 35 (2018), and cases cited (defendant agreeing to continuance without finding does not make his appeal moot because adjudication of delinquency could adversely affect his outstanding request to change his immigration status); Commonwealth v. Bain, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 724, 725 n.2, 108 N.E.3d 481 (2018) (probation violation is not moot after probation period is completed because defendant faces collateral consequences and violation may be considered in future proceedings for bail, sentencing, or parole).

1. Individualized assessment of juvenile. The juvenile contends that it was error for the judge to hold her in summary criminal contempt without considering her juvenile status because under G. L. c. 119, § 53, the judge had a mandate to treat the juvenile as a child requiring "aid, encouragement and guidance." In this regard, she argues that her being an African-American girl exposes her to the risk of implicit bias, adolescent brain development makes juveniles unusually prone to emotional outbursts, and incarceration should be a last resort to avoid retraumatizing a juvenile in a form of custodial limbo.

General Laws c. 119, § 53, provides that children brought before the court "be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." We therefore "recognize that the juvenile justice system ‘is primarily rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences between juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward "the correction and redemption to society of delinquent children." ’ " See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575-576, 998 N.E.2d 1003 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461, 961 N.E.2d 581 (2012), and Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1959). See generally, R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, supra at § 1.3.

A Juvenile Court judge may impose sanctions for criminal contempt and may utilize summary contempt proceedings pursuant to rule 43 or 44. See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, supra at § 1.89.

However, "[a]s the Supreme Court recognized in [ Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ], ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,’ irrespective of the specific crimes that they have committed." Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 670, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013), S.C., ...